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Abstract 
 
CCS legislation is currently comprised of an overlapping network of international 
agreements and regional policies which form a strong basis for environmental protection 
for potential leakage of CO2 from underground storage sites. However, these legislative 
instruments form an uncoordinated legal basis for CCS with overly stringent liability 
provisions posing a significant barrier to stakeholder investment, technology development 
and future roll-out of commercial scale CCS projects. 
A number of insurance companies have recently developed different types of insurance 
mechanisms for covering CO2 storage facilities. Whilst these types of insurance policies 
are beneficial in encouraging the CCS industry in general, there are also drawbacks. 
Mostly, they only cover the CO2 capture facility during the operational phase of power 
plants or they solely cover the facility for 10 to 30 years after injection has been completed 
and storage sites have been sealed off. 
Furthermore, there is no standard regime for a comprehensive insurance mechanism for 
commercial scale CO2 storage facilities due to lack of enough information in regards to the 
long-term liability of potential CO2 leakage, type of risks involved in the technology of 
geological storage of CO2 and the likelihood of occurrence of these perceived. 
This research has identified the main risks associated with CO2 storage under geological 
formations and has developed a novel mechanism that enables the insurance industry to 
assess the risks of CO2 storage more effectively and therefore adjust their premium rates 
more in favour of CCS projects. In addition, this will also be beneficial for regulators in 
enabling them to regulate more effectively in order to incentivise stakeholder participation 
and investment in the CCS technology. The said mechanism has been developed using a 
range of systems engineering optimization techniques in order to assess the significance 
and criticality of the risks of CO2 leakage through the caprock and their likelihood of 
occurrence.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Human activities every year emit around 25 billion tons of carbon dioxide to the earth's 
atmosphere and as a result increase the level of greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased dramatically in the 21
st
 
century at rate of 2.0 ppm (parts per million) per year from 2000 to 2009 and faster since then 
(Tans and Keeling, n.d.). According to Tans and Keeling, this increase has been from 280 
ppm during pre-industrial times to 395 ppm in 2013 (Earth System Research Laboratory and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) with some researchers believing that this 
comes from anthropogenic sources (Etheridge et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global 
average temperature and sea level are rising, that is attributed to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
produced by human activities, wherein CO2 is the largest contributor (Metz et al., 2005). This 
is said to be creating a dangerous disorder in the climate closer to earth. The forests and 
oceans absorb around two to three billion (which results in the acidification of the ocean) and 
seven billion tons of this carbon dioxide every year respectively. Experts estimate that 5 to 10 
billion tons of greenhouse gas − more than 40% of the produced carbon dioxide − can be 
transported out of the atmosphere and be stored in a safe manner. 
Moreover, some say that presently the greatest environmental threat facing the globe is 
climate change (Nilsen, 2008). Climate change is caused by increased levels of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere with carbon dioxide being the significant gas causing global 
warming. This gas is produced from industries, vehicle emissions and households. According 
to the IPCC, with the development of the world economy, CO2 emissions have risen from 
280ppm level to 379ppm in the past 100 years (IPCC, 2007). Reduction in the amount of 
carbon dioxide released from industries would lead to significant cuts in levels of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere thereby helping to control global warming and save the 
environment from the devastating impacts of global warming.  
One option explored in reducing the industrial carbon dioxide emissions is CCS (Gerard and 
Wilson, 2009). Gerard and Wilson describe CCS as the process where carbon dioxide will be 
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captured from industrial sources and it is ultimately disposed of by storing it in underground 
geologic reservoirs rather than releasing it to the atmosphere. 
In this chapter, an introduction and some background information is going to be given with 
regards to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), its potential risks from different points of 
views and the way by which those risks can be potentially quantified in order to decrease 
their likelihood of occurrence as much as possible. 
There has clearly been a tangible progress in the technology to capture carbon dioxide in 
order to store underground. In addition to the increase in production of renewable energy and 
promotion of productivity and saving energy, the strategy in which storage of carbon dioxide 
will have to be carried out can be easily understood by all those who believe fossil fuels 
should also continue to exist for future generations as for the current one. 
Furthermore, this technology provides a unique opportunity to global energy infrastructure in 
order to overcome the threat that we are facing with regards to global warming. In a world 
that the amount of carbon dioxide should be heavily restricted, in order for industries such as 
coal and gas fired power stations, cement and steel plants etc. to be able to continue using 
fossil fuels as their primary source fuel, countries have to rely on technologies that captures 
CO2 from the sources and stores it deep in geological formations. 
CCS is believed by many to be a safe and low-cost solution in the reduction of carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere on a large scale (International Energy Agency, 2013, Marshall 
et al., 2007, Energy Technologies Institute, n.d.). However, CCS has to be implemented on a 
large scale for it to have a chance of reducing CO2 emissions. In the longer term, assuming 
the demonstration projects are successful, it is likely that a more integrated approach to CCS 
development using networks would bring benefits in comparison to multiple isolated 
facilities (Cockerill et al., 2011). This requires the regulators’ and insurance companies’ 
support from regulations and insurance points of views respectively. Insurance companies 
have to be comfortable and able to insure large scale CCS projects in order to encourage and 
convince stakeholders about the development and operation of CCS networks. Recent 
research showed that the extent of any network needs to be carefully considered as more than 
50% of the UK’s annual electricity derived from CO2 could currently be collected from a 
network linking just 8 current power stations, and 60% from a network of 13 power stations 
(Cockerill et al., 2011). 
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Newmark and Friedmann et al. argue that CCS is an attractive option as it will allow 
industries to continue using fossil fuels as it helps to stabilise the atmospheric levels of 
carbon emissions (Newmark et al., 2010). Moreover, they argue that CCS is both 
commercially viable and technologically feasible. 
Although CCS remains a viable option in helping stabilise the atmospheric carbon dioxide 
levels, it still has to demonstrate that it is a feasible option in terms of cost and harmlessness 
to the environment (Utility Week, 2007). This means that it has to be made sure that the risks 
associated with this technology are well understood and devise strategies to manage and 
minimise said risks which include risks to the environment and human’s health and safety 
(Farret et al., 2011). The technology of carbon capture and storage is a system with four 
interrelated elements which should be studied in understanding the risks of the technology. 
These elements include capture, transport, injection and storage. 
 
1.1. Carbon Dioxide Capture 
Carbon dioxide capture is the process in which carbon dioxide is removed from the burning 
coal, gas or biomass that is used as the fuel for power stations. Although the focus of this 
technology is mainly on power stations, but some attention is also focussed on steel, cement 
and other industrial processes. 
Carbon dioxide capture is performed using one of three technologies. They are as follows: 
 Post-combustion capture: Where the carbon dioxide is captured from the exhausts of 
coal or gas fired power stations or any other industrial plant after the fuel has been 
burnt using a specially formulated liquid (Carbon Capture & Storage Association 
(CCSA), n.d.-c). The captured carbon dioxide is then removed and compressed ready 
for transport to the storage reservoirs. 
 Pre-combustion capture: Where CO2 is separated from a mixture of hydrogen and 
CO2 before the coal or gas has been pre-heated after which the carbon dioxide is 
ready for transportation to the underground storage reservoirs.   
 Oxy-fuel combustion systems: Where the fuel is burned with oxygen instead of air 
producing a more concentrated carbon dioxide stream which makes the purification 
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process easier before the compression and transportation to storage reservoirs take 
place.  
 
1.2. Carbon Dioxide Transport 
For the plants that are not directly above underground storage reservoirs, carbon dioxide has 
to be transported from the point of capture to storage sites. There are two main methods that 
the captured CO2 can be transported which are transportation by pipelines and marine 
transportation i.e. transportation by ships.  
According to the IPCC report, pipelines today operate as a mature market technology and are 
the most common method for transportation of CO2 and therefore can be used for a means of 
transportation in a cost effective manner. However, CO2 can also be liquefied and transported 
via ships, road or rail tankers that carry CO2 in insulated tanks at a temperature well below 
ambient and at much lower pressures (IPCC, 2005). 
  
1.3. Carbon Dioxide Storage 
The storage of carbon dioxide takes place either offshore on onshore depending on the 
countries’ available onshore underground storage space. Countries such as the UK for 
example have many storage reservoirs that can be used offshore in the North Sea.  
Carbon dioxide can be stored in different locations. However, the three types of geological 
formations that have received extensive consideration are depleted oil and gas reservoirs, 
deep saline formation and unminable coal beds where CO2 is injected in a dense form into a 
rock formation below earth’s surface (IPCC, 2005).  
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Figure 1, CCS process involves CO2 capture, CO2 transport and CO2 storage (Farret et al., 2011) 
 
Figure 2 shows the ways in which carbon dioxide can be stored under geological formations 
onshore and offshore with reference to the Enhanced Oil Recovery technology (EOR). 
Depending on the nature of the geological formation, the injected CO2 will then undergo 
different kinds of changes (in other words, trapping mechanisms) which can potentially 
include changing from free-phase CO2 to CO2 dissolved in water to CO2 forming minerals 
over thousands of years. Furthermore, the four trapping mechanisms that ensure the injected 
CO2 is held in place are structural (or stratigraphical), residual, solubility and mineral 
trapping. 
In structural trapping, the CO2 is trapped at the top of an anticline or in a tilted fault block. 
The sealing rock (caprock) will then prevent the upward movement of CO2 (Cooperative 
Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Technologies (CO2CRC)). Moreover residual trapping 
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involves the trapping of CO2, in low concentration form, into pore spaces between rocks as a 
result capillary pressure from the water. Furthermore, as pressure in the reservoir increases, 
solubility of the injected CO2 in water increases. Consequently, some CO2 is dissolves in 
water and as a result, water becomes denser and begins to sink downwards. This allows for 
CO2 to become more dispersed in the water. Over time the amount of dispersed CO2 in the 
water can potentially increase (Mitchell et al., 2010). The fourth mechanism by which CO2 is 
trapped when injected in to the storage reservoir is mineral trapping. This mechanism occurs 
when dissolved CO2 reacts with minerals in the geologic formation creating carbonate 
minerals which can precipitate (Benson and Cole, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 2, Overview of ways in which CO2 can be stored under geological formations (IPCC, 2005) 
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The most important public concern regarding CCS is the risk of leakage back to the surface 
(land or water). However, no such leaks have been reported in CCS demonstration sites to 
date. For example, Norway’s Sleipner gas field, which is the oldest storage site of CO2 on an 
industrial scale, was assessed recently and it was concluded that storage had been successful 
and that the site was stable and suitable for future storing of CO2. Moreover, the likelihood of 
CO2 leakage in another test site at Weyburn, Canada was determined to be less than one per 
cent in five thousand years. 
Furthermore, in an ideal scenario, a storage site will be positioned away from areas with 
seismic activity. However, in the case of countries that have been located on tectonically 
active areas, storage sites may have been located closer to potential earthquake zones. In 
October 2004, an earthquake occurred close to the Nagaoka CO2 storage project in Japan. 
Injection was subsequently stopped immediately and the site was monitored for potential 
leakages. However, no leakage was detected after monitoring and therefore, injection 
restarted (British Geological Survey). 
As we shall see later on in the thesis, leakage may theoretically occur as a result of injection 
well failures or leakage up abandoned wells − which could create a sudden and rapid release 
of CO2 – and leakage through undetected faults, fractures or through leakage wells – where 
the release to the surface is more gradual and diffuse (IPCC, 2005). 
In the CCS industry, the public, regulatory agencies, customers, governments and in-plant 
personnel require that companies demonstrate a commitment to control possibilities of 
incidents and hazards by conducting environmental, health and health related risk 
assessments. As such, this research project has concentrated only on the storage phase within 
the CCS chain by studying the ways in which the catastrophic accidents can occur and the 
ways in which they can be quantified or estimated and then minimised as a result.  
There are several methods that can be used in analysing risks involved such as the Fault Tree 
Analysis technique (FTA), Life Cycle Assessment (LCA), Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) Methods among others. Some of these 
techniques have been used in other industries such as nuclear, chemical and oil and gas 
industries but have not been incorporated in analysing the risks associated with CCS even 
though the risks are similar. FTA and MCDM are examples of these methodologies which 
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have successfully been used for risk analysis and risk management in nuclear, chemical and 
waste management industries although they have not been incorporated in the CCS industry.   
 
1.4. Setting the general technical context 
In general terms, there are two main possible causes of a leak from a CCS underground 
storage facility. One is a natural occurrence related to a seismic event and/or tectonic plate 
shifting. The other is man-made and would probably arise by accident rather than through 
negligence. 
Earthquakes or seismicity is the vibrations or sound waves that are created when rocks slip on 
a fracture during tectonic plates’ constant moving. Natural leaks from a subterranean rock 
store are more probable after an earthquake or a major landslip. The shock waves crated as a 
result of the seismic events might create exit routes through the rocks, so dislodging the 
stored gas. 
As mentioned before, the captured CO2 from sources is injected to underground storage 
reservoirs with high pressure. This high-pressure injection of the gas underground generally 
does not in itself cause a significant earthquake, but can cause the rocks to slip on a fracture, 
which therefore causes an earthquake. This is because the injection or withdrawal of a fluid 
underground has an impact on the pressure balance – where injection or withdrawal of a fluid 
causes an increase in pressure above the natural pressure, the likelihood of causing a slip (and 
therefore an earthquake) is greater (Carbon Capture & Storage Association (CCSA), n.d.-b). 
Historically, many activities have involved injection and and/or withdrawal of fluids 
underground such as oil and gas production, geothermal energy production and water 
injection. These activities all have the potential to cause insignificant earthquakes (less than 
4.0 on the Richter scale) as a result of the mechanisms described above that are not normally 
felt by humans. Moreover, according to research conducted by the Department of Natural 
Resources and the South Carolina Geological Survey, thousands of earthquakes are recorded 
every day with magnitudes of less than 3.0 on the Richter scale and 55,000 recorded between 
3.0 to 4.9 on the Richter scale every year that can be felt but cause little or no damage 
(Department of Natural Resources and South Carolina Geological Survey, 2005). 
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The rock strata containing the captured carbon dioxide using CCS are usually of sedimentary 
type and are from the era that oil was created. Furthermore, they may have a dip or slope 
upwards towards the surface and as a result may cause the gas to seep out along the strata to 
the atmosphere. It may be difficult to follow a rock stratum through the ground to ensure 
there are no escape routes. 
The rocks that will hold the captured CO2 possibly held oil before, and may crack from any 
settlement after the oil is withdrawn. This cracking may lead to the leakage of any gas that 
has been stored there. The pressure on the gas might force it to other areas, where it could 
escape from the lower rocks into the upper ground and thus into the atmosphere. Gas is a 
fluid and can travel, unlike nuclear waste which is immobile. 
Water erosion of the rock strata might create weaknesses and exit routes for the gas. In 
limestone and sandstone, weathering during previous glacial periods might create clints (as in 
limestone pavements) which the gas could use, or where fractures could occur. Furthermore, 
man-made leaks are possible, for example, after another borehole is put down into the gas 
holding strata by mistake. Moreover, high pressure carbon dioxide might leak up beside the 
main injection pipe, pushing out the drilling mud lining the well hole. 
In addition, if a drilling hole is not properly filled in and capped after drilling ceases, then it 
might provide a simple route for high pressure gas to escape. Existing or new coal mines in 
the same area might also cause settlement of the gas holding strata, and allow an escape of 
gas through the cracked rocks. 
Future search for water or coal might lead to a new well inadvertently being drilled through 
the CCS strata and cause the stored carbon dioxide to leak.  
It is also foreseeable that in some areas in order to use heat pumps in heating houses from hot 
underground rocks, borehole providing domestic heating might interfere with the CCS 
storage reservoirs and cause leakage. 
For the above reasons, careful planning and technical expertise that exist within the industry 
sector are more than a match for the technical possibility of leakage established in the above-
mentioned anthropogenically-induced scenarios. 
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1.5. Carbon Capture and Storage in the EU 
The European Union (EU) prides itself on taking a leading role in combating climate change 
and as such is working to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across all of its Member States. 
Green technology is seen as a lynchpin to its strategy going forward. Among low carbon 
strategies, CCS is seen as a key contributor and the EU and selected Member States have 
been broadly reasonable and helpful in taking steps to advance this technology. Accordingly, 
the European Union wishes to see 20% of greenhouse gas emissions captured using this 
technology by 2030 with the percentage contribution to rise over a further two decades. 
However, no low carbon technology is without its challenges. Otherwise, it would already be 
well-established. In relation to CCS, risk analysis and risk management measures around 
leakage of carbon dioxide are precisely that challenge.  
Thus far, the Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament’s (CCS Directive) underlying 
regulatory approach places a high technical and financial risk burden on industry 
participation in CCS, featuring uncapped and uncertain long term liability. This is out of step 
with other regulatory permit-based frameworks (i.e. for oil and gas, nuclear power and waste 
management industries). Equally, the EU, and, as a consequence of its regulatory framework 
− a number of her Member States − are not giving the financial assurances to an industry that 
are already being granted in other competing states (i.e. Canada, Australia, the United States 
of America and Norway).   
As such, the UK, a Member State that is known for its commercial pragmatism, may wish to 
consider these factors in its CCS Directive transposition strategy. For example, the 
requirement that storage site operators provide financial security for a worst case scenario 
with an additional 25% contingency added on top is but one illustration of the challenges that 
industry may face in implementing the CCS Directive. Another example concerns the 
apparent requirement that private sector actor’s must purchase Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) allowances if a leak occurs at some point in the future. There is a significant likelihood 
that allowances will increase in price in the future and though it is unlikely that a leak of the 
kind that gives rise to liability under the Liability Directive would arise, if it did then the cost 
of allowance purchases would outstrip any gains from the introduction of CCS in the ETS. 
What is more, as these allowances are meant to address climate change mitigation and the 
Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament (Environmental Liability Directive) 
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already regulates the main environmental impacts associated with climate change, industry is 
in effect, made to pay potentially twice over for the same leak. 
One means of developing greater confidence in the technology is for regulators to cultivate a 
sense that CCS is not a high risk activity. In turn, this will lead to the development of a 
nascent CCS insurance market which in turn would solve a range of current stakeholder 
challenges around risk and liability. 
 
1.6. Timeline of the Development of EU Policy Measures Regarding CCS 
to Date 
Certain EU legislative instruments that have a bearing on CCS began as early as 1996. What 
follows is a list with the subject matter of the instruments generally being clear as to their 
application. 
 Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances 
 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (EU ETS Directive). 
 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 
85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 
2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, European 
Union. 
 Commission Decision of 30 June 2009 establishing a template for National 
Renewable Energy Action Plans under Directive 2009/28/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. Member states have until June 2010 to produce their 
plans.  
 Regulation (EC) No 663/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 establishing a programme to aid economic recovery by granting 
Community financial assistance to projects in the field of energy (European 
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Parliment, 2009b).  
 Report from the Commission of 27 April 2010 to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery 
(European Parliment, 2010b) − Not published in the Official Journal 
Report offers a state of play on the implementation of the European Energy 
Programme for Recovery (EEPR). Following assessment of the 87 proposals, the 
Commission decided to grant funding to 58 projects, of which 6 are for the carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) sector. As soon as the award decisions had been adopted, 
the Commission started to make the individual legal commitments. In the case of the 
OWE and CCS, the legal commitments take the form of grant agreements, to be 
signed by the Commission and the beneficiary. This process is well under way and the 
Commission considers that all the adopted projects will have legal commitments by 
the 31 December 2010 deadline set by Regulation (EC) No  663/2009 (European 
Parliment, 2009a). 
 On 10 November 2010, the European Commission has adopted the Communication 
"Energy 2020 − A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy" (European 
Parliment, 2010a) 
 CONFERENCE − Building Public Awareness of CO2 Capture and Storage, Draft 
Programme,  23 Nov 2010 
 European Commission’s Guidance Document 1 (GD1) on the CO2 Storage Life Cycle 
Risk Management Framework addresses the overall framework for geological storage 
in the CCS Directive for the entire life cycle of geological CO2 storage activities 
including its phases, main activities and major regulatory milestones (European 
Parliment, 2011a) 
 This Guidance Document 2 (GD2) builds on the first Guidance Document (GD1) that 
has laid out the overarching framework and nomenclature for the entire life cycle of 
geological storage activities including its phases, main activities and major regulatory 
milestones. This non-legally binding document provides guidance on (European 
Parliment, 2011b): 
o Site selection; 
o Composition of the CO2 stream; 
o Monitoring; 
o Corrective measures. 
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 This Guidance Document 3 (GD3) addresses the issue of transfer of responsibility for 
all legal obligations from a site operator to the Competent Authority or Authorities 
(CA or CAs) (European Parliment, 2011c). 
 This Guidance Document 4 (GD4) is part of a series of four Guidance Documents 
each covering different aspects of the geological storage of CO2. GD4 is to provide 
guidance on Article 19 financial security and Article 20 financial mechanism 
(European Parliment, 2011d). 
 
1.7. Aims and objectives of the research 
1.7.1. Aims of the research 
The aim of this research project is to assess the main risks associated with the storage phase 
of CCS projects and after doing so, quantify them using different risk analysis methods. In 
order to do so, risks of carbon dioxide storage have been analysed from a qualitative and 
quantitative points of views.  
With regards to the qualitative risk analysis, the long-term liability of carbon dioxide storage, 
the regulatory and legislative challenges that storage site operators face have been studied 
and analysed. In addition, a comparative study was conducted as part of this research in order 
to compare the regulatory and legislative challenges between different competing states with 
the UK. 
After doing so, a comprehensive literature review was conducted as part of this research 
project which revealed that extensive research had been carried out in order to evaluate the 
risks associated with CCS projects qualitatively whereas there had not been a great deal of 
effort spent on quantifying those risks in order to estimate the probability/likelihood of 
occurrence, criticality and their subsequent effect on the environment. As a result, this project 
quantified the risks described in the available literature using five different methodologies. 
These methodologies each quantified the risks of carbon dioxide storage from different points 
of views since they each represented a different notion of risk analysis.   
The results of this study will consequently be used by the insurance companies in order to 
calculate and estimate the probability of an undesired event, identify safety critical 
functions/components/phases and assess the effects of design changes. This will in-turn be 
 33 
used in order to enable them adjust their present terms and premium rates when insuring CCS 
projects against its associated risks. Moreover, the findings of this project will help regulators 
and policy makers better understand and hence legislate more effectively to address the risks 
associated with CCS projects. 
 
1.7.2. Objectives 
The objectives of this research project are predominantly to: 
1. Study the regulatory and legislative aspects of carbon dioxide storage, more 
specifically with regards the long-term liability of storage sites and the potential 
leakage of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere and the ocean. 
2. Study the ways in which other states address the issue of long-term liability  
3. Study the risks associated with carbon dioxide storage 
4. Conduct consultation amongst experts within academia and the industry 
5. Collect data on risks associated with the storage phase of CCS 
6. Study the ways by which other industries similar to CCS address those risks  
7. Evaluate methodologies in order to quantify the risks discovered  
8. Select methodologies that are most suited to perform quantitative risk analysis on 
carbon dioxide storage 
9. Perform quantitative risk analysis in order to estimate likelihood and criticality of the 
said risks: 
 Conduct a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) in order to map all the risks involved in 
this project. 
 Perform risk analysis using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and 
Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP). 
10. Draw conclusions with regards to the risks involved in the storage phase of CCS and 
their probability and likelihood of occurrence along with their criticality in 
comparison with each other. 
11. Use results in order to assist the insurance industry and regulators to gain a better 
understanding of the risks involved and their significance in terms of likelihood of 
occurrence and their potential to cause harm to the environment.  
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Items 1, 2, 3 and 6 have been addressed in chapter 3 of this thesis. Furthermore, item 4 has 
been addressed in chapter 5 and items 7 and 8 in chapters 2 and 4. Moreover, item 9 has been 
explained in detail in chapter 6, Appendix I and Appendix II. Finally, items 10 and 11 have 
been addressed in chapters 7 and 8 of this research thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RISK ANALYSIS
 36 
2 RISK ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter falls into nine different sub-sections. The chapter will first begin by looking at 
the meaning of the word “Risk” and different approaches that exist when it comes to 
analysing the risks involved in a project (section 2.2). Moreover, this chapter will then 
present some possible risks that exist within CCS projects and the way in which they 
compare with the risks in other industries (section 2.3). It will then look at the importance of 
insurance in the CCS industry and examines the current stage at which the insurance industry 
is at with regards to insuring CCS projects (section 2.4). 
Furthermore, some background information about the analytical methods that were used 
within this thesis in order to quantify the importance of the risks involved when it comes to 
storing carbon dioxide deep under geological formations is going to be presented followed by 
the justification for the use of the said methods. 
It should be noted that this research project has solely focussed on the storage aspect within 
the CCS chain. 
 
2.2 Approaches to Risk Analysis 
The word “risk” has varying meanings depending on different contexts. To a common man, 
risk simply is the concept of probability and severity of an outcome. For example, people do 
not view death from the impact of an asteroid very risky since the likelihood of such event 
occurrence is considered to be very small. However, people consider death and injury from 
criminal related activities as very risky and are widely feared since the occurrence of these 
events is frequent as reported in the media. Risks involve both adverse results and uncertainty 
of their occurrence. According to Diakaki et al., risk changes as the related information 
becomes more specific. In other words, as more information on a certain event becomes 
clearer, the risk associated with that event may increase or decrease (Diakaki et al., 2006).   
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The term risk is used in everyday conversation to mean the chance of a disaster. When the 
term is applied in risk assessment processes, it implies a more specific definition. The widely 
accepted definition of risk is a combination of chance, or frequency of occurrence of a 
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of an event (Schwartz et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, a hazard is described as the potential to cause harm. It is also defined as a 
situation or property that in specific circumstances could lead to harm.  
Risk assessment is used in a variety of professions such as environmental management where 
it is used to examine environmental problems. Problems such as environmental 
contamination due to introduction of toxic substances in the environment are complex 
situations that results in worldwide effects. For a long time, environmental risk assessment 
methodologies have emphasised examination of the impacts of a problem to the health of 
humans but more efforts are being made to ensure that risk assessments methodologies assess 
the ecological effects of any undertaking. Environmental risk assessment evaluates the 
chances that undesirable effects occur on the environment or the human health as a result of 
exposure to physical, biological or chemical agents. The evaluation requires an understanding 
of the undesirable impacts that could result from exposure to chemical agents. In addition, the 
evaluation requires the knowledge of the duration and intensity required to cause adverse 
impacts on the environment and the population.   
Risk assessment is a necessary tool for organizing, structure and compiling scientific 
information to enhance the ability of identifying hazardous situations, predict potential 
problems and set out priorities. It also helps provide a foundation for regulatory control and 
identification of corrective actions. According to some scientists, the basic principle in risk 
assessment holds that some risks can be tolerated given that nothing is usually wholly safe. 
The risk assessment process involves a series of actions starting from hazard identification, 
exposures assessment, dose-response assessment and risk characterization. 
Hazard identification entails identifying the potential adverse effects which a substance has 
an inherent capacity to cause (European Parliment, 1994). Exposure assessment' is the 
determination of the emissions, pathways and rates of movement of a substance and its 
transformation or degradation, in order to estimate the concentrations/doses to which human 
populations or environmental spheres (water, soil and air) are or may be exposed (European 
Parliment, 1994). 
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Furthermore, dose-response assessment involves analysis of the relationship between the 
level of exposure to a given substance, the frequency and the impact of the effect (White, 
2000). Dose-response assessment is described as an estimation of the frequency and severity 
of an adverse effect which is likely to happen to the human population or part of the 
environment following actual or envisaged exposure to a substance. In addition, risk 
characterization is simply defined as the quantification of the probable occurrence of a hazard 
following exposure to a particular substance (European Parliment, 1994). 
As described earlier, CCS is a system having four elements; capture, transport, injection and 
storage stages. The capture stage involves tapping carbon dioxide produced from industrial 
facilities to ensure that these emissions are not released into the atmosphere. On the other 
hand, in the transportation stage, carbon dioxide is condensed or compressed and carried by 
pipes or ships to the storage site where it will be injected and stored underground. When 
using a pipe to transport the gas, valves, transitional storage and re-compression stages could 
be used to operate the pipe or to ensure the safety of the system (Farret et al., 2011). 
Transportation is followed by injection and Farret explains that the study of the injection 
stage is important as it joins the injection well to the main tube used to transport the gas 
(Farret et al., 2011). When drilling a well, there is a particular zone within the rock which 
appears and is known as the Excavation Damaged Zone (EDZ) which may act as a leakage 
path in future in addition to the gates used in the transportation pipe (Amann et al., 2009). 
The storage stage is the last phase of the CCS system and the most important matter that 
should be considered here is the long-term development of the storage reservoir. This brings 
the need to understand the type of systems used in CCS projects as this helps predict the 
behaviour of the system.  
Risks arising from systems failure to humans and the environment result from external forces 
acting on the system, resisting its goals and trying to divert the system from its objective 
(Ondrey, 2011). Risk analysis of a system involves defining what can go wrong, how likely is 
it that this event can occur and what the consequences would be should it occur. The biggest 
risk identified in geological storage of carbon dioxide underground − similar to nuclear and 
chemical waste management industries − is leakage of material. Leakage can occur as a result 
of many reasons such as poor quality or aging injection well completion (DiCosmo, 2011). 
Leakage can also happen in abandoned wells or due to inadequate caprock characterisation. 
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Moreover, inconsistent and inadequate monitoring can also lead to leakage of CO2 (Bode and 
Jung, 2006). 
In addition to the potential risks of leakage of carbon dioxide from the geologic reservoirs − 
therefore making CCS not achieve the envisioned role of atmospheric greenhouse gases 
stabilization − Gerard and Wilson describe other risks to the environment. Given the volume 
and the properties of carbon dioxide, the risks associated with CCS will vary depending on 
the stage at which the project is at and the local and regional geology (Gerard and Wilson, 
2009). Rootzén et al., observed that the risks of CCS may reduce with the passage of time 
(Rootzén et al., 2011). Large surface leakages of carbon dioxide can result in direct risks to 
the health of humans, both through immediate deaths resulting from asphyxiation or impacts 
of prolonged exposure to high concentrations of carbon dioxide (Graus et al., 2011). Seepage 
of carbon dioxide over a long period of time into the subsurface would result in devastating 
harm to the fauna and flora of the area (Gerard and Wilson, 2009). Consequently, this could 
disrupt the local ecology and agriculture. This is because living organisms play a critical role 
in breaking down the organic materials to provide the required nutrients for plant growth. 
However, these microorganisms require oxygen for respiration as they are aerobic. The other 
potential risk associated with CCS is that although the gas can stay in the reservoir for a long 
time, however, it has a potential of displacing saline water into the potable groundwater 
aquifers (Gerard and Wilson, 2009). Moreover, the injection of carbon dioxide into 
geological reservoirs can trigger ground heave and seismic events. Gerard and Wilson 
observe that the probability of the risks described occurring as low. However, they assert that 
managing CO2 injection to guarantee human and ecological safety is critical for the  success 
of the program (Gerard and Wilson, 2009). 
 
2.2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Storage of carbon dioxide in deep underground geological reservoirs uses many technologies 
that have already been developed for use in the nuclear and oil and gas industries. Past 
experience from oil and gas production, natural gas storage and acid disposal, form a basis 
from which the risks of geological storage can be evaluated (Benson, 2006). Benson further 
explains that industrial use of carbon dioxide in various applications offers guidelines for safe 
handling of carbon dioxide (Benson, 2006). Assessment of the risks of CCS is informed by 
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wide knowledge developed over the last century on effects of carbon dioxide on humans and 
the occupational safety in handling CO2 in industrial settings. In addition, studies on carbon 
dioxide release in volcanic settings have also enhanced risk assessment in CCS projects 
(Aksu et al., 2010).  
In risk assessment, two quantitative methods are used to estimate the risks of a constructed 
structure to man and the environment. These are probabilistic and deterministic approaches. 
In assessing the risks, the first step is to dissect the whole system into the basic elements. The 
idea behind this approach is that a system’s behaviour can be understood clearly from the 
basic elements that make up the whole system because of lack of adequate data on the 
behaviour of a system (Kirchsteiger, 1999). As described earlier in this chapter, risks from 
systems to humans and the environment result from external forces acting on the system and 
resisting the objectives of the system. In a CCS project, external forces such as a leak can act 
on the system preventing it from containing the CO2 in the geological reservoir. This calls for 
the development of methodologies that can be used to respond to the questions of what can 
go wrong, how likely is it that an event can occur and in case it occurs, what are the potential 
consequences (Ingelson et al., 2010).  
A CCS system may behave in a deterministic, probabilistic or a chaotic behaviour. These 
types of systems have been discussed in section 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.2 Deterministic and Probabilistic Systems 
Kirchsteiger describes a deterministic system as one which is predictable since they follow a 
well-known rule. In a deterministic system the components of the system can be described at 
any time in the future and the past (Kirchsteiger, 1999).  
The other type of system is known as a probabilistic system which has some degree of 
uncertainty in telling how they will behave in future (Glessner and Young, 2008). A CCS 
system is a probabilistic system since the behaviour of the system cannot be clearly described 
and this can only be predicted through the use of past knowledge or experience. Furthermore, 
another type of system is known as a chaotic system which is difficult to predict since they 
depend on small variations in the current state.  
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In reality, it is assumed that physical systems flow in a deterministic way. Thereby this 
method assumes that causes have effects and likewise effects have causes which results in a 
deterministic flow of events which facilitates perfect prediction of risks without having to use 
probabilities. The deterministic flow of events is shown in the figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 3, Flow of physical reality versus reconstruction of reality by risk analysis (Kirchsteiger, 
1999) 
 
Risk analysis calls for reconstruction of the reality by responding to the three questions 
described above either by quantitative methods or by qualitative ones. To respond to the 
question of what can go wrong requires a qualitative analysis which enhances the ability to 
identify and rank all the possible failure mechanisms which can result in system failure 
(Nordhaus and Pitlick, 2009). 
In the second and third questions, qualitative and quantitative analyses have to be employed. 
Consequently, deterministic and probabilistic methods can be used in risk assessment in 
conjunction with each other. Kirchsteiger explains that probabilistic methods are used to 
reconstruct the reality in cases where incomplete information on the initial conditions of a 
flow of events is available (Kirchsteiger, 1999). 
 
2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Deterministic and Probabilistic Methods 
Tables 1 and 2 show some of the advantages and disadvantages associated with probabilistic 
and deterministic risk analysis methods. Unfortunately, there is always some degree of 
uncertainty when analysing CCS systems and that is the reason why one has to rely on pre-
Causes/Evolution of Causes 
Accident 
Consequences 
Risk Analysis 
Reconstruction of Reality Reconstruction of Reality 
Time 
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existing information in order to calculate the probabilities and therefore predict or estimate 
the likelihood of an undesired events occurrence.  
 
Risk Assessment 
Method 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Deterministic 
 The resulting assessment and the 
process of decision making are 
usually relatively clear and simple. 
 Systems analysis and the calculations 
are well defined. 
 Answer to decision makers is either 
safe or not safe (Kirchsteiger, 1999) 
 Relatively easy to conduct with little 
effort. 
 Suitable to be used by engineering 
personnel who have wide knowledge 
of the design of plant and operations. 
However, having experience in 
performing risk analysis is not 
necessary. 
 It relies on the past experience 
which in most cases is usually held 
by a particular person or company 
(Ondrey, 2011). 
 Lacks an explicit consideration of 
the different types of probabilities. 
 Lacks consistent information on the 
particular criteria or assessment 
results. 
 It is not possible to rank the risks 
 Since the deterministic method 
relies on the worst case scenario, 
there is a danger that systems 
evaluated using this method are 
over-stated in terms of the safety 
levels or protection levels (Ha-
Duong and Keith, 2004). 
 The method is only sufficient for 
crude identification of internal 
safety management but cannot be 
used for risk assessment of events 
with off-site consequences. This 
makes the approach not feasible for 
use in the assessment of risks from 
CCS project since this can be 
widespread (Kirchsteiger, 1999). 
Table 1, Advantages and disadvantages of a deterministic approach to risk assessment 
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Risk Assessment 
Method 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Probabilistic 
 Integrative and quantitative 
thereby it allows ordering of 
results and issues, and explicitly 
considers and treats all types of 
uncertainties. 
 Cost effective to the regulatory 
authorities since it ensures that 
resources are directed in dealing 
with the critical safety issues 
 The results of the assessment can 
be communicated clearly and on a 
well-defined basis. 
 It can be used when the amount of 
data is insufficient. 
 Issue of absolute accuracy is not 
usually an issue even when the 
information is limited thereby it 
helps to make well informed 
decisions in choosing operation or 
design alternatives (Kirchsteiger, 
1999). 
 It is a time consuming and 
complex method in decision 
making. Consequently, the 
assumptions, methods and results 
used in risk analysis require a 
person with a background in 
mathematics. 
Table 2, Advantages and disadvantages of a probabilistic approach to risk assessment 
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2.3 Possible Risks Involved in CCS 
Having studied the available literature associated with the CCS technology, table 3 was 
produced showing some of the possible risks involved in the entire CCS process from 
technical, financial, environmental, safety issues to regulatory and legislative ones. In some 
cases, some comparable work that has been carried out in different (yet similar) industries has 
also been shown such as the Nuclear, Chemical, Oil and Gas and Waste Management 
(Landfills) industries as well as, EOR and EGR.   
 
Risks Type of Risk Comparable Industries 
Site selection Technical 
Nuclear new build/high level waste 
storage and wind farm siting 
Injecting operation Technical 
Enhanced oil recovery (EOR), 
Enhanced gas recovery (EGR), Coal 
bed methane recovery (CBM) 
Closing well Technical Oil industry 
Stewardship Technical Oil industry 
Consistency of CO2 cap (cap might 
fracture or become faulty) 
Technical EOR 
Economical profit Financial/Monetary All industries 
Certainty of investment Financial/Monetary All industries 
Local/regional hazards Environmental 
Oil and Gas, Nuclear, Landfill, EOR, 
EGR and CBM etc. 
Quantitative estimation of CO2 
emission reduction 
Environmental EOR 
Health and Safety issue of area Safety and Public/Institutional barriers 
Oil and Gas, Nuclear, Landfill, EOR, 
EGR and CBM etc. 
System safety Safety and Public/Institutional barriers 
Nuclear, EOR, EGR, CBM, Chemical 
etc. 
Geotechnical safety Safety and Public/Institutional barriers EOR, EGR and CBM 
Long-term reliability Safety and Public/Institutional barriers Nuclear waste and Landfill 
Legislation (Environment, Safety and 
Energy) 
Safety and Public/Institutional barriers 
Oil and Gas, Nuclear, Landfill, EOR, 
EGR and CBM etc. 
Communication with society Safety and Public/Institutional barriers All industries 
Table 3, Some of the potential risks that exist within CCS projects 
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2.4 Insurance in carbon capture and storage projects 
Given the risks associated with the CCS technology and the relative advantages of this 
technology in controlling climate change, it is critical that this technology is implemented on 
a large scale. However, it is critical to offer insurance as an incentive to companies adopting 
this technology since in this way they will be able to share the liabilities resulting from any of 
the risks. Moreover, provision of insurance will give confidence to the public and the society 
in general in that they would be adequately compensated in an event of potential failures in 
this technology (Pritchard, 2005). Ruquet observes that insurance companies are realigning 
themselves to offer insurance for risks on carbon capture and storage in case the technology 
becomes the primary method of controlling climate change (Ruquet, 2010). Ruquet further 
states that commercial insurance coverage purchased to cover power, utility and energy 
clients could be converted into a service to cover CCS clients against the risks (Ruquet, 
2010). He however also noted that these discussions are still at an early stage. 
One means of developing greater confidence in the CCS technology is for regulators to 
cultivate a sense that CCS is not a high-risk activity. In turn this will lead to the development 
of a nascent CCS insurance market, which in turn would solve a range of current stakeholder 
challenges around risk and liability.  
In discussing CCS long-term liabilities, The EU Guidance Document 4 (GD4) demonstrates 
the knowledge that a risk-sharing approach, such as commercial insurance or risk pooling, 
would be preferable. However, since they perceive that CCS technology is not well 
developed and lacks a long empirical history, they posit that a risk-sharing approach would 
create a high degree of uncertainty in estimating probabilities and magnitudes of potential 
leakages. 
This research project aims to provide the insurance industry with the necessary tools in order 
to increase their confidence when insuring CCS projects. This will be achieved by providing 
them with different potential failure mechanisms that can occur in the storage phase (mainly 
after storage has been completed and storage site has been sealed off) together with the 
probability and likelihood of the said risks occurring along with the significance of these risks 
should they occur. This will enable the insurance industry to be able to focus more on the 
risks that have higher significance and probability of occurrence. 
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It has to be noted that, some risks might not have high probability of occurrence but might be 
very significant. In other words, some risks may be very unlikely to cause the carbon dioxide 
to leak from storage reservoirs and therefore harm humans and the environment but should 
they do so, then they would have catastrophic consequences with potentially very high 
leakage rates. 
One of the challenges that exist in this case is the uncertainty in the way in which the 
insurance industry should interpret the results achieved by these types of quantitative risk 
analyses in order to adjust their premium rates accordingly. This is something that has to be 
addressed in future research and indeed is going to be addressed to some extent within this 
thesis. 
With regards to the CO2 storage facility insurance, it has to be noted that, there are currently 
insurance companies that cover risks associated with operational and decommissioning 
activities but not the post-closure risks. However, this might change should a regularity cap is 
introduced to be put on the risks. More information with regards the current insurance market 
has been given in section 4.2.1 of chapter 4. 
 
2.5 Modes of decision-making 
When one is required to make a decision, one is faced with either a continuous or discrete 
space. Furthermore, decisions that have to be made may be dependent on a single criterion or 
it can well be dependent on multiple criteria. These criteria can be quantitative, qualitative or 
a combination of both. Of course, the method of decision making needed to be used in each 
will have to be different. 
In discrete spaces with a single criterion, decision making is simple and convenient. An 
example of this is when one is required to choose the shortest route out of n number of routs. 
This selection is done very easily since it is a quantitative one. However, when the selection 
needs to be a qualitative one, then it is a much harder task to choose between one another. In 
this case, firstly, the term “shortest distance” has to be defined and then the available options 
have to be ranked according to their distance. In case of having multiple criteria, in addition 
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to the above problem, the conversion of the criteria also adds to the challenges that one has to 
overcome.  
According to Haimes et al., the term risk assessment means identifying “risk scenarios”, i.e., 
determining what can go wrong in the system and all the associated consequences and 
likelihoods (Haimes et al., 2002). They further explain that the steps after determination of 
what can go wrong are to generate mitigation options, evaluate each in terms of its cost, 
benefit and risk trade-offs and then decide which options to implement and in what order 
(Haimes et al., 2002). Therefore, ranking the risks associated in any project in accordance 
with their criticality and importance can help in deciding which risk scenarios contribute 
most towards the main risks so that more attention can be focused on them. 
The need for ranking the risks arises in a variety of situations. The following are a few 
examples where risk ranking is not only desirable but essential: thousands of military and 
civilian sites have been contaminated with toxic substances; myriad sources of risk are 
commonly identified during the development of software-intensive engineering systems; and 
each year thousands of the space shuttle’s mechanical and electronic components are placed 
on Critical Item List (CIL) to identify items that contribute significantly to program risk. 
The common element in such risk identification procedures is the need to establish prioritise 
among a large number of individual contributions to the overall system risk. A dependable 
and efficient ranking of identified risk elements can be a step toward systemic risk reduction. 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method was invented to attempt to solve such 
problems. 
 
2.6 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a mathematical method that derives ratio scales 
from paired comparisons. AHP was first introduced by Professor Thomas. LC. Saaty in 
1970s, however, its extensive review in academic and professional circles was done in mid-
1980s. Numerous articles have been written and many expert analyses have been carried out 
with regards to the effective and broad spectrum of this method. AHP is used in many fields 
such as strategic marketing, resource allocation, technology selection, risk 
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analysis/assessment, marketing strategies, asset allocation and evaluating of engineering 
projects, production and operations management, assessment of personnel as well as 
economic, political and sociological issues. The advantages of this theory are many and the 
concept is very easy. Furthermore, this method can be easily applied in order to solve 
complex problems whether they are multi-objective, multi-variable or multi-time problems. 
Moreover, AHP can lead one to a detailed understanding of the goal of the problem and 
stabilise judgments. 
Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) methods which deal with the problem of 
choosing an alternative from a set of alternatives are characterised in terms of their attributes. 
Usually, within MADMs a single goal exists which can be of two different types. The first 
type is where the goal is to select an alternative from a set of scored alternatives based on the 
values of their importance/significance. The second type of goal is to classify alternatives, 
using a kind of role model or similar cases. MADM is a qualitative approach due to the 
existence of criteria subjectivity (Saaty, 1978a). When using this method, the decision maker 
has to define a ranking mechanism for the criteria as importance or weights. There are many 
forms for expressing these weights, but the most common are: Utility Performance Function, 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1978b, Yager, 1978), and Fuzzy Version of the classical 
linear weighted average (Baas and Kwakernaak, 1977, Baldwin and Guilg, 1979). AHP is a 
multi-criteria decision method that uses hierarchical structures to solve complicated, 
unstructured decision problems, especially in situations where there are important qualitative 
aspects that must be considered in conjunction with various measurable quantitative factors.  
The AHP method is useful and effective way to prioritise between a set of alternatives taking 
into account certain criteria which will have to be defined. Furthermore, because of the 
sophisticated nature but yet ease of use and applicability to a wide range of decision-making 
problems, AHP has been popular amongst scientists from different fields. 
Yu et al. applied the AHP method in order to select a suitable site for the geological storage 
of carbon dioxide in Taiwan taking into account different criteria such as economics, safety 
requirements, storage effectiveness and storage capacity (Yu et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
Promentilla et al. have used AHP along with its more generalised approach, Analytical 
Network Process (ANP), and have as a result analysed and therefore proposed potential CO2 
sources and sinks in a CCS system (Promentilla et al., 2013). In addition, Tan and 
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Promentilla proposed a modified form of AHP for ranking storage sites upon introduction of 
new information (Tan and Promentilla, 2013).  
The AHP technique has also been used extensively in other research areas in the field of 
energy. Kagazyo et al. used AHP in order to evaluate and prioritise energy-related projects 
taking into account technological issues as well as resources and social aspects (Kagazyo et 
al., 1997). They further subdivided each category forming a tree-like hierarchy with nineteen 
energy-related characteristics and seven environmental characteristics in order to evaluate 
research projects and as a result have identified short, intermediate and long-range strategies 
for Japan, short and intermediate range strategies for less developed countries and 
intermediate and long-range strategies for all other countries (Kagazyo et al., 1997). 
Others have used different applications of the AHP in order to perform analyses such as to 
assess domestic solar heating systems (Mohsen and Akash, 1997, Chedid, 2002), evaluate 
and allocate energy resources (Ramanathan and Ganesh, 1995a, Ramanathan and Ganesh, 
1995b), prioritise public transportation plans (Poh and Ang, 1999, Tzeng et al., 2005) and 
environmental cost analysis (Huang et al., 1997, Huang et al., 1996).  
Moreover, in another study, Lee and colleagues analysed the potential competitiveness of 
Korea’s ability in the development of hydrogen energy technology using the AHP technique. 
Furthermore, Aragonés-Beltrán et al. used an AHP/ANP approach in order to assist a Spanish 
solar power investment company to decide whether or not to invest in a particular solar-
thermal power plant project and if so, to prioritise the projects in the company’s portfolio 
(Aragonés-Beltrán et al., 2014). 
The AHP method – described in detail in sections 2.6 and 3.4 of chapters 2 and 3 respectively 
− has been used in this study in order to evaluate the importance of each risk element within 
the fault tree that was developed – shown in figure 7 in section 4.3 – in comparison with 
other risk elements. However, since the AHP method is not a scientific method and can be 
inaccurate at times, it was decided to use the TOPSIS and PROMETHEE methods in order to 
test the robustness and validate the AHP method and to inspect whether or not they produce 
different results to the AHP method. The said two methods have been described in chapter 7 
and the calculation steps have been described in section 10.1.1 of Appendix I.  
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The AHP method has been used in order to calculate importance weights for each risk 
element within the fault tree developed in this project − using the output of the ‘expert 
consultation’ stage of this study − and therefore, assess the likelihood of the said risks.  
The AHP is based on four main axioms (Saaty, 1980): 
1. Given any two alternatives (or sub-criterion), the decision-maker is able to provide a 
pairwise comparison of these alternatives under any criterion on a ratio scale which is 
reciprocal. 
2. When comparing two alternatives, the decision-maker never judges one to be 
infinitely better than another under any criterion. 
3. One can formulate the decision problem as a hierarchy. 
4. All criteria and alternatives which impact a decision-problem are represented in the 
hierarchy. 
 
2.6.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Table 4 shows the general advantages and disadvantages of the AHP method. 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 Hierarchical structuring of a 
decision problem 
 Combining multiple inputs 
from several persons to a 
consolidated outcome 
 Plausible results: people 
usually agree with the 
resulting priorities. 
 Calculation of results 
possible using Excel sheet 
 Pair-wise comparison 
is an artificial way of 
comparing a set of 
items. 
 If consistency index 
is above 10%, then 
problems will arise 
requesting to 
reconsider inputs 
Table 4, Outline of the main advantages and disadvantages of AHP 
 51 
Table 5 shows Saaty’s 9 point scale which is used by the decision makers when using the 
AHP method in order to compare the different alternatives in a given project in a pairwise 
manner.  
 
Intensity of 
Importance 
Invers of Intensity 
of the Importance 
Definition Explanation 
9 1/9 Extreme importance 
The evidence favouring one 
element over another is of the 
highest possible order of 
affirmation 
7 1/7 
Very strong 
importance 
One element is favoured very 
strongly over another and its 
dominance demonstrated in 
practice 
5 1/5 Strong importance 
Experience and judgment 
strongly favour one element 
over another 
3 1/3 Moderate importance 
Experience and judgment 
slightly favour one element 
over another 
1  Equal importance 
Two elements contribute 
equally to the objective 
2, 4, 6 and 8 1/2, 1/4, 1/6 and 1/8 
When compromise is needed. Can be used to express 
intermediate values 
1.1, 1.2, etc. 1/1.1, 1/1.2, etc Elements that are very close in importance 
Reciprocals  
If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal 
value when compared with i. 
Rationales  
Ratios arising from the 
scale 
If consistency were to be 
forced by obtaining n 
numerical value to span the 
matrix 
Table 5, Fundamental importance scales in AHP (Chen et al., 2007) 
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2.7 Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) 
2.7.1 Fuzzy theory 
The Fuzzy theory was developed by Professor Lotfi A. Zadeh, in 1965 (Zadeh, 1965) and it 
has been developed and used in many different fields since then such as control theory and 
artificial intelligence. Novák and colleagues mention in their book that Fuzzy logic is a 
complicated and very wide topic that deals with approximate rather than fixed and exact. 
Furthermore, they say that compared to traditional binary sets – where variables may be 
either 0 or 1 – Fuzzy logic deals with that exist within the 0 to 1 range (Novák et al., 1999).  
In his book, Hanss said that “A fuzzy number is an extension of regular number in the sense 
that it does not refer to one single value but rather to a connected set of possible values, 
where each possible value has its own weight between 0 and 1. This weight is called the 
membership function. A fuzzy number is thus a special case of a convex, normalised fuzzy 
set of a real line” (Hanss, 2005).  
 
2.7.2 Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) 
Fuzzy numbers come in the form of different shapes. These shapes are Triangular, 
Trapezoidal and Bell Shape. Among these shapes, the Triangular shape is the most popular 
shape. TFNs are fuzzy numbers that are represented with three points as follows:  
 
 321 ,, aaaA   
Equation 1, Typical triangular fuzzy number 
 
As shown in figure 4 and equation 1, TFNs can then be interpreted as membership functions. 
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Equation 2, Triangular fuzzy numbers as membership functions 
 
 
Chan et al. state that fuzzy numbers are intuitively easy to use in expressing the decision 
makars’ qualitative assessments (Chan and Kumar, 2007). A fuzzy number can be shown by 
it’s left and right number within the membership function for the lingustic values expressed 
by the experts when using the FAHP method. A typical membership function is shown in 
figure 5. 
 
Figure 5, FAHP: membership function for linguistic values (Pan, 2008) 
µA(x) 
x a1 a2 a3 
1 
Figure 4, Triangular fuzzy number A = (a1, a2, a3) 
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The AHP method − described in detail in section 2.6 of this thesis − is an effective method 
when it comes to solving problems with multiple criteria. However, there are also drawbacks 
to this method including the fact that it is unable to handle the inherent subjectivity and 
ambiguity that is associated with the experts’ perception to an exact number. According to 
Kahraman and colleagues, “although the AHP is to capture the expert’s knowledge, the 
traditional AHP still cannot really reflect the human thinking style” (Kahraman et al., 2003). 
The reason for this is that the AHP method uses an exact value to express decision 
makers’/experts’ pair-wise comparisons of the alternatives (Wang and Chen, 2007). 
In this research project, the FAHP method is used in order to rank the different risks within 
the fault tree developed in chapter 4 (Methodology chapter). Similar to the conventional AHP 
method, the Fuzzy AHP method also involves the creation of a hierarchy that includes a set 
of alternatives,  miM i ,,2,1  , criteria that are used for evaluation purposes, 
 njC j ,,2,1  , and a final weighting vector,  nwwww ,, 21   (Pan, 2008). 
Furthermore, the pair-wise comparison matrices have to be converted to fuzzy pair-wise 
comparison matrices. In order to produce these matrices, the pair-wise comparison matrices 
that were used for the AHP method in section 2.6 of this chapter are going to be used. These 
matrices are created in the exact way that the AHP matrices are created.  
This step involves the pair-wise comparison of the members of the decision making matrix. 
These pair-wise comparison matrices are created in order to determine the relative 
preferences of the alternatives with respect to each other. The structure of a generic pair-wise 
comparison matrix comparing the different alternatives of a decision is shown in equation 3. 
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Equation 3, FAHP: Comparison matrix 
 
 55 
The Consistency Index (CI) which evaluates the inconsistency of pair-wise comparisons is 
calculated using equation 4. 
1
max



n
n
CI

 
Equation 4: FAHP: Consistency Index (CI) 
 
where   is an eigenvalue of matrix A and n is the number of columns. In addition, a 
Consistency Ration (CR) is calculated using equation 5. 
 
 RICICR 100  
Equation 5: FAHP: Consistency Reaction (CR) 
where CR is the consistency ratio, CI  is the consistency index and RI  is random index.  
Furthermore, following the construction of the hierarchy, Chen and Yang’s table (table 5) can 
be modified to accommodate the Fuzzy AHP technique which can be seen in table 6. 
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Intensity of 
Importance 
Definition Explanation 
(8, 9, 10) Extreme importance 
The evidence favouring one element 
over another is of the highest 
possible order of affirmation 
(6, 7, 8) Very strong importance 
One element is favoured very 
strongly over another and its 
dominance demonstrated in practice 
(4, 5, 6) Strong importance 
Experience and judgment strongly 
favour one element over another 
(2, 3, 4) Moderate importance 
Experience and judgment slightly 
favour one element over another 
(1,1,1) Equal importance 
Two elements contribute equally to 
the objective 
(1,2,3); (3,4,5); 
(5,6,7) and (7,8,9) 
When compromise is needed. Can be used to express intermediate 
values 
(0.1,1.1,2.1); 
(0.2,1.2,2.2) etc. 
Elements that are very close in importance 
Reciprocals 
If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it when 
compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal value when 
compared with i. 
Rationales Ratios arising from the scale 
If consistency were to be forced 
by obtaining n numerical value 
to span the matrix 
Table 6, Fundamental fuzzy importance scales in FAHP  
 
2.8 Justification for research techniques 
The information gathered in this chapter, increases our knowledge concerning issues related 
to the risks associated with the storage of CO2 underground and the ways in which these risks 
can potentially turn into hazards. However, evidence presented in the review of literature 
conducted, suggest that the majority of previous studies have analysed and assessed the risks 
associated with CO2 storage from a qualitative point of view. In other words, there has been 
little effort to date in quantifying these risks so that a better understanding of the probability 
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and likelihood of different elements of the risks and the way in which they can be managed is 
gained (either individually or in conjunction with one another). 
By improving this area of knowledge, this project aims to develop a framework in order to 
assist insurance bodies by providing them with the necessary scientific knowledge to be able 
to adjust their present terms and premium rates when insuring CCS projects against risks. 
Moreover, the findings of this project will help policy makers and regulators better tailor the 
legislation to address the risks associated with the CCS technology in general and more 
importantly the likelihood of them turning into hazards and their potential consequences. 
According to the review of available literature, the methods used within this research, namely 
the FTA, AHP and FAHP techniques have not been widely used in combination with each 
other to quantify the risks involved in industrial scale projects such as CCS. Moreover, the 
said methods have neither been previously used in combination with each other within the 
CCS industry nor have they been used on an individual basis. However, they have been used 
widely on their own within other similar industries such as the nuclear, oil and gas and 
chemical industries.  
The AHP method is an effective method when it comes to solving problems with multiple 
criteria. However, there are also drawbacks to this method including the fact that it is unable 
to handle the inherent subjectivity and ambiguity that is associated with the experts’ 
perception to an exact number. According to Kahraman and colleagues, “although the AHP is 
to capture the expert’s knowledge, the traditional AHP still cannot really reflect the human 
thinking style” (Kahraman et al., 2003). The reason for this is that the AHP method uses an 
exact value to express decision makers’/experts’ pair-wise comparisons of the alternatives 
(Wang and Chen, 2007). 
In order to find a solution to this matter, Buckley developed the Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (FAHP) method (Buckley, 1985). This method was then developed by many 
(Boender et al., 1989, Chang, 1996, Cheng, 1997, Barzilai, 1997, Chen, 2000, Hsieh et al., 
2004, Gu and Zhu, 2006, Zeng et al., 2007, Wang et al., 2007) and different applications 
thereof have been used in many different sciences by different researchers (Büyüközkan et 
al., 2004, Cheng and Tang, 2009, Huang and Wu, 2005, Uberman and Ostrega, 2005, 
Aghajani Bazzazi et al., 2008, Naghadehi et al., 2009).  
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The conventional AHP method facilitates judgments and calculation preferences using pair-
wise comparisons. Nonetheless, human judgments are commonly imprecise. Hence, the 
priorities are not determined by precise numeric amounts (Herrera and Herrera-Viedma, 
2000). Zadeh developed the fuzzy theory in order to overcome imprecise judgments and 
preferences.  
Since fuzziness and vagueness are common characteristics in many decision-making 
problems, an FAHP method should be able to tolerate vagueness or ambiguity (Mikhailov 
and Tsvetinov, 2004). In other words, FAHP is capable of capturing a human’s appraisal of 
ambiguity when complex multi-attribute decision making problems are considered (Erensal et 
al., 2006). 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the AHP and Fuzzy AHP methods that were used in this study, have worked in 
parallel to each other in order to provide consultation to decision makers within the field of 
CO2 storage. This consultation will be in the form of relative importance and criticality of 
different risks that have been shown in the form of a fault tree diagram (figure 7). 
Another point that has to be taken into account is that as mentioned before, these two 
methods are used in order to rank the risks that have been shown in the fault tree of this 
research project according to their importance and criticality from different perspectives 
using the output of the expert consultation stage. Therefore, decision makers need to use 
these results to suit their needs and hence make a decision that best suits their particular 
situation. For example, in one scenario (a scenario which makes use of one of the said 
methods), criterion ‘A’ carries 70% weight, criterion ‘B’ carries 20% and criterion ‘C’ 
therefore carries 10% of the total importance weight. In this case, one can clearly decide that 
criterion A is by far the most critical criteria (in case of the CCS industry, this would be the 
risk which has the highest probability of occurrence) followed by criterion ‘B’ and criterion 
‘C’. Therefore, in the case of an insurance body wanting to insure a particular CO2 storage 
facility, most of their effort has to be put on criterion ‘A’ in order to manage the risks 
followed by criterion ‘B’ and ‘C’.  
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On the other hand, in another scenario where another one of the said methods has been used, 
this combination of importance weights might be as follows: criterion A = 40%, criterion B = 
39% and criterion C = 21%. In this case, criterion ‘A’ is still ranked as the most significant 
risk in terms of its potential negative effects on the environment. However, one cannot 
necessarily conclude that criterion ‘B’ is less significant than ‘A’ since this 1% difference 
might well be owing to the fact that the input parameters for the methods used in this study is 
based on the expert consultation stage and therefore are subjective and/or ambiguous and can 
potentially be inaccurate.  
However, on the other hand, one must also take this into account that even though the 
methods described in this thesis have previously been used in a vast number of studies but 
they are still somewhat theoretical methods. In other words, in a given scenario, an 
alternative ‘A’ might be more advantageous and desired for a decision maker than alternative 
‘B’. However, alternative ‘A’ might not be a practical or financially feasible solution for the 
decision makers to implement in their projects. 
The next chapter will present a methodological framework to identify, prioritise, assess and 
manage scenarios of risk to a large-scale system from multiple overlapping perspectives.  
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3 LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF CCS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter has been produced based on Makuch, Z, et al, Carbon Capture and Storage in 
the United Kingdom, Imperial College Press, 2011. “Carbon Capture and Storage in the 
United Kingdom” was produced as a result of a request from Scottish Power for Imperial 
College London to study the long-term liability of storing CO2 in deep geological formations 
and the ways in which this liability can be addressed and dealt with. 
Chapter 3 analyses the latest legislative and regulatory developments with regards to the CCS 
industry. The chapter falls into five sections. Firstly, the latest developments in CCS 
legislation and the underlying policy will be explored in section 4.2 followed by some 
potential forward looking scenarios. This chapter will then address specific risk-related 
financial and regulatory liability issues with regards to CCS. For example, there is discussion 
of the long-term liability of CO2 storage sites that have been sealed off after injection has 
been completed. The ways in which the regulatory and legislative aspects of CCS are 
addressed in other jurisdictions and the lessons to be learned shall be discussed afterwards in 
section 4.5. Finally, the chapter compares the CCS industry with some other industries that 
are similar to CCS with regards to the type of risks involved in them, their likelihood and 
their potential effects on humans and the environment. 
 
3.2 The latest developments in CCS legislation and underlying policy 
3.2.1 Certain developments within the European Union 
Since the passage of the CCS Directive, the following list of developments have occurred: 
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) COM (2010) 191. 
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Findings include: 
 Success of the call for proposals; high number and quality of the proposals received 
confirms the relevance of the EEPR approach and the readiness of industry. 
 EEPR appears to have been an accelerator of infrastructure investments. Indeed, the 
technical maturity of the selected projects meant that pre-feasibility studies, cost and 
market analysis and investment strategies, in some cases funded by the TEN-E 
programme, had already been completed before the EEPR came into the picture.  
 Perspective of the EU financial support for capital expenditure has proven to be 
decisive in the actual launching of the projects. EEPR funding has acted as a stimulus, 
attracting co-financiers and encouraging them to make investment commitments.   
 CCS projects are making good progress. Demonstration effect is already being felt in 
the Rotterdam and Hatfield projects, which are aspiring to become CCS hubs with a 
potential to attract other investments for CO2 transport and storage infrastructure from 
other big CO2 emitters in the region. First orders for installations will be placed 
during 2010 and will lead to substantial capital expenditures and job creation. 
 European Commission published four draft guidance documents on CCS with 
Guidance Document 4 Article 19 Financial Security and Article 20 Financial 
Contribution due to be finalised at the end of January 2010.  
 
3.2.2 European Environment Agency Report (EEA) 
The report presents an overview of all data that have been published in the National 
Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs). Furthermore, the report covers 21 out of 27 
European Member States and includes no specifics on plans for CCS projects. 
 
3.2.2.1 Implementation of EU CCS Directive 
The EU CCS Directive was transposed into national law on 25 June 2011 by Member States 
(in summary with detail to follow): 
 Netherlands: A bill was before the Lower House in order to implement the CCS 
directive by amending the Mining Act. The bill focused mainly on the amendment of 
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Chapter 3 of the Mining Act. More specifically, the bill dealt with the embedding of 
CO2 storage and ensured that the application process for a permanent storage licence 
is accessible to all entities that possessed the necessary capabilities. It did this by 
giving effect to other licences and protecting third-party access. Thus, Chapter 3 of 
the Mining Act is divided into two sections: one section with general provisions for 
the storage of substances, including CO2; and the other with additional provisions that 
apply only to the permanent storage of CO2. 
 United Kingdom: Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) consulted on 
the UK implementation of the Directive at the end of 2009. The consultation 
document noted that applications for a CCS licence must provide proof of financial 
security for all the obligations arising from a storage permit and the insurance policies 
might be of the form of security. Insurers, including Lloyd's, have met DECC 
representatives to discuss insurance issues. DECC's response to the consultation, 
published in August 2010, noted that the liability issue requires a co-operative 
approach between Government, industry and the commercial insurance market. The 
development of products to satisfy the financial security requirement will be 
facilitated by the introduction of additional certainty around particular issues, such as 
maximum liability exposure and time periods. The European Commission finalised 
guidance on the Directive's financial security requirements in January 2011. 
 
3.2.2.2 Developments in the UK connected to the transposition of the CCS Directive 
3.2.2.2.1 The UK Regulatory Response 
Legislative developments in recent times at European level have created a regulatory 
framework for offshore CCS within the European Community, whilst amendments to the 
London Protocol and OSPAR Convention to allow for sub-seabed geological storage, provide 
an international regulatory dimension. Whilst supporting the amendments to the London 
Protocol and OSPAR Convention in 2007, UK announced a competition for funding a full-
scale demonstration project.  
The Energy Bill was unveiled in 2008 which detailed a framework for the licensing, 
enforcement and registration of CCS. The Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory 
Reform (BERR) expected that the Bill would provide a sound system, which would enable 
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private sector investment in CCS projects and along with the Planning and Climate Change 
Bills, ensure legislation that underpins the long term delivery of the energy and climate 
change strategy. Creative legislative solutions in addition to the provision of finance will 
need to operate in tandem if first mover gains are to be won in the CCS field. 
 
3.2.2.2.2 The Energy Act 2008 
In summary, the Energy Review of 2006 concluded that should it be proved that CCS is cost-
effective the next stage would need to be commercial demonstration. In Budget 2007, the 
Government announced a competition to design and build full-scale demonstration of CCS 
projects and it was launched in November 2007. The Energy Act 2008 established the 
enabling provisions for regulating offshore CO2 storage in the UK in November 2008. 
Furthermore, consultation on the proposed offshore CO2 licensing regime, including draft 
regulations to implement that regime was done in September 2009. 
The Energy Act introduces a regulatory framework for the licensing of the offshore storage 
aspect of CCS. Furthermore, the Act states that there is a right of the Crown to the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends from the edge of the 12 miles of territorial sea for 
another 188 nautical miles in accordance with Part V of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982, in relation to the storing of gas. The Government may also 
designate 'Gas Importation and Storage Zones' within the EEZ. For operators seeking to 
undertake CCS activities within the newly designated EEZ, a lease and presumably a rental 
payment will be required from the Crown Estate. According to this Act, all natural resources 
belong to the coastal state including storage space under the sea bed.  
A regime based upon licensing is introduced and requires a licence from the relevant 
authority for activities relating to the storage of CO2 (with a view to its permanent disposal). 
These activities also include the conversion, exploration and maintenance of the 'controlled 
place' (site which may be found 'in, under or over' the territorial sea, or waters within a Gas 
Importation and Storage Zone). According to the Act, the Secretary of State grants a licence 
that may also attach a set of particular requirements for a specific applicant. The licence may 
include provisions relating to financial security in respect of future obligations, as well as 
obligations between the closure of an installation and the termination of a licence.  
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Furthermore, the Act introduces a detailed section about the enforcement of licences and 
criminal offences and sanctions in when activities are undertaken without a licence or where 
a licence holder fails to abide by its prescribed conditions. Inspectors may be appointed by 
the Secretary of State to assist with the inspection of such misconduct. 
The Act applies Part 4 of the Petroleum Act 1998 (which concerns the abandonment of 
offshore installations) to carbon storage installations. The 1998 Act prescribes detailed plans 
and approvals that require persons seeking to abandon an installation offshore to provide an 
'abandonment programme' which sets out the 'measures proposed to be taken in connection 
with the abandonment of an offshore installation or submarine pipeline'. Moreover, 
provisions are made for the licensing authority to formulate regulations with regards to the 
termination of licenses. 
 
3.2.2.2.3 Energy Act 2010 
The Bill implements elements of: The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan – a national strategy 
for climate and energy. 
This Plan will deliver emission cuts of 18% on 2008 levels by 2020 (and over a one third 
reduction on 1990 levels) on the way to achieving a reduction of at least 80% by 2050. The 
Plan makes it clear that emissions need to be cut in a way that helps the sustainable 
development of the economy, society and environment. This means keeping energy supplies 
safe and secure, maximising economic opportunities and protecting the most vulnerable 
consumers. 
 Carbon Capture and Storage and Decarbonisation 
The Energy Act 2008 formed a financial incentive to support four CCS demonstration 
projects on power stations which were being powered by coal through a levy mechanism on 
electricity suppliers. In addition, according to the Act, the Government is required to prepare 
regular reports on the progress that has been made on the decarbonisation of electricity 
generation in UK and the development and use of CCS. 
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 Schemes for Reducing Fuel Poverty 
The energy suppliers are forced by this Act to reduce the price of fuel for vulnerable 
consumers in order to reduce fuel poverty when the previous Voluntary Agreement with the 
energy suppliers ended in March 2011. A fundamental part of these schemes will be social 
price support which, subject to consultation, will come in the form of an electricity bill refund 
to certain groups of people that are more vulnerable in comparison with others.  
 Regulation of Gas and Electricity Markets 
This part of the Act clarifies the responsibilities of Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem) with respect to climate change, protecting consumers and increasing energy 
security. 
The Energy Act 2010 gives more authority to the Secretary of State to introduce a Market 
Power Licence Condition for electricity generators that will make it easier for Ofgem to 
address certain issues arising from the exploitation of market power where there are 
constraints on the amount of electricity that can be transmitted. 
With respect to deadlines, the Act has changed the time limit that Ofgem can impose 
penalties for licence breaches from twelve months to five years. 
Furthermore, this Act has given power to the Secretary of State to address situations where 
cross-subsidies between gas and electricity businesses lead to groups of consumers being 
disadvantaged. 
Finally, the Act gives power to the Secretary of State to modify supply licences so that it can 
be made certain that suppliers will let their consumers know about any potential changes to 
their contract in terms of pricing or any other changes as such within a certain period of time. 
 
3.2.2.2.4 The Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Licensing etc.) Regulations 2010 
These Regulations introduce a permitting regime for offshore CCS activities under the 
authority of Energy Act 2008. Furthermore, they set out a range of requirements that 
operators need to fulfil in order to obtain a storage site permit from the Secretary of State. 
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The Regulations do not cover licences granted by the Scottish Minister for Carbon Capture 
and Storage activities that are undertaken in the territorial waters adjacent to Scotland. In 
contrast, they do cover the conditions for granting licences and exploration permits, 
obligations of the storage site operator, closure of the storage site, post-closure period and 
financial security. Therefore, they only partially fulfil the UK’s obligation to transpose the 
EU Directive on the geological storage of CO2 (European Commission, 2009) into UK 
domestic law. 
 
3.2.3 Regulatory Consultations to the UK 
The list of regulatory consultations on CCS were as follows:  
 Environmental Permitting: Consultation on further amendments to the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 
 Consultation on the Proposed Offshore Carbon Dioxide Storage Licensing Regime 
 Consultation on a framework for the development of clean coal 
Those that appear to be most germane to this research are analysed below. 
 
3.2.3.1 Environmental Permitting (EP) 
Consultation on further amendments to the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2010. 
 
3.2.3.1.1 Introduction 
The EP Regulations 2010 comprises a common set of definitions, processes and controls for 
the permitting of specified activities to prevent pollution. In doing so it has rationalised 
various permitting regimes into a common framework that is easier to understand and use. 
For example, it only requires businesses to have one permit instead of several permits for 
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activities falling under the regulations on one site and by doing so it allows the regulators to 
focus recourses on activities with higher risks. 
This consultation paper outlines four amendments to be made into the EP Regulations 2010 
to take effect from 6 April 2011. The first two amendments arise from the need to transpose 
certain parts and provisions of the CCS directive. The third amendment is with respect to 
offshore CCS activities and the final amendment is regarding the gas produced by anaerobic 
digestion plants.  
 
3.2.3.1.2 Regulatory Changes Proposed 
 Amendment Required by the “Carbon Capture and Storage Directive” 
The Government proposed (i) an addition to Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the EP Regulations 2010, 
and (ii) an amendment to paragraph 8 of Schedule 22 to the EP Regulations 2010 to transpose 
respectively Article 37 and 32 of the CCS Directive. Although the Directive’s transposition 
deadline was 25 June 2011, the Government considered that transposition some three months 
early will not add any regulatory burden. Rather, it will further clarify the regulatory 
framework for CCS and, through incorporation in a larger set of amending regulations, will 
reduce proliferation of regulations. 
 Amendment in Respect to Offshore Carbon Capture and Storage Activities 
The Government proposed an amendment to paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 1.1 (interpretation 
and application of Part A (1)) of Schedule 1 to the EP Regulations 2010 to avoid double 
regulation of offshore CCS activities. 
 Amendment in Respect of Gas Produced by Anaerobic Digestion Plants 
The Government proposed to remove from coverage by the activity description in Part A(1) 
of Section 1.2 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations the production of gas at AD plants 
treating biodegradable waste where that production is not part of a combustion activity. 
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3.2.3.2 Offshore Carbon Dioxide Storage Licensing Regime 
3.2.3.2.1 Introduction 
Carbon capture and storage is seen as an important technology when trying to reduce the CO2 
emitted from the industry and everyday life. Storing the captured CO2 deep under geological 
formations is a crucial part of this process since it has to be made sure that the storage takes 
place at a place where the risk of leakage is minimal for the foreseeable future. 
Accordingly, the Government has taken steps to provide a legal framework for the conduct of 
CO2 storage operations in the UK. The Energy Act 2008 is promoted as one of the first legal 
regimes in the world specifically designed to permit the safe storage of CO2 underground.  
 
3.2.3.2.2 Regulatory Changes Proposed 
Through the designation of a Gas Importation and Storage Zone (GISZ), the Government of 
the UK has applied the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 
order to assert certain rights to make use of the offshore area beyond the territorial sea. This 
Act also provides for a regulatory regime for CO2 storage in the UK offshore area and for 
certain relevant existing offshore oil and gas legislation. For example, the decommissioning 
regime of Part IV of the Petroleum Act 1998 will be applied to facilities used for CO2 
storage. 
In this document, DECC is proposing ways in which the licensing regime proposed by the 
government for these activities is going to be introduced. It further shows how they are going 
to implement the CCS Directive. Furthermore, the supporting consultation document sought 
to build on earlier work by setting out a proposed licensing framework under the powers of 
the Energy Act, which would be embodied with regulations transposing the Directive into 
UK law. The licensing regime for CO2 storage is meant to cover an area of up to 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines of the territorial sea (throughout the GISZ and the area of territorial 
sea). 
Under the provisions of the Food and Environment Protection Act (FEPA) License, the 
Scottish Ministers and the Secretary of State have in turn the regulation making, licensing 
and enforcement powers in relation to CO2 storage sites located in the territorial sea adjacent 
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to Scotland and the remainder of the relevant UK waters respectively. Regarding the Welsh 
and Northern Ireland territorial sea, the developed administration has elected to retain their 
FEPA consenting powers. 
The licensing regime will regulate storage in depleted and partially depleted hydrocarbon 
fields under the sea bed and in non-hydrocarbon geological features such as deep saline 
aquifers. 
The Government intended to set down the regulations in the first quarter of 2010 in order to 
bring the regime into force in April 2010 (subject to the outcome of its consultation around 
the regulations).  
This document outlines what developers need to do in order to obtain a licence to undertake 
all the activities involved in a project as such. These activities include the exploration stage, 
storage site development, storage site operation and storage site closure.  
 Liability Implications 
The proposed license is very similar to the licences granted to the petroleum production 
industry. The licence − subject to specific consent for drilling of any well − permits the 
conduction of intrusive exploration. Furthermore, it also expresses time limited rights to 
apply for storage permits which allows site operators to construct storage facilities − 
including offshore storage facilities − in order to store the liquefied CO2. Moreover, the 
licence provides the necessary framework to demonstrate the legal obligations that site 
operators have with respect to ensuring the safe/secure containment of CO2 under geological 
formations, decommissioning the site after use and the monitoring of the stored material’s 
behaviour during and after the completion of storage operations. 
 
3.2.3.3 Planning for New Energy Infrastructure: Consultation on Revised Draft National 
Policy Statements for Energy Infrastructure 
3.2.3.3.1 Introduction 
Historically, national policy planning and implementation for major infrastructure has proven 
to be a real challenge. It is anticipated that this may also be the case for CCS infrastructure 
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including a complex and evolving network that will integrate capture, pipeline and storage 
features. The latest effort to plan for the delivery of similar infrastructure comes by way of 
the National Policy Statements for Energy Infrastructure consultation. It is believed by the 
author that it would be wise to take the planning and lessons of this process and apply them to 
the development of CCS infrastructure in the UK. For this reason, information and analysis in 
relation to the National Policy Statements (NPS) for Energy Infrastructure have been 
included in this thesis. 
Accordingly, the Government wants a planning system for major infrastructure which is 
rapid, predictable and accountable. Planning decisions should be taken within a clear policy 
framework making these decisions as transparent as possible. The energy NPSs will be a 
blueprint for decision-making on individual applications for development consent for the 
relevant types of infrastructure.  
Between November 2009 and February 2010, the previous Government consulted six draft 
energy NPSs and the Appraisal of Sustainability (AoSs), Habitats Regulations Assessments 
(HRAs) and Impact Assessment that accompanied those NPSs. Over 3000 responses were 
received and this document identifies the key themes and responds to them. 
This document has been produced as a result of a re-consultation that had to be made owing 
to the fact that the Government made changes after receiving the responses to the original 
consultation and having considered the outputs of the Parliamentary scrutiny process. 
 
3.2.3.3.2 Regulatory Changes Proposed 
According to the Government, the most important changes that this document has undergone 
are: 
 Reconsideration of the alternatives: The selection and appraisal of policy alternatives 
within the AoSs for EN-1 to EN-5 have been reconsidered. New alternatives have 
been developed and appraised. This means that the likely impacts of consenting new 
energy infrastructure in accordance with the policies set out in these NPSs should be 
clearer. 
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 Need for the infrastructure: This section sets out the need for new energy 
infrastructure and has been updated to take account of the latest modelling and 
Pathways to 2050 work. The changes are reflected in EN-1 which is where the need 
for individual technologies also now appears. 
 
3.2.3.3.3 Potentially Suitable Sites 
Potentially suitable sites for nuclear power station development: Kirksanton and Braystones 
in Cumbria have been removed from the list of potentially suitable sites within EN-6 whereas 
Dungeness in Kent remains off the list. 
As regards the next steps for draft energy NPSs, the Government intends to finalise and then 
formally designate and adopt the energy NPSs (subject to this consultation) in 2011. 
Furthermore, once they have been designated, the energy NPSs will be the primary 
consideration for the IPC when it makes decisions on applications for development consent 
for nationally significant energy infrastructure under the Planning Act 2008.  
Listed below, are the different points that have been changed in the revised version of the 
consultation document: 
 Revised draft Overarching National Policy Statement for Energy (EN-1) 
 Revised draft National Policy Statement for Fossil Fuel Electricity Generating 
Infrastructure (EN-2) 
 Revised draft National Policy Statement for Renewable Energy Infrastructure (EN-3) 
 Revised draft National Policy Statement for Gas Supply Infrastructure and Gas and 
Oil Pipelines (EN-4) 
 Revised draft National Policy Statement for Electricity Networks Infrastructure (EN-
5) 
 Revised draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6) 
 Revised Appraisals of Sustainability for EN 1-5 
 Revised Habitats Regulations Assessments for EN 1-5 
 Revised Appraisals of Sustainability for EN-6 (the revised draft Nuclear National 
Policy Statement) 
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 Revised Habitats Regulations Assessments for EN-6 (the revised draft Nuclear 
National Policy Statement) 
 Revised Impact Assessment 
 
3.2.3.3.4 Looking Forward 
“A framework for the development of clean coal” was published in November 2009 
committing the UK to 4 commercial scale demonstrations of CCS, funded through a financial 
incentive and setting out the regulatory policy for the consenting of new coal fired power 
stations in England and Wales. The framework prohibits the construction of new coal fired 
power stations without the demonstration of CCS and sets out plans for the long-term 
transition to clean coal. 
Detailed provisions concerning the financial incentive mechanism was laid in regulations 
(spring 2011). 
The framework also refers to the implementation of the EU Directive on the geological 
storage of CO2 in the UK, including: 
 Regulations and guidance on offshore storage of CO2 (autumn 2010). 
 Regulations for third party access to CO2 pipelines and storage sites (December 
2010). 
 
3.3 Forward looking scenarios 
3.3.1 UK Policy and Regulatory Milestones for the Future 
In this section, key policy and regulatory milestones have been identified within which 
carbon capture and storage facilities are meant to be developed. 
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3.3.1.1 Scottish Policy and Regulatory Milestones for the Future  
3.3.1.1.1 Important Milestones 
If CCS is to have a significant contribution in reducing CO2 emission, the milestones listed 
below have to be met by 2030. 
 2015-2020: Globally, 20 CCS projects should exist, of which 8 of them should be 
demonstrated by the EU. Furthermore, 4 of these demonstration projects should be 
situated in the UK and Scotland should at least have 1 share (or more) of these 
demonstration projects. Overall, the EU should be able to store 30 million tonnes per 
year CO2 (Scottish Government and Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
 2020: By 2020, the EU is expected to be able to cumulatively store 150 million tonnes 
of CO2. Furthermore, the EU and UK should start deploying CCS. There would also 
be a need for large scale proven aquifer storage capacity. There would be a need for a 
financial funding method for CCS deployment established (Scottish Government and 
Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
 2020-2030: CCS changes from demonstration to deployment phase and CCS rollout 
(Scottish Government and Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
 
3.3.1.1.2 Legal and Regulatory Milestones  
The Scottish Government has seen the following regulatory changes as necessary in order for 
CCS to become a reality in Scotland. 
 2009-2010: The development of offshore carbon licensing regime (2009-2010); 
Working with UK government on funding mechanisms for generation (2009-2010) 
(Scottish Government and Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
 2010-2015: OSPAR and London Convention ratified to allow cross border; Details on 
electricity levy mechanism to facilitate CCS demonstration projects; Amendment to 
regulations to allow CCS as an activity to gain Pollution Prevention and Control 
(PPC) permitting regime (Scottish Government and Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
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 2015-2029: Money from levy has been deployed for demonstration projects; 
Continued refinement of regulatory approach especially in relation to storage 
(Scottish Government and Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
 2030: Clear approach on regulation with reward to all aspects of the CCS chain 
(Scottish Government and Scottish enterprise, 2010). 
 
3.4 Addressing Specific Liability Issues 
In this section, some of the pressing legal and regulatory issues and their interpretation in the 
context of the CCS industry have been addressed. 
In addition to stating what is covered, a question is also raised that is beyond the scope of this 
research save for a few remarks. However, it deserves greater attention in future research. It 
concerns state aids law application to CCS. This question is as follows: Given the current 
uncertain and uncapped nature of liability in relation to CO2 stream storage sites, the primary 
objective of CO2 storage is not to provide a solid business opportunity for investors. Instead 
CO2 storage is essentially providing a public interest function aimed at satisfying climate 
change mitigation and therefore addresses legislated targets placed upon Member States of 
the EU. Given this public interest function, it is logical to ask whether state aids restrictions 
on financial incentives for CCS apply given that state aids rules do not apply to the delivery 
of public interest legislation by Member States. It would appear, at least that subsidies 
provided for advancing commercial scale CCS plants have not attracted such attention as they 
are permitted further to the financing mechanism of the Emissions Trading Directive. 
Wilson et al. note that creating a liability regime for CCS must strike a balance between risks 
and benefits of technology and this could influence the deployment of CCS. They argue that 
the certainty, clarity and extent of legal liability could affect technology adoption, or 
specifically new technology deployment. Companies considering the adoption of a new 
technology may be deterred by uncertain or potentially unlimited liabilities associated with 
technological problems new to industrial scale (Wilson et al., 2009).  
Legal liability is critical for the government and regulatory authorities to promote adoption of 
CCS technology as it helps ensure a party with the highest information on the risks and 
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solutions to those risks take the appropriate measures to avoid adverse consequences (Selmer-
Olsen, 2006). In addition, transparent and clear liability system enhances the ability of the 
public to understand the risks and have confidence that these risks to the human health and 
the surrounding environment are being actively managed and in case an accident happens, it 
will be effectively remediated and they will be adequately compensated (Selmer-Olsen, 
2006). Under the CCS Directive and ETS, the liabilities associated with CO2 exposure deal 
with the impacts of CO2 to climate change in case it leaks to the surface. This therefore calls 
for the companies to continuously monitor and evaluate the storage site to ensure that they 
take appropriate actions to prevent leakage of CO2 throughout the system (Haan-Kamminga 
et al., 2010). 
These liabilities deal with the measures that should be adopted by the companies to protect 
human health and the environment. Currently, regulations for underground injection only 
address the operational phase and fail to specify future monitoring and risk management 
issues (Wilson and Gerard, 2007). Wilson and Gerard explain that when the storage site gets 
to its storage capacity, it is critical to implement to close up the site and monitor the site to 
ensure that the injected CO2 remains there. 
According to Figueiredo et al., liability for carbon capture and storage can be looked from the 
operational liability and post-injection liability (de Figueiredo et al., 2006). At the operational 
stage, liability includes the environmental, health and safety risks involved in the capture of 
CO2, transportation and injection. Post-injection liability in CCS refers to the liability that 
comes up in the storage of CO2 after its injection into the geological reservoir (Zheng et al., 
2009). Carbon capture liability during the storage stage can either be in-situ liability or 
climate related liability.  
In-situ liability results from the potential risks of harm to the environment, human health and 
property. Climate related liability on the other hand deals with liability arising from the 
leakage of CO2 from geological reservoirs and the resulting impacts to the climate (de 
Figueiredo et al., 2006). Climate liability is a function of the international and national 
policies formulated to address greenhouse gas emissions. Post-injection liabilities present 
unique challenges given that the projected CO2 volumes to be stored in geological reservoirs 
are very high; 103-590 GtC between 2000 and the year 2100 (de Figueiredo et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the risks of CO2 leakage may take long before manifesting themselves and there 
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are uncertainties in the geophysical system. Given the above challenges, a private liability 
may not be effective in addressing the risks of CCS (Durrant, 2011). 
As time passes, the risks associated with the CO2 stored in geological reservoirs could be 
reduced and as a result the safety could increase owing to geochemical and geophysical 
trapping (Ha-Duong and Keith, 2003). When liability is fully placed on the private sector, the 
potential unbounded liability can make deployment of CCS unlikely. On the other hand, 
when the public sector is made to bear the liability for any future leakage, this can potentially 
affect the safety measures taken by companies in the near term (Ha-Duong and Keith, 2003). 
Leakage of CO2 − which is the main risk associated with CCS − can either occur into the 
surface or subsurface. However, some argue that the most probable cause for loss of 
containment is neglected wells. Furthermore, they suggest that properly-designed reservoirs 
have the ability to contain CO2 long after they have been abandoned. Figueiredo et al. 
observe that poorly completed reservoirs are more likely to lead to CO2 escaping into the 
atmosphere. On the other hand, some suggest that another way CO2 can be released is for it to 
leak via pores of low-permeable caprocks when the injection is done at high pressure (de 
Figueiredo et al., 2006).  
Figueiredo et al. note that there are five categories of risks resulting from CO2 storage 
liability. These include toxicological effects, environmental effects, subsurface trespass, 
induced seismic actions and effects on the climate. Toxicological effects are directly related 
to the concentrations and period of exposure. The liability related to climate risk is basically a 
contractual liability for non-performance (de Figueiredo et al., 2006). Compensation to 
victims in an event of risk may be difficult given that CO2 can remain in the ground for too 
long before it escapes and by then the companies responsible may have been out of business. 
Consequently, seeking for compensation for such risks may be difficult given that the 
afflicted would have to identify defendants. Moreover, even when the defendants are 
identified, afflicted parties may experience difficulties in demonstrating the particular 
causation or that the storage site of the defendant is responsible for causing the injuries 
suffered.  
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3.4.1 Liability for a Release of Stored CO2 under the ETS and CCS Directives 
According to Recital (30) of CCS Directive (which is not binding but is to be treated as 
informing the purposive interpretation of the CCS Directive):  
“Provisions are required concerning liability for damage to the local environment and 
the climate, resulting from any failure of permanent containment of CO2. Liability for 
environmental damage (damage to protected species and natural habitats, water and 
land) is regulated by Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and 
remedying of environmental damage (1), which should be applied to the operation of 
storage sites pursuant to this Directive. Liability for climate damage as a result of 
leakages is covered by the inclusion of storage sites in Directive 2003/87/EC, which 
requires surrender of emissions trading allowances for any leaked emissions. In 
addition, this Directive should establish the obligation on the operator of the storage 
site to take corrective measures in case of leakages or significant irregularities on the 
basis of a corrective measures plan submitted to and approved by the competent 
national authority. Where the operator fails to take the necessary corrective measures, 
these measures should be taken by the competent authority, which should recover the 
costs from the operator.” 
Aside from the recital above, the CCS Directive itself does not address the question of 
liability. Hence, we must look to the Environmental Liability Directive and the Emissions 
Trading Scheme Directive given that the CCS Directive delegates this matter to them. 
Further to Article 34 of the CCS Directive, the Environmental Liability Directive brings 
storage site operations within the liability framework of the European Union. As such, 
operators of CCS sites have obligations in respect of the prevention and remediation of 
environmental damage associated with such sites.  Financial security measures are also to be 
undertaken by storage site operators further to Article 14. A flexible interpretation of Article 
14 allows for the use of ceilings on financial instruments. It also allows for the exclusion of 
liability on behalf of operators, where they are not at fault or are otherwise not negligent. 
Finally, in respect of exclusions from liability a CCS operator will not be liable for 
environmental damage or the imminent threat of damage in relation to a natural phenomenon 
of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character.  
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As the CCS Directive is without its own liability provisions
1
, the Environmental Liability 
Directive language pertaining to the definition of “environmental damage” and corresponding 
duties of prevention (Article 5) and remediation/mitigation (Article 6) should be 
determinative in this regard
2
. As such it is of great importance to the determination of liability 
particularly when one notes in respect of Article 4 exceptions from liability that seismic 
events or tectonic plate shifts resulting in environmental damage would give rise to no 
liability to the operator Article 4 (1) (b).  
In the context of the Emissions Trading Directive, arguably, as environmental damage that 
might arise from a CO2 leak would include environmental damage in a climate change 
context, such events or shifts would give rise to no liability to any party and as such 
allowances would not be required to be purchased to make up for the leak. On a related note, 
where climate change mitigation and prevention efforts that have as their goal the prevention 
of impacts to land, water, species or their habitats as covered by the Environmental Liability 
Directive and they are compensated for in relation to a leak then they should not be the 
subject of further emissions allowance surrenders as these will have already been 
compensated for under the Environmental Liability Directive. 
                                                 
1
CCS Directive Article 28 penalties may be designed to punish non-compliance with the Directive however, the 
consequences for environmental damage (i.e., liability for environmental damage) are addressed through 
delegated legislation through Article 34 which draws environmental liability in the CCS sphere into the 
Environmental Liability Directive 
2
According to the Environmental Liability Directive "environmental damage" means: (a) damage to protected 
species and natural habitats, which is any damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining 
the favourable conservation status of such habitats or species. The significance of such effects is to be assessed 
with reference to the baseline condition, taking account of the criteria set out in Annex I; 
Damage to protected species and natural habitats does not include previously identified adverse effects which 
result from an act by an operator which was expressly authorised by the relevant authorities in accordance with 
provisions implementing Article 6(3) and (4) or Article 16 of Directive 92/43/EEC or Article 9 of Directive 
79/409/EEC or, in the case of habitats and species not covered by Community law, in accordance with 
equivalent provisions of national law on nature conservation. 
(b) water damage, which is any damage that significantly adversely affects the ecological, chemical and/or 
quantitative status and/or ecological potential, as defined in Directive 2000/60/EC, of the waters concerned, with 
the exception of adverse effects where Article 4(7) of that Directive applies; 
(c) land damage, which is any land contamination that creates a significant risk of human health being adversely 
affected as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, on or under land, of substances, preparations, 
organisms or micro-organisms; 
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Further to this point, it has been noted that the purchase of emissions credits serves as a 
climate change mitigation and prevention strategy in itself and that damage in terms of failed 
climate change mitigation is already covered in respect of the types of damage listed in the 
EU Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC) including, but not limited to species loss, 
marine ecosystem damage, fundamental changes in land use, damage to land, damage to 
water, etc. If CCS operators are legally required to buy emissions credits and CCS operators 
also bound to cover liability of the same leakage event, there is a clear double-payment by the 
private sector. Therefore, this problem of double-counting liability has to be addressed by 
regulatory solutions that push forward CCS technology investment. 
In reference to the ETS Directive, from 2013 captured CO2 will be considered as non-emitted 
(see Recital 39 of ETS Directive). 
If, despite the precautions taken in selecting a site, it does leak in practice, it is suggested that 
corrective measures must be taken to rectify the situation and return the site to a safe state. A 
review of the ETS Directive as amended suggests that emissions trading allowances would 
need to be surrendered for any leaked CO2 to compensate for the fact that the stored 
emissions were credited under the ETS as not emitted when they left the source. On the basis 
of the discussion in this sub-section, the treatment of emissions allowances in the event of a 
leak is in terms of the amounts to be surrendered and the distribution of responsibility for the 
purchase and surrender of the said allowances. 
 
3.4.2 Liability at Carbon Dioxide Storage Facilities 
Geological storage will extend over much longer periods than the lifespan of an average 
commercial entity. Arrangements are needed to ensure the long-term stewardship of storage 
sites. The CCS Directive (Article 32) thus provides for sites to be transferred to Member 
State control in the long term. However, arguably, the polluter pays principle requires that the 
operator retain responsibility for a site while it presents a significant risk of leakage. Also, 
rules are needed to ensure that no distortion of competition arises from different Member 
State approaches.  
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Furthermore, under the Article 33 of the Directive, a storage site shall be transferred 
(including legal liabilities) to the state when 1) all available evidence indicates that the CO2 
will be completely contained for the indefinite future, 2) a minimum period before transfer to 
be determined by the competent authority has elapsed, 3) a financial contribution for the post-
transfer period covering at least the costs for monitoring for 30 years has been made and 4) 
the site has been sealed and the injection facilities have been removed. As this is the second 
key decision in the lifecycle of a storage site (the first being the decision to permit the site for 
use), a Commission review is foreseen at this stage too. 
 
3.4.3 Costing and Attribution of Liability for Surrendered Allowances under the ETS 
Directive 
In theory, emissions trading allowances must be surrendered for any leaked CO2, in order to 
compensate for the fact that the stored emissions were credited under the ETS as not emitted 
when they left the source. However, questions arise as to the applicability of the surrender 
requirement noting that ETS itself does not have a surrender requirement attached but an 
exemption in respect of stored CO2. Equally, if for argument sake a leak occurred during a 
relevant Phase of ETS when allowances could be purchased to address storage taking place in 
that phase then this may be a more straightforward compensation issue. There is a greater 
likelihood of leakage in a long term storage scenario which may occur many phases after the 
phase in which the leaked CO2 was first stored. Against this scenario, the application of the 
ETS to a leak is less clear. 
CCS Directive Guidance Document 4 provides further insight into this question. However, 
the proposed assumptions and calculation methods yielded in the document would appear to 
be highly speculative in estimating leakage ab initio. 
As summarised below, in respect of the surrender of allowances, there is the argument that by 
virtue of the inclusion of geological storage sites under Annex I of the Emissions Trading 
Directive, installations will be required to surrender allowances for any emissions from the 
site, including leakage, as calculated pursuant to the Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines for 
CCS (forthcoming). The amount of the FS for this obligation can be based on the potential 
total tons of emissions, including due to leakage(s), multiplied by the market cost of 
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purchasing an equivalent amount of allowances. This calculation will require (1) estimates 
for the total tons of emissions that may be released, including due to leakage(s), (2) the 
timing of emissions, and (3) costs of allowances when releases occur. 
In the absence of experience with geological storage of CO2, determining an appropriate 
amount of FS for surrender of allowances can be based on different assumptions concerning 
the amounts of potential leakages of CO2. Options can include calculating the amount based 
upon: 
 A conservative estimate of the maximum portion of CO2 that can be released from 
storage, which, in most situations, will be much less than 100%; 
 Best case assumption that only a small portion (e.g., 1%) of the CO2 is released. 
The initial amount of FS for surrenders of allowances should be based on the potential for 
leakages during (1) the operator’s anticipated period of injections (e.g., 20 years, 30 years, 50 
years) plus (2) the expected duration of closure activities, and (3) the minimum period of 
years for post-closure determined by the CA. Periodic updates to the FS may reflect other 
assumptions about potential amounts of leakages as more evidence on the site and storage 
behaviour is gathered. 
The timing of leakages is important to determining the amount of FS because the EU 
Allowances (EUA) price is determined on the carbon market. 
There is unavoidable uncertainty about the future price of EUA at the time of any potential 
leakage. There is no cap on the EUA price; the penalty for excess emission (100 Euros per 
tonne) does not relieve the operator of the need to provide allowances to cover the emissions, 
and is not therefore a cap on EUA prices.  
Beyond this uncertainty, other practical and legal issues arise. These are detailed in the 
remaining paragraphs of this sub-section. 
The requirement to reimburse CO2 emitted as a result of the leak from a CO2 storage facility 
is problematic in view of the uncertainty about the future rules (if not the future of the 
Scheme in the coming decades) that might apply to emissions allowances under the EU (and 
therefore UK) emissions trading system. At this point, we simply do not know what 
international context will exist beyond the Kyoto Protocol and its extension agreement, nor 
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do we know whether any rule changes to impact upon the shelf life of emissions allowances 
are the period to which they would have to be applied. 
Carbon capture facilities and CO2 storage facilities will not be required to surrender 
emissions allowances, where CO2 is transported and stored in a permanent facility could not 
hedge against market uncertainty in respect of future carbon prices, because a leak is more 
likely after the operational phase of a carbon capture and storage facility. This may well be in 
the distant future. This is problematic because emissions allowances tend to have a shelf life 
for the (average four-year) phase in which emissions occur. Certain types of emissions 
allowances can be carried over to the next phase. However, any leak in the post operational 
phase of a carbon storage facility would occur well past this second phase.  
The need to hedge against such risk becomes important when it is likely that liability for 
allowances would entail greater costs over time as carbon prices rise. From an economic 
point of view, when considering the position on indemnification of allowances at some future 
date, it would be cheaper for energy producers to purchase emission allowances in contrast to 
investing in a technology that has significant upfront installation costs and significant 
investment costs for a long term liability which may well not ever materialise.  
Furthermore, the assumption for long-term emissions credits liability would mean that 
allowances which are bought in the future, as a compensatory measure for loss of CO2 stored, 
would be with a significantly higher price tag than those bought today which would further 
defer investments. This is especially true as readily available primary resources of energy are 
in global decline and the price of bringing energy to market is steadily increasing. If the EU 
wishes to increase investment in low-carbon and renewable technologies, it would also be 
assumed to favour environmental cost internalization and a subsequent higher pricing of 
traditional forms of energy in order to enhance the competitiveness of renewables. These 
likely trends in relation to a higher carbon price would result in the payment of future 
allowances many times the value of those purchased that might be purchased at a date closer 
to carbon capture plant deployment and would thus significantly disincentivise CCS 
deployment. 
It is also unlikely that the shelf life of emissions allowances will be extended in view of the 
requirement under the so-called Commitment Period Reserve (CPR) which requires States to 
ensure that 90% of their assigned emissions reduction amount or five times the States was 
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recently reviewed inventory, must be constantly held as valid units and allowances. Noting 
that as climate-change related damage increases and so to the cost of mitigation it is likely 
that carbon prices will rise and there will be less likelihood of carrying over allowances for 
extended periods of time. In part, this conclusion is made on the basis that States − and the 
private sector entities that they regulate − will be subject to greater scrutiny for regularised 
reduction trends as climate change-related damage ramps up and becomes more obvious to 
members of civil society. 
If the requirement to surrender allowances were to occur at some point in the distant future 
then this compounds certain other technical challenges. It is to be noted that a number of 
firms will provide carbon streams to any given storage site. A question would arise as to 
which carbon stream provider should assume responsibility and in what proportion for any 
given leak. It may well be that certain carbon stream providers will argue that the “leaked” 
CO2 did not include at least some CO2 from their specific carbon stream and there may be 
grounds for the technical argument that a leak in a reservoir at the opposite end of the initial 
injection point would constitute a leak of CO2 from early (rather than the latest) carbon 
stream provision to the storage site, noting that there is a time window before which carbon 
stream mix and composition become uniform within a storage reservoir. Apportioning 
“emission allowance surrender” responsibility to individual private-sector carbon stream 
providers in those circumstances, would be particularly challenging.  
This problem is compounded still further by the evident conflict that may arise in relation to 
apportionment of “emission surrender allowance” liabilities as between carbon stream 
providers and carbon storage sites (both parties are regulated under the amended ETS). In 
such circumstances, it is worth noting that the recipients of the exemption from surrendering 
allowances in respect of the revised Article 3A of the ETS Directive would be those that have 
captured and transported the emissions for permanent storage. As exemption beneficiaries, 
their contribution to an “emission allowance surrender” where they have provided a CO2 
stream to the storage site at which a leak has occurred would need to be considered.   
Finally, another level of complexity in “emission surrender allowance” appears by reference 
to Draft Commission Decision amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the inclusion of 
monitoring and reporting guidelines for greenhouse gas emissions from the capture, transport 
and geological storage of CO2. This reporting guidance suggests monitoring and reporting for 
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leakage in respect of three specific activities namely, capture, transport and storage, that are 
regulated through the following Annexes of the Draft Decision: 
 Annex XVI – Activity-specific guidelines for determination of greenhouse gas 
emissions from CO2 capture activities for the purposes of transport and geological 
storage; 
 Annex XVII – Activity-specific guidelines for determination of greenhouse gas 
emissions from the transport of CO2 by pipelines; and, 
 Annex XVIII – Activity-specific guidelines for the geological storage of CO2 in a 
storage site 
As capture facilities, transport networks and storage facilities may well be separately owned 
and controlled, then each firm could have some responsibility for leakage and, therefore, the 
costs of emission surrender allowance-related purchases. 
It is this line of analysis which is as perplexing as the long term liability implications for 
storage site operators under the Environmental Liability Directive. Indeed, this double 
liability for environmental damage, which is covered by two liability regimes for one event 
(i.e., one leakage event), requires sophisticated policy and legislative drafting skill and 
attention. Otherwise, the long term liability risks and uncertainties will significantly outweigh 
any benefit of private sector participation in CCS as a public interest climate change 
mitigation strategy.   
In conclusion, the proposed methodology for addressing leakage as indicated in the 
Commission Guidance document is without a sufficient technical basis to be reliable for 
prospective investors and other private section analysis. This is why the following preferred 
line of argumentation is taken. 
By way of reviewing the legislative groundwork, further to the ETS Amending Directive, 
there is a new Article 12 (3a) which states that allowances are not required to be surrendered 
for emissions verified as captured and transported to a storage facility. 
Article 19 of the ETS Directive requires set up of an Emission Trading Registry for issuing, 
holding, transferring and cancelling allowances. This mechanism assists in the determination 
of allowances to be surrendered by an ETS-regulated installation on an annual basis. 
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It is unlikely that allowances to be surrendered in the event of a leak perhaps a decade or 
decades after start-up of CO2 stream transport to storage sites would be visited upon a power 
company with a carbon capture site (regulated under ETS) many years after the phase in 
which that site began transport of a carbon stream to a storage facility. 
For this reason and noting the number of risk management measures available to competent 
authorities under the CCS Directive and storage site operators by way of their evolving 
technical know-how, the requirement that storage sites be selected on the basis that they will 
not leak all suggest that CO2 stream providers and storage site operators should make no 
provision for allowance purchases to account for a hypothetical leak. Such a purchase should 
only be made if required by evolving law, whatever that may be, noting the leakage is more 
likely in the post-operational period of a storage site. 
 
3.4.4 Leakage after Site Closure or the Cessation of Carbon Dioxide Storage: Handover 
to the Government 
In advance of the grant of a permit, a detailed analysis of the potential site must be carried out 
according to criteria specified in Annex I of the CCS Directive, including modelling of the 
expected behaviour of CO2 following injection. The site can be used only if this analysis 
shows that under the proposed conditions of use there is no significant risk of leakage, and 
that no significant health or environmental impacts are likely to occur. This gives the 
competent authority considerable comfort over the risks and risk management measures that 
might attend a prospective site as it cannot be approved unless the competent authority is 
satisfied that the prospective site will not leak. 
The initial analysis of the site is done by the potential operator, who then submits the 
documentation to the Member State competent authority in the permit application. The 
competent authority reviews the information and if it is satisfied that the condition is met, 
issues a draft permit decision financing of the demonstration projects.   
In relation to site closure, the responsibility for the storage site, including specific legal 
obligations, should be transferred to the competent authority, if and when all available 
evidence indicates that the stored CO2 will be completely and permanently contained. To this 
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end, the operator should submit a report to the competent authority for approval of the 
transfer. This suggests that in the eventuality of the CO2 leaking afterwards, the liability is 
transferred from the operator to the competent authority. 
As the basis upon which the decision to transfer control of the storage site to competent 
authority could be made more clear, it is important for the competent authority to be more 
methodologically specific in this regard with respect to its national legislation. This will 
create more certainty around investment-related risk decisions as the failure to be more 
specific will leave significant subjective discretion for the competent authority to decide 
when complete and permanent containment of CO2 has occurred. Other jurisdictions are 
already much more specific in this regard. 
 
3.4.5 International Law 
In respect of the international law pertaining to CCS, the London Dumping Convention 
(LDC) and the OSPAR Convention and their legal instruments are given treatment in this 
sub-section with appropriate conclusions provided for each regime. 
 
3.4.5.1 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter 1972 (London Dumping Convention) 
The operative provisions of the London Dumping Convention as they pertain to CCS are as 
follows: 
 Article 3: Dumping does not include: placement of matter for a purpose other than the 
mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of the 
Convention (IMO, 1972). 
 Article 4: Dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex 1 prohibited, Annex 2 
requires a special permit. Others require a prior general permit (IMO, 1972). 
 Article 6: Each Contracting Party shall designate appropriate authorities to issue 
special permits for Annex 2 substances or other unlisted matter. They are also to keep 
records and monitor the state of sea (IMO, 1972). 
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 Article 10: In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State 
responsibility for damage to the environment of the other States or to any other area 
of the environment, caused by dumping of wastes and other matter of all kinds, the 
Contracting Parties undertake to develop procedures for the assessment of liability 
and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping (IMO, 1972). 
 Article 12: Contracting Parties pledge themselves to promote, within the competent 
specialised agencies and other international bodies, measures to protect the marine 
environment against pollution caused by:  
o (a) hydrocarbons, including oil, and their wastes;  
o (f) wastes or other matters directly arising from, or related to the exploration, 
exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources 
(IMO, 1972).  
Annex I 
Annex does not apply to substances which are rapidly rendered harmless by physical, 
chemical or biological processes in the sea provided they do not:  
1. make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or  
2. endanger human health or that of domestic animals. 
 
3.4.5.2 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, Entry into force: 4 March 2006. 
In essence, dumping is prohibited, except for materials on an approved list. This contrasts 
with the 1972 Convention which permitted dumping of wastes at sea, except for those 
materials on a banned list. In respect of a review of the compatibility of CO2 capture and 
storage in sub-seabed geological structures, as part of a suite of measures to tackle the 
challenge of climate change and ocean acidification the precautionary approach is stressed. 
The 1996 Protocol introduces (in Article 3) what is known as the "precautionary approach" as 
a general obligation. This requires that appropriate preventative measures are taken when 
there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the marine environment 
are likely to cause harm even when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation 
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between inputs and their effects (IMO, 1972). The article also states that the polluter should, 
in principle, bear the cost of pollution and it emphasizes that Contracting Parties should 
ensure that the Protocol should not simply result in pollution being transferred from one part 
of the environment to another (IMO, 1972). 
The 1996 Protocol states (in Article 4) that Contracting Parties "shall prohibit the dumping of 
any wastes or other matter with the exception of those listed (IMO, 1996)" (in Annex 1 to the 
Protocol). These materials include: 
 Dredged material 
 Sewage sludge  
 Fish waste, or material resulting from industrial fish processing operations  
 Vessels and platforms or other man-made structures at sea  
 Inert, inorganic geological material  
 Organic material of natural origin  
 Bulky items primarily comprising iron, steel, concrete and similar harmless materials, 
for which the concern is physical impact, and limited to those circumstances where 
such wastes are generated at locations, such as small islands with isolated 
communities, having no practicable access to disposal options other than dumping.  
Geographical coverage is wider, as it also governs storage of wastes in the seabed, as well as 
the abandonment, or toppling, of offshore installations (Article 1). 
Although the internal waters of a State are excluded from the dumping provisions under both 
the Convention and Protocol, Parties to the Protocol have the option to apply its rules to their 
internal waters if they wish (Article 7). 
The Protocol contains better linkages with other international environmental agreements 
(Basel Convention). 
Storage of CO2 under the seabed will be allowed from 10 February 2007, under amendments 
to an international convention governing the dumping of wastes at sea. 
For Contracting Parties to the London Protocol of which the UK is one, recent amendments 
regulate the sequestration of CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes in sub-seabed 
geological formations. This means that a basis has been created in international 
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environmental law to regulate carbon capture and storage (CCS) in sub-seabed geological 
formations, for permanent isolation, as part of a suite of measures to tackle the challenge of 
climate change and ocean acidification, including, first and foremost, the need to further 
develop low carbon forms of energy. In practice, this option would apply to large point 
sources of CO2 emissions, including power plants, steel and cement works. 
The amendments (entered into force on 10 February 2007) state that CO2 streams may only 
be considered for dumping, if: disposal is into a sub-seabed geological formation; they 
consist overwhelmingly of CO2 (they may contain incidental associated substances derived 
from the source material and the capture and sequestration processes used); and no wastes or 
other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of them. 
In conclusion, liability lies with the storage site operator (and also transport operator if at sea) 
under the precautionary principle. If storage takes place within internal waters only (which is 
unlikely in a UK context) then the London Dumping Convention does not need to apply. 
 
3.4.5.3 OSPAR Convention 
The operative provisions of the OSPAR Convention in respect of CCS activities are as 
follows. 
Article 2 of the Convention states that Contracting Parties shall take all possible steps to 
eliminate pollution and protect maritime area as well as safeguard human health.  It further 
states that, the precautionary principle shall be applied − preventative measures taken when 
reasonable grounds of concern exist that substances or energy introduced, directly or 
indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm 
living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate 
uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between 
the inputs and the effects. Polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of pollution 
prevention, control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter (OSPAR 
Commission, 1992). 
Article 21 of the OSPAR Convention is with regards to the Transboundry Pollution matter 
and it states that when pollution originating from a Contracting Party is likely to prejudice the 
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interests of one or more of the other Contracting Parties to the Convention, the Contracting 
Parties concerned shall enter into consultation, at the request of any one of them, with a view 
to negotiating a cooperation agreement (OSPAR Commission, 1992). 
 
Annex I 
Article 1 of the Annex I of the Convention states that when adopting programmes and 
measures for the purpose of this Annex, the Contracting Parties shall require, either 
individually or jointly, the use of best available techniques for point sources and best 
environmental practice for point and diffuse sources including, where appropriate, clean 
technology. 
Furthermore, the Article states that the Contracting Parties have to take preventive measures 
in order to minimise the risk of pollution caused by accidents. In addition, the Article also 
requires that the Contracting Parties take into account of the following when adopting 
programmes and measures in relation to radioactive substances (including waste): 
 The recommendations of the other appropriate international organisations and 
agencies; 
 The monitoring procedures recommended by these international organisations and 
agencies 
 
Annex II 
Article 3 of the Annex II states that the dumping of all wastes or other matter is prohibited, 
except for listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article (OSPAR Commission, 1992). The list 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is as follows: 
 dredged material; 
 inert materials of natural origin, that is solid, chemically unprocessed 
geological material the chemical constituents of which are unlikely to be 
released into the marine environment; 
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 sewage sludge until 31st December 1998; 
 fish waste from industrial fish processing operations; 
 vessels or aircraft until, at the latest, 31st December 2004; 
 CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes for storage provided that disposal is 
into a sub-soil geological formation; the streams consist overwhelmingly of 
CO2. They may contain incidental associated substances derived from the 
source material and the capture, transport and storage processes used; no 
wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes 
or other matter; they are intended to be retained in these formations 
permanently and will not lead to significant adverse consequences for the 
marine environment, human health and other legitimate uses of the maritime 
area (OSPAR Commission, 1992). 
 
Annex III 
Article 3 of Annex III prohibits any dumping of wastes or other matter from offshore 
installations. However, this does not include the discharge or emissions from offshore 
sources. Moreover, the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 does not apply to 
CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes for storage provided that the following conditions 
are met
3
: 
 Disposal is into a sub-soil geological formation; 
 The streams consist overwhelmingly of CO2 which may contain incidental 
associated substances derived from the source material and the capture, transport 
and storage processes used; 
 No wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes 
or other matter; 
                                                 
3
 This paragraph and the one which follows were introduced and adopted by amendments to the Annex agreed 
by OSPAR 2007 
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 They are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead 
to significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health 
and other legitimate uses of the maritime area (OSPAR Commission, 1992). 
 
Article 4 of this Annex states that the Contracting Parties have to make sure no streams 
referred to in the list above is disposed of in sub-soil geological formations without 
authorisation or regulation by their competent authorities. It further states that such 
authorisation or regulation shall implement the relevant applicable decisions, 
recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Convention (OSPAR 
Commission, 1992). 
 
3.4.5.4 OSPAR Decision 2007/2 on the Storage of Carbon Dioxide Streams in Geological 
Formations 
The purpose of the Decision is to seek the application of the OSPAR Guidelines for Risk 
Assessment and Management of Storage of CO2 Streams in Geological Formations.  
Accordingly, authorities shall ensure that CO2 streams, which are stored in geological 
formations, are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead to 
significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health and other 
legitimate uses of the maritime area. This Decision shall be applied to any regulatory action, 
such as the granting of permits or approvals by the competent authorities concerning the 
storage of CO2 streams in geological formations (OSPAR Commission, 2007). 
Storage in geological formations of CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes shall not be 
permitted by Contracting Parties without authorisation or regulation by their competent 
authorities. Any authorisation or regulation shall be in accordance with the OSPAR 
Guidelines for Risk Assessment and Management of Storage of CO2 Streams in Geological 
Formations, as updated from time to time. A decision to grant a permit or approval shall only 
be made if a full risk assessment and management process has been completed to the 
satisfaction of the competent authority and that the storage will not lead to significant adverse 
consequences for the marine environment, human health and other legitimate uses of the 
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maritime area. The provisions of the permit or approval shall ensure the avoidance of 
significant adverse effects on the marine environment, bearing in mind that the ultimate 
objective is permanent containment of CO2 streams in geological formations (OSPAR 
Commission, 2007).   
Any permit or approval issued shall contain at least:  
1. a description of the operation, including injection rates; 
2. the planned types, amounts and sources of the CO2 streams, including incidental 
associated substances, to be stored in the geological formation; 
3. the location of the injection facility; 
4. characteristics of the geological formations 
5. the methods of transport of the CO2 stream; 
6. a risk management plan that includes: 
 monitoring and reporting requirements ; 
 mitigation and remediation options including the pre-closure phases; and 
 a requirement for a site closure plan, including a description of post-closure 
monitoring and mitigation and remediation options; monitoring shall continue 
until there is confirmation that the probability of any future adverse 
environmental effects has been reduced to an insignificant level (OSPAR 
Commission, 2007). 
The competent authorities shall require reports, including post-closure reports on the results 
of the risk assessment and management process from the operator. The data from these 
reports shall be made available to the Commission. Sufficient stakeholder involvement shall 
be ensured in the process of risk assessment and management as to ensure completeness in 
the assessment process. 
This Decision entered into force, in respect of storage in accordance with Annex I to the 
Convention, on 15 January 2008 and, in respect of storage in accordance with Annexes II and 
III, from the date of entry into force of the amendments of those Annexes. Subsequent to the 
notification of a permit, the Contracting Party shall report to the next meeting of the 
appropriate OSPAR subsidiary body on the implementation of this Decision using, to the 
extent possible, the format as set out in Appendix Subsequent implementation reports shall be 
made annually. 
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In conclusion, regulation of CCS, especially in geological formations, is allowed under 
OSPAR and must follow national legislation, keeping in mind other international agreements. 
Perhaps there is room for an EU Directive to be superimposed over OSPAR without any 
contradiction as between the two regimes. The polluter pays and precautionary principles are 
to be observed in this regard. There are no specifics on liability of operators. Thus far, in a 
manner consistent with most international law, liability is placed on a national level 
(Contracting Party). Authorities must ensure that CO2 streams, which are stored in geological 
formations, are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead to 
significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health and other 
legitimate uses of the maritime area. Any authorisation or regulation must be in accordance 
with the OSPAR Guidelines for Risk Assessment and Management of Storage of CO2 
Streams in Geological Formations and must follow its updates as well as report to the 
relevant OSPAR subsidiary bodies. 
 
3.5 CCS in Other Jurisdictions and Lessons to be Learned 
3.5.1 Australia (Otway, Victoria State) 
CO2CRC (The Cooperative Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Technologies) has defined 
an operational Quality Health Safety and Environment Policy and has as a result developed a 
Management System. Insurance policies have been taken to ensure appropriate coverage for 
operational risks. The long term liability associated with the storage of CO2 will be covered 
under the Research Development and Demonstration approval provision under the Victorian 
Environment Protection Act, recognising that more comprehensive legislative cover would be 
necessary in the future for any commercial geo-sequestration projects. 
Onshore storage is to be legislated by the relevant state government, while federal legislation, 
consistent with the London Protocol, will cover offshore storage. However, the state 
governments have worked together to develop nationally consistent Australian Regulatory 
Guiding Principles. In addition to these guiding principles, applicable law concerning the 
position on liability comes in the form of the consultation upon and the results of the 2008 
Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Act. Consultations around the 
Act considered four possible positions on long term liability as follows: Government accepts 
all long term liability for CCS; Industry accepts all long term liability; Government and 
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industry share liability in some manner; or, the common law is the basis for liability. The 
2008 legislation opts for the last option in which the common law is to be the basis for 
liability on the basis that it: 
 Makes use of existing frameworks 
 Provides incentive to industry to take practical actions to minimise exposure 
 Provides a mechanism by which liabilities would be shared over time 
 Does not set new precedents for government policy 
It rejected other proposals owing to the fact that: 
 They could impose higher costs than necessary on industry through the need to 
contribute to a fund which would be held in perpetuity; 
 There was an issue as to determining the appropriate level of contribution to an 
industry fund; 
 There was a lack of clarity on liability sharing between industry and government. 
For the purposes of this research, a common law liability result is more manageable as it 
promotes the development of insurance products that can take their risk assessment and risk 
management cues from existing case law, while avoiding the uncertainties raised in this 
research in respect of emissions surrender allowances and the Environmental Liability 
Directive. Overall, the default common law liability position of the Australian Government 
would appear to be a favourable decision in respect of promoting innovation and investment 
in CCS. 
 
3.5.2 Norway (Sleipner) 
The Norwegian Sleipner project is an important precedent as the evidence base for CCS 
regulation in the UK is being built. This is the case for two reasons: thus far no significant 
leakage issues have arisen and the project has progressed as expected in this regard, secondly, 
the Sleipner project itself benefitted significantly from a carbon emission tax of €40 t/CO2. 
As such, public sector participation in financing the project loomed large in incentivising 
CCS in this jurisdiction. Interestingly, the Sleipner project is silent as to the liability of the 
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Demonstration Project Operator, in effect absolving the project of any long term liability for 
leakage and transferring that responsibility to the government. 
 
3.5.2.1 CCS under the Pollution Control Act  
The Pollution Control Act regulates emissions both at land and at sea within the economic 
zone. A company whose undertakings will result in large emissions must obtain an emissions 
permit pursuant to the Pollution Control Act and fulfil the formal terms of that permit. The 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority may set conditions to reduce or prevent emissions. 
For example, a condition in the permit for the new gas-fired power plant at Mongstad is that 
CCS technology be incorporated from the year 2014. 
An emissions permit does not include the transport, deposition and storage of CO2. This 
requires a specific permit. Because of the risks of leakage, the deposition and storage of CO2 
is considered pollution and requires a permit under the Norwegian Pollution Control Act 
(Norwegian Government, 1983). The Sleipner project for demonstrating storage of CO2 in 
geological offshore reservoirs was granted such a permit by the Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority after it had received an account of the environmental aspects of the project. 
 
3.5.2.2 CCS under the Petroleum Act 
The Norwegian State is the owner of the deposits of oil in the Norwegian territorial seas and 
has exclusive rights over the administration of the natural resources. CCS as part of 
petroleum activities, whether for the purpose of EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) or permanent 
storage on the continental shelf, is regulated by a permit under the Petroleum Act (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 1996). 
 
3.5.2.3 CCS under the Norwegian Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Act 
Industrial activities included in the Norwegian Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Act have 
to submit quotas equivalent to their emissions. 
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CO2 may leak during capture, transport or storage and at present, the responsibility for 
leakages is not satisfactorily regulated under Norwegian law. According to the Pollution 
Control Act, the owner of the CCS installation would primarily be responsible for leakages 
(Norwegian Government, 2004).  
On the other hand, it seems the system found in the Emission Trading Act places the 
responsibility for the leakage upon those who are obliged to submit quotas for emissions 
installations that form part of the chain. The alternative is to include each link of the chain in 
the emission trading system. This would oblige the owner of, for example, the transportation 
pipes, to submit quotas for any leakages from the pipes. 
 
3.5.3 Canada 
The Alberta Provincial Government set up a CAD 2 billion (as of 2008) CCS fund. Alberta's 
government has estimated that CCS could contribute around 70% of the province's CO2 
mitigation efforts and intends to have 3-5 projects operational by 2015. The Weyburn project 
has been operating for 10 years and provides an excellent example of how projects can 
operate across borders and boundaries (the Weyburn operations cover both sides of the US-
Canadian border) (ECOAL, 2010). 
In Alberta, the CCS Act will amend the Mines and Minerals Act so that a closure certificate 
will be issued upon the completion of a CCS Project (Makuch et al., 2012). Thereafter, the 
Government of Alberta will take on liability for the captured CO2, assuming all obligations of 
the party that injected it into the ground (the lessee) including: 
 Obligations as an owner and licensee under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of the 
wells and facilities covered by the agreement that authorized the injection of the CO2;  
 Obligations as the person responsible for the injected captured CO2 under the 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act; 
 Obligations as the operator under Part 6 of the Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Act in respect of the land within the location of the agreement used by 
the lessee in relation to the injection of CO2; and  
 Obligations under the Surface Rights Act.  
 99 
A closure certificate will be accompanied by a release of the lessee by the Government. The 
Government will also indemnify the lessee against liability for damages in an action in tort if 
liability arises in relation to an action or omission of the lessee occurring in the context of the 
initial permitted injection of CO2.  
In short, the issuance of a closure certificate results in the full-scale, permanent assumption 
by Alberta of all liabilities that may arise in relation to the injected CO2 (Averbach et al., 
2010).  
 
3.5.4 United States of America 
CCS-specific legislation is being developed on a state-by-state basis. There are several 
regional sequestration projects which highlight US action and co-operation on CCS at local 
level. In respect of CO2 injection, for maximized hydrocarbon extraction there is a 20 year 
history of environmental permitting experience. In North Dakota for example, all liability 
passes from the operator to the state within 10 years of the closure of a project (Javedan, no 
date).  
As the US Department of Interior has recently been criticised for its lax approach to issuing 
permits for oil and gas drilling, it has been mandated that the competent authority to deal with 
these issues will be the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. This authority is expected to 
draft comprehensive permit regulations for offshore oil and gas in the very near future. As for 
the matter of CCS, there exists a Class V Experimental Technology Well Guidance for Pilot 
Geologic Sequestration Projects drafted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
This document establishes some of the regulatory measures proposed for the implementation 
of CCS technology.  
The finalised requirements for CCS under the authority of the EPA include the development 
of a new class of storage wells (Class VI) to be used specifically for geological storage of 
CO2. The regulations for Class VI wells and CCS activities in general come under the 
authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act’s (SDWA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
Program. Also known as the Class VI rule, these requirements are designed to protect 
underground sources of drinking water. They address CO2 injection for long-term storage and 
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ensure that wells used for CO2 are appropriately sited, constructed, tested, monitored, funded 
and closed. Furthermore, the rule gives operators injection depth flexibility in various 
geological settings in which geologic sequestration may occur, including very deep 
formations and oil and gas fields that are transitioned for use as CO2 storage sites. 
It is of note that there is also a complimentary EPA ruling under the authority of the Clean 
Air Act. The US EPA has finalized reporting requirements under the Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program for facilities that inject CO2 underground for geological sequestration and 
all other facilities that inject CO2 underground. Thus, information obtained under the 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program will enable EPA to track the amount of CO2 received by 
these facilities. Detailed regulations for that legislation are forthcoming. 
Perhaps the most relevant document when looking at the way that the USA addresses CCS 
long-term liability for storage is the Underground Injection Control (UIC), Class VI Program 
Research and Analysis in Support of UIC Class VI Program, Financial Responsibility 
Requirements and Guidance. This document was signed and issued in late November 2010 
and contains relevant information regarding the future permitting of CCS on a Federal Level 
as well as stakeholder consultation feedback which was used by the EPA in drafting the 
guidance document. Especially important is the section which addresses Post-Injection Site 
Care (PISC) discussed below. 
PISC is the period after injection ceases but before site closure, during which the operator 
must continue monitoring to ensure US Drinking Water (USDW) protection from 
endangerment. Moreover, having a PISC monitoring plan is singled out as an important part 
of the CCS permitting process. The EPA has proposed that during PISC, owners or operators 
of Class VI wells would be required to periodically monitor the site and track the position of 
the CO2 plume and pressure front to ensure USDWs are not endangered. The proposed 
default PISC timeframe is 50 years after injection had been terminated. This timeframe was 
based on a review of research studies, industry reports and existing environmental programs. 
In order to support site-specific flexibility, the proposed rule stipulated that the PISC 
timeframe could be shortened by the Director after cessation of injection if the owner or 
operator is able to demonstrate that USDWs would not be endangered prior to 50 years. 
Similarly, if after 50 years the Director determined that USDWs may still become endangered 
by the CO2 plume and/or pressure front, they could lengthen the PISC timeframe.  
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Industrial stakeholders have since been consulted and have expressed a wish to reduce that 
timeframe citing significant, even prohibitive operative costs for such extensive periods. On 
the one hand, it was suggested by some that the PISC timeframe should be specific to the 
characteristics of a project including the predicted extent of the CO2 plume and the area of 
elevated pressure, geological factors, modelled predictions of CO2 trapping and subsurface 
geochemical reactions. In addition, they suggested that the PISC period be established in a 
case by case basis as part of the permitting process. On the other hand, others supported the 
50 years timeframe indicating that the risks of CCS are still unclear and thereby a 
conservative monitoring time is a good idea. Yet another group of stakeholders have 
proposed a combination of fixed time and performance standards as good balance between 
the two suggested options and as the preferable approach. 
The EPA acknowledges the merits of a performance-based approach for the PISC timeframe, 
especially recognizing the variety of site conditions that will affect the appropriate PISC 
timeframe, and therefore EPA officials have decided that the EPA Director will be in the best 
position to make a site-specific determination allowing for the PISC timeframe to be 
modified while ensuring USDWs are not endangered. Therefore, the EPA retains the 
proposed default 50-year PISC timeframe with additional flexibility allowed by discretion of 
the Director. This allows the Director discretion to shorten or lengthen the PISC timeframe 
during the PISC period based on site-specific data as well as affords them the discretion to 
approve a Class VI well owner or operator to demonstrate, based on substantial data gathered 
during the permitting process, that an alternative PISC timeframe is appropriate if it ensures 
non-endangerment of USDWs.  
With regards to site closure, the EPA has proposed that if a site is determined to no longer 
pose a risk of endangerment to USDW, the Director would be able to approve site closure 
and the operator would be required to properly close site operations. The closure activities are 
similar to those for other well classes and include plugging all monitoring wells, submitting a 
site closure report and recording a notation on the deed to the facility property or other 
documents that the land has been used to inject and store CO2. Operators are obligated by 
their permits to demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility for performing corrective 
action on wells in the area of review, injection well plugging, PISC and site closure and 
emergency and remedial response. These financial responsibility requirements ensure that 
owners or operators have the resources to carry out activities related to closing and 
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remediating GS sites if need be during injection or after wells are plugged but before site 
closure is approved so that they do not endanger USDWs.  
The proposed EPA approach to financial responsibility regulations follows previous systems 
for financial assurance of other classes of wells. This is typically performed through two 
broad categories of financial instruments: 
 Third party instruments: including surety bonds, financial guarantee bond or 
performance bond, letters of credit and an irrevocable trust fund  
 Self-insurance instruments: including corporate financial test and corporate 
guarantees 
Currently, the EPA believes that there is a need to adjust these instruments for CCS. 
However, it has indicated that such instruments can be supplemented by additional financial 
responsibility instruments. In addition, the EPA has chosen to allow for separate financial 
demonstration for injection well plugging and PISC (i.e. a demonstration which will be 
submitted prior to well plugging and the beginning of the post-injection site care period rather 
than with the permit application) (D. Edwin Hogle and Sharon L. Kercher, no date).  
Stakeholder consultations performed by the EPA have discussed the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of various financial responsibility instruments and expressed a specific concern 
for the risk of bank failures and corporate insolvency which has potential to leave financial 
obligations unfunded. Generally speaking, stakeholders are in agreement with the EPA in 
supporting the provision of separate financial instruments for injection well plugging and 
PISC. There has been, however, concern about potentially high costs and long time frames of 
CCS with some stakeholders believing that financial assurances would be difficult to obtain, 
particularly though the duration of PISC and may discourage investment. Furthermore, 
stakeholders also expressed the need for regulatory certainty to help inform financial 
requirements for well owners and operators. The EPA was proposed to be the competent 
authority which specifies the acceptability of various financial responsibility instruments, 
specifically acting to inform State legislatures with information on what instruments they 
should approve in order to meet Federal requirements.  
Despite the general approval for additional financial responsibility instruments to supplement 
those established by previous regulations, it has been suggested that the proposed framework 
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leaves too much discretion to the EPA Director which may leave operators with a heightened 
risk of having their financial instrument of choice rejected. In order for operators to operate 
with flexibility in their choice of instrument, it has been proposed that the Director would be 
allowed discretion of choice in assessing these instruments, but would have to do so in the 
context of operational and site-specific factors, including the assessment of project risk over 
time. This conditional approach is a sensible proposal. 
The Environmental Financial Advisory Board (EFAB) agreed that both self-insurance and 
third-party insurance should be made available to responsible parties. They have also 
supported the requirement that third-party providers, such as insurers, pass financial strength 
requirements, such as the use of credit ratings, to demonstrate financial strength, stipulating 
that the owner or operator should notify the Director in the event of bankruptcy. The EFAB 
also agreed that financial responsibility requirements ought to be linked to cost estimates, 
with regular updates to both cost estimates and financial responsibility demonstrations. 
Additionally, the EFAB specifically recommended (Environmental Financial Advisory Board 
(EFAB)):  
 The use of standardised language for financial instruments. (Although EFAB did not 
recommend the use of standardized policy language for insurance, they did suggest 
that procedures be adopted so that the Director can specifically agree to limitations 
contained in the insurance policy or specifically reject such limitations during the 
review process). 
 That the owner or operator be required to notify the Director by certified mail of any 
proceeding under bankruptcy within 10 business days after the commencement of the 
proceeding. 
 That owners or operators be deemed to not possess the required financial 
responsibility in the event of bankruptcy, insolvency, or a suspension or revocation of 
the license or charter of the third party when using letters of credit, surety bonds, or 
insurance policies or loss of authority of the third party to act as a trustee when using 
a trust fund. 
 That because the RCRA financial mechanisms, which are largely used in the SDWA 
Class I program, were developed based on hazardous waste facility owner's or 
operator's considerations, there may be differences in the owner or operator profiles 
for proposed Geological Storage facilities that warrant additional assurance 
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mechanisms. Thus, the Agency should consider adding a new category of financial 
assurance to the Class VI program that provides the Agency with the flexibility to 
approve the "functional equivalent" to the established RCRA financial assurance tests. 
 That the EPA considers the use of rate-based financing, a new category of instrument 
that would provide the Director with the flexibility to approve instruments that are 
functionally equivalent to existing qualifying instruments.  
Having consulted stakeholders and the EFAB, the EPA has announced its decision for final 
regulation to retain the substantive requirements that owners or operators of class VI wells 
must demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility to cover cost of corrective action, 
injection well plugging, PISC and site closure and emergency and remedial response. The 
EPA also proposed that this regulation be modified in order to provide clarity on acceptable 
instruments and to enhance the enforceability of such financial requirements as well as set 
reporting timeframes to provide consistency with other EPA regulations. Specifically, the 
EPA has clarified the financial responsibility requirements by:  
 Describing "qualifying instruments" to cover the cost of corrective action, injection 
well plugging, PISC and site closure, and emergency and remedial response in a 
manner that prevents endangerment of USDWs.  
 Adding language clarifying that the financial responsibility instrument is directly 
enforceable regardless of whether the requirement is a condition of the permit.  
 Requiring submission of annual inflationary updates and specifying a 60-day 
timeframe after notification by the Director for the submission of written updates of 
adjustments to the cost estimate.  
 Requiring owners or operators to notify the Director no later than 10 days after filing 
for bankruptcy.  
 Requiring an owner or operator or its guarantor using self-insurance to demonstrate 
financial responsibility for GS to meet a Tangible Net Worth of an amount approved 
by the Director; have both a net working capital and a tangible net worth of at least 
six times the sum of the current well plugging, post-injection site care and site closure 
cost; have assets located in the US amounting to at least 90 percent of total assets or at 
least six times the sum of the current well plugging, post-injection site care and site 
closure cost; submit annual report of bond rating and financial information; and either 
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1) Pass a bond rating test issued by one or both of the nationally recognized 
bond rating agencies, Standard & Poor's and Moody's for which the bond's 
rating must be one of the four highest categories (i.e., AAA, AA, A, or 
BBB for Standard & Poor's or AAA, AA, A, or Baa for Moody's)); or,  
2) Meet all of the following five financial ratio thresholds:  
 A ratio of total liabilities to net worth less than 2.0  
 A ratio of current assets to current liabilities greater than 1.5  
 A ratio of the sum of net income plus depreciation, depletion, 
and amortization to total liabilities greater than 0.1;  
 A ratio of current assets minus current liabilities to total assets 
greater than -0.1;  
 A net profit (revenues minus expenses) greater than 0.  
These requirements are not meant to duplicate existing financial responsibility regulations but 
are instead tailored to the unique characteristics and requirements of CCS. Considering the 
potential high costs associated with large scale CCS deployment, the EPA wishes to ensure 
appropriate and continuous financial mechanisms are in place throughout the lifetime of a 
project and that costs associated with CCS operation are not passed along to public. The EPA 
thus supports stringent self-insurance instruments in addition to annual evaluations of 
financial instruments minimizing the potential for institutions that have passed the financial 
test to then suffer financial difficulties which would hinder the financial demonstration of 
CCS projects. 
The EPA does not have authority under SDWA to be the direct or indirect beneficiary of a 
trust fund under this statute for the purpose of establishing financial responsibility for CCS 
projects. The EPA must comply with the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and therefore standby 
trust funds are not allowed to be the sole financial instruments that can be used by an owner 
or operator to demonstrate financial responsibility. Standby trusts must be used in 
conjunction with certain types of  financial responsibility instruments (e.g., surety bonds, 
letters of credit or escrow accounts) in order to enable the EPA to be party to the financial 
responsibility agreement. The final EPA ruling identifies the following qualifying financial 
instruments for Class VI wells, all of which must be sufficient to address endangerment of 
USDWs. Moreover, standby trusts are not needed for options 1, 4, and 5.  
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1) Trust Funds: If using a trust fund, owners or operators are required to set aside funds 
with a third party trustee sufficient to cover estimated costs. During the financial 
responsibility demonstration, the owner or operator may be required to deposit the 
required amount of money into the trust prior to the start of injection or during the 
"pay- in period" if authorized by the Director.  
2) Surety Bond: Owners or operators may use a payment surety bond or a performance 
surety bond to guarantee that financial responsibility will be fulfilled. In case of 
operator default, a payment surety bond funds a standby trust fund in the amount 
equal to the face value of the bond and sufficient to cover estimated costs, and a 
performance surety bond guarantees performance of the specific activity or payment 
of an amount equivalent to the estimated costs into a standby trust fund.  
3) Letter of Credit: A letter of credit is a credit document, issued by a financial 
institution, guaranteeing that a specific amount of money will be available to a 
designated party under certain conditions. In case of operator default, letters of credit 
fund standby trust funds in an amount sufficient to cover estimated costs.  
4) Insurance: The owner or operator may obtain an insurance policy to cover the 
estimated costs of GS activities requiring financial responsibility. This insurance 
policy must be obtained from a third party to decrease the possibility of failure (i.e., 
non-captive insurer).  
5)  Self-Insurance (i.e., Financial Test and Corporate Guarantee): Owners or operators 
may self-insure through a financial test provided certain conditions are met. The 
owner or operator needs to pass a financial test to demonstrate profitability, with a 
margin sufficient to cover contingencies and unknown obligations, and stability. If the 
owner or operator meets corporate financial test criteria, this is an indication that the 
owner or operator can guarantee its ability to satisfy financial obligations based solely 
on the strength of the company's financial condition. An owner or operator who is not 
able to meet corporate financial test criteria may arrange a corporate guarantee by 
demonstrating that its corporate parent meets the financial test requirements on its 
behalf. The parent's demonstration that it meets the financial test requirement is 
insufficient if it has not also guaranteed to fulfil the obligations for the owner or 
operator.  
6) Escrow Account: Owners or operators may deposit money to an escrow account to 
cover financial responsibility requirements. This account must segregate funds 
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sufficient to cover estimated costs for GS financial responsibility from other accounts 
and uses.  
7) Other instrument(s) satisfactory to the Director: In addition to these instruments, EPA 
anticipates that new instruments that may be tailored to meet GS needs may emerge, 
and may be determined appropriate for use by the Director for the purpose of financial 
responsibility demonstrations.  
The final rule specifies that the qualifying financial responsibility instrument must include 
protective conditions of coverage, including, but not limited to: cancellation, renewal and 
continuation provisions; specifications on when the provider becomes liable in case of 
cancellation if there is a failure to renew with a new qualifying financial instrument; and 
requirements for the provider to meet a minimum credit rating, minimum capitalization, and 
ability to pass the bond rating when applicable. This clarification was made in direct response 
to issues raised by commenter’s for numerous instruments and also to make sure that there is 
no gap in coverage should a financial instrument fails. Furthermore, it requires the owner or 
operator to have a detailed written estimate, in current US dollars, of the cost of: performing 
corrective action on wells in the area of review, plugging the injection well(s), PISC and site 
closure and emergency and remedial response. A cost estimate must be prepared separately 
for each of these activities and be based on the costs to the owner or operator of hiring a third 
party (who is neither a parent nor a subsidiary of the owner or operator) to perform the 
activities. The EPA will not allow for a separate financial responsibility demonstration for 
well plugging and PISC (i.e., a demonstration submitted prior to well plugging and the 
beginning of the PISC period rather than with the permit application). A demonstration of 
financial responsibility for all phases of the GS project will be required prior to the issuance 
of a Class VI permit, however, an owner or operator may demonstrate financial responsibility 
by using one or multiple qualifying financial instruments for specific GS activities, thereby 
realizing greater flexibility and cost savings from this regulation. 
It must be noted also that the EPA has added language that a financial responsibility 
instrument is directly enforceable regardless of whether the requirement is a condition of the 
permit or not. It also specifies circumstances under which an owner or operator may be 
released from a financial instrument, including that the owner or operator has completed the 
geological storage project activity for which the financial instrument was required and has 
fulfilled all financial obligations as determined by the Director, or has submitted a 
 108 
replacement financial instrument and received written approval from the Director accepting 
the new financial instrument and releasing the owner or operator from the previous financial 
instrument. The Director's determination of completion of a geological storage project 
activity may be sustained by a professional engineer's report on completion as well as by 
guidance (currently being developed), which will provide direction to the Director for when a 
demonstration may no longer be adequate to cover the GS activities.  
As a Federal agency, the EPA’s remit is to create a nationally consistent financial 
responsibility program for CCS activities, however it does, simultaneously provide State 
permitting authorities with an appropriate level of flexibility. The EPA is in the process of 
developing guidance on financial responsibilities for owners or operators of Class VI in order 
to assist said stakeholders in evaluating the financial responsibility requirements for Class VI 
wells and to assist Directors in evaluating financial responsibility demonstrations. 
Additionally, under SDWA authority, owners or operators of injection wells must ensure the 
protection of underground sources of drinking water from endangerment and are subject to 
liability for enforcement under the USDW Act.  
Once an owner or operator has met all regulatory requirements under Part 146 for Class VI 
wells and the Director has approved the site, the owner or operator will generally no longer 
be subject to enforcement under section 1423 of SDWA for noncompliance with UIC 
regulatory requirements. However, an owner or operator may be held liable for regulatory 
noncompliance under certain circumstances even after site closure is approved such in cases 
where the owner or operator provided erroneous data to support an approval of site closure. 
In addition, an owner or operator may always be subject to an order should the Administrator 
deem necessary to protect the health of persons under section 1431 of the SDWA after site 
closure if there is fluid migration that causes or threatens imminent and substantial 
endangerment to a USDW. For example, the Administrator may issue a SDWA section 1431 
order if a well may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of 
persons, and the State and local authorities have not acted to protect the health of such 
persons. The order may include commencing a civil action for appropriate relief. If the owner 
or operator fails to comply with the order, they may be subject to a civil penalty for each day 
in which such violation occur or failure to comply continues. Furthermore, after site closure, 
an owner or operator may, depending on the fact scenario, remain liable under tort and other 
remedies, or under other Statutes including, but not limited to, Clean Air Act. 
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Under current SDWA provisions, the EPA does not have authority to transfer liability from 
one entity (i.e., owner or operator) to another.  
 
3.6 Assessment of Risks from Similar Industries 
This section of the thesis examines three mature regulatory and financial regimes that may 
inform the manner in which liability should be managed in a CCS context. They include oil 
and gas facility permitting, the management of oil spills at sea, the nuclear industry and 
landfill site regulation.  
 
3.6.1 Oil and Gas Industries  
What is being covered in this section is comparable to Carbon Capture and Storage’s  
financial and regulatory aspects in the sense that in both cases an international pool fund may 
be appropriate in case of incidents such as leakage or structural failure of the vessels 
(Makuch et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, funds could be drawn down to cover the cost of damages. The consequences of 
the failure of both cases i.e. Oil and Gas spills and CCS are broadly similar. When such 
vessels fail or leak, oil and gas gets released into either the atmosphere or water. Similarly, 
failure of CCS projects has the same consequences. If there is a leak in deep geological 
formations, the captured CO2 can potentially be released into the atmosphere and in case 
there is a leak in the ocean, the captured CO2 can potentially be released into the water 
making the water acidic and subsequently harming marine life. 
During transportation of gas or oil, care must be observed to ensure that it is not spilt or no 
leakage occurs as this poses a threat to the human health and safety and that of the 
environment. 
To deal with the risks involved in this industry, several types of insurance regimes have been 
developed. Vehicles transporting oil or gas are insured against potential risks of fire in 
addition to other risks that may be faced with during transportation of these sources of energy 
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(Broderick et al., 2000). In case hazards results during production of gas, litigation on who 
pays for the losses suffered makes an assessment on whether the contamination could have 
been avoided or it was accidental (Tjernshaugen, 2008). The amounts paid in insurance vary 
across the nations given the legal and institutional frameworks guiding the process (Pritchard, 
2005). 
 Jurisdiction 
The Convention (1992 Conventions on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage) applies.  
a) To pollution damage caused:  
 In the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State 
 In the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting State, establishment in 
accordance with international law, or, if a Contracting State has not established 
such a zone, in an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of that State in 
accordance with international law and extending not more than 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured 
 
b) To preventive measures, whenever taken, to prevent or minimize such damages. 
 
 Regime Type 
The international financial fund mentioned holds the funds contributed by each member 
states in each calendar year. The way in which this contribution amount is calculated has 
been explained in the “Amount” sub-section (pertaining to the fund pool). 
 Risk Type 
The possible risks associated with oil and gas rigs are mainly owed to adverse weather 
conditions such as super storms, hurricanes, earthquakes and other violent sea conditions, 
different modes of structural failures of the vessels which could result in the complete 
collapse of the rig and human error and/or negligence which could cause different problems 
such as fire and subsequently leakage of both oil and gas. 
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Furthermore, oil and gas could escape to drains, and into houses, or escape into cities with 
varying consequences for people and the environment. 
 Risk Longevity 
The type of risks mentioned can exist for as long as oil is being drilled, recovered and 
shipped. Furthermore, the risks can also exist when the recovery of oil is finished and the 
wells are closed due to aging of the well plug. 
 Who Pays 
An International Fund for Compensation for pollution damage named “The International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund 1992” pays the costs of the damages resulted from an accident 
providing that the Fund cannot prove that the accident was intentional or as a result of 
negligence and misconduct. 
According to Article 10, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the Convention, annual contributions to 
the fund are to be made in respect of each Contracting State by any person who in the 
calendar year has received in total quantities exceeding 150,000 tones. 
 Amount 
In order to assess the amount of annual contributions of each member state, if any, and taking 
account of the fact that there needs to be sufficient liquid funds available, the Assembly 
makes an estimate in the form of a budget of Expenditure and Income for each calendar year: 
The Assembly decides the total amount of contribution needed to be levied from the 
Contracting States. On the basis of that decision, the Director, calculates the amount annual 
contribution for each person referred to in Article 10 of this Convention. 
The maximum amount of compensation payable by the Fund is 200 million units of account 
with respect to any incident occurring during any period when there are three Parties to this 
Convention in respect of which the combined relevant quantity of contributing oil received 
by persons in the territories of such Parties, during the preceding calendar year, equalled or 
exceeded 600 million tons. 
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“The units of account” is the special Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The amounts mentioned will need to be converted into national currency. 
A tanker owner's liability limit under the Civil Liability Convention depends on the size of 
the tanker. The liability limits set out in the Civil Liability Convention in respect of claims 
following a spill of persistent oil are as follows: 
o For all tankers with a gross tonnage up to 5,000: 4.51 million Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR);  
o For tankers with a gross tonnage of between 5,000 and 140,000: 4.51 
million SDR plus 631 SDR for each gross ton in excess of 5,000; and  
o For tankers with a gross tonnage of 140,000 and over: 89.77 million SDR. 
 
 Risk Measure Effectiveness 
Noting that there have been no defaults on fund pay-outs to date, there is little financial risk 
with this instrument. On a practical note, if the best available technologies are applied to 
minimise the risks such as structural failure of different members within the structure of the 
vessel, then the main risks will be owing to severe weather conditions and human error and 
negligence. 
Furthermore, vessels leak oil when they are not designed to a high standard that meets 
international requirements (double hull instead of single hull). Therefore, the design method 
also needs to be considered too as one of the most important factors in the stability of the 
vessels. 
 
3.6.2 Nuclear Power Plants 
The main safety issues that nuclear power stations may face include:  
 Waste Management: In relation to radioactive material storage and disposal, one has 
to ensure that the right technical standards are put in place in order to protect public 
safety and the environment. 
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 Leak of Radiation: In relation to plant level operations, one has to constantly 
implement preventive measures in order to protect people and the environment from 
harmful effects of ionising radiation on and off site. 
The risk longevity for radioactive waste is significant. High-level radioactive waste is 
generally material from the core of the nuclear reactor or nuclear weapons. Most of the 
radioactive isotopes in high level waste emit large amounts of radiation and have extremely 
long half-lives (some longer than 100,000 years) creating long time periods before the waste 
will settle to safe levels of radioactivity. Therefore, the potential risks can last for 100,000 
years. The potential risks of nuclear facilities and CCS are similar in terms of the possibility 
of leakage (Makuch et al., 2011). Although, clearly radioactive leakage contamination is 
more dangerous than CO2 leakage and as such potential environmental damage for 
radioactive leakage is much higher. 
Support from nuclear power plants from the public declined following the Fukushima and 
Nagasaki crisis. The risks experienced in this industry emanate from issues of storage of 
wastes from nuclear power plants, leakage at the industries’ sites and earthquakes (Smith and 
Maremont, 2011). This leakage could lead to devastating impacts to the human health and the 
environment. Furthermore, these emissions may be taken up by plants and bio accumulate in 
living organisms thereby the impacts of any leakage would continue being experienced long 
after an accidents. Moreover, leakage could also result from accidents in the industry.  
 
3.6.2.1 The UK Nuclear Installations Act (1965) 
In the UK, we find one of the toughest and most thorough regulatory frameworks for the 
nuclear sector in the world. Nuclear liabilities are covered by the Nuclear Installations Act 
1965 as amended. The licensee is required to provide cover for third party claims within the 
limits prescribed by the Act in accordance with arrangements approved by the Health and 
Safety Executive (or the Scottish Executive for Scotland). The Health and Safety Executive 
(or the Scottish Executive) will review the adequacy of the licensee’s section 19 cover, which 
may be provided by insurance, indemnity or other approved means. This will usually be done 
when a new site is licensed, when there is a new licensee, or when there is a change to the 
insurance status of the site. 
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In the UK, the Energy Act 1983 brought legislation into line with earlier revisions to the 
Paris/Brussels Conventions and set a new limit of liability for particular installations. After 
that, in 1994 this limit was increased to £140 million for each major installation. Therefore, 
the operator is liable for claims up to this amount and must insure accordingly.  
 Who Pays 
The majority of this insurance is provided by a pool of UK insurers comprising 8 insurance 
companies and 16 Lloyds syndicates (Nuclear Risk Insurers Limited (NRI)). 
 Amount 
Beyond £140 million, the current Paris/Brussels system applies, with government 
contribution to €360 million. The Government was planning legislation for 2010 which 
would require insurance above the £140 million level, and towards the €700 million level 
specified under the 2004 Paris/Brussels Protocol (when it enters force), this to be provided by 
government at commercial rates. 
The most recent site management contract, signed in 2008 for Sellafield lasts for 17 years and 
expects the operator (Areva) to insure itself against the first £140m of an accident, the 
balance being covered by the Government. 
 Risk Measure Effectiveness 
The risk of waste mismanagement is minimal and so is the risk of leakage. The only other 
possible major risk is the risk of the core being melted. This has not occurred since the partial 
core meltdown of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generation Station 1979. Nowadays, the 
nuclear industry believes that the power stations are 100% safe. However, there is always a 
possibility of radiation leakage and problems arising with mismanagement of the nuclear 
waste based upon human error. 
 Liquidity 
The funds will be available by the insurance companies that will insure the power station in 
case an accident or disaster is occurs. According to the Word Nuclear Association, operators 
of nuclear power plants are liable for any damage caused by them, regardless of fault. 
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 Duration 
The instrument will remain active for as long as the power station is not decommissioned and 
is still working and generating electricity. In relation to flexibility, the instrument may be 
amended by the Government or the insurance companies if need be. 
 
3.6.2.2 The US Price-Anderson Act (1957)  
The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act is a United States federal law, first 
passed in 1957 and since renewed several times, which governs liability-related issues for all 
civil nuclear facilities constructed in the United States before 2026. The main purpose of the 
Act is to partially indemnify the nuclear industry against liability claims arising from nuclear 
incidents while still ensuring compensation coverage for the general public. The Act 
establishes a no fault insurance-type system in which the first approximately $12.6 billion (as 
of 2011) is industry-funded as described in the Act (any claims above $12.6 billion would be 
covered by the federal government) (USNRC, 2011). 
Power reactor licensees are required by the act to obtain the maximum amount of insurance 
against nuclear related incidents which is available in the insurance market (as of 2011, $375 
million per plant) (USNRC, 2011). Any monetary claims that fall within this maximum 
amount are paid by the insurer(s). The Price-Anderson fund, which is financed by the reactor 
companies themselves, is then used to make up the difference. Each reactor company is 
obliged to contribute up to $111.9 million in the event of an accident. As of 2008, the 
maximum amount of the fund is approximately $11.6 billion if all of the reactor companies 
were required to pay their full obligation to the fund (USNRC, 2011). This fund is not paid 
into unless an accident occurs. However, fund administrators are required to have 
contingency plans in place to raise funds using loans to the fund, so that claimants may be 
paid as soon as possible. Actual payments by companies in the event of an accident are 
capped at $17.5 million per year until either a claim has been met, or their maximum 
individual liability (the $111.9 million maximum) has been reached. 
Over the first 43 years of the Price-Anderson Act to 2000, secondary insurance claims did not 
arise. A total of $151 million was paid to cover claims (including legal expenses), all from 
 116 
primary insurance, including $70 million for Three Mile Island. Additionally, the Department 
of Energy paid about $65 million to cover claims under liability for its own nuclear 
operations in the same period. 
 
3.6.3 Waste Management Sites – Landfill  
Landfill sites represent a potentially useful comparison with CCS storage sites on the basis 
that both facilities entail risk of leakage during the site life and well beyond it. Both sites 
feature risks that arise beneath the earth’s surface (and as such are conventionally out of 
view) and both risks may be large. 
In legal terms, there are also similarities in that regulatory authorities use a permit mechanism 
as the primary regulator of standards and liability issues are addressed through this 
mechanism. The two sites are dissimilar in that landfill sites are at their greatest service to the 
public interest during the life of the site (i.e. before site closure) whereas CCS storage sites 
serve the public interest during the entire life of the sight, at least because the storage of the 
greenhouse gas emissions prevents their release into the environment on a permanent basis. 
For private firms in the waste management business, there is also the comparative advantage 
of decades of experience in site management and the uses of well-established technologies 
for landfill management. By contrast, CCS storage site investors and operators are required to 
shoulder the operational and long term risks of an emerging technology which the 
Government has accepted as a key component of greenhouse gas emissions abatement 
strategy for long term compliance with national, European Union and international laws and 
imperatives. Noting the public and environmental interest functions served by CCS and the 
large range of risk evaluation and decision-making powers available to regulators, there is an 
issue as to the fairness of placing essentially all of the risk on storage site operators rather 
than sharing that risk with Government and/or putting appropriate risk mitigation instruments 
in place at a regulatory level. 
 Jurisdiction 
The first contemporary waste legislation in the UK came by way of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 as subsequently amended by the Environment Act, 1995. 
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In the UK, the EU Landfill Directive 1999/31/EC was transposed into UK law in 2002. The 
Environmental Permitting Regulations, 2010, SI 675 and SI 676 now supplement the said 
Directive.  
 Objective 
The objective of this legislation is to reduce the dependence on landfill sites, which are 
rapidly filling up, and will be full soon, and to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases such 
as methane and CO2, which cause global warming and damage the upper atmosphere by 
destroying the ozone layer. Furthermore, certain metals are becoming scarce and recycling 
will reduce the need to make new quarries and mines. The legislation also seeks to improve 
public health, protect water supplies and aquifers. It is aimed at stopping run-off (leachate) 
from waste getting into water supplies (and reducing rodent and vermin populations).  
 Régime Type 
The regulatory regime in place is highly similar to that established by the CCS Directive with 
both focusing upon technical compliance through environmental permitting of facilities. 
As a complement to the permitting regime for guarding against environmental damage, there 
is a Landfill Tax which encourages a reduction in the amount of waste created and disposed 
of in landfills. Imposed limits to national percentages of waste disposed of in this way. The 
risk of both EU (where the Environment Agency has not sufficiently well-enforced 
compliance with Waste Directives) and UK fines for non-compliance encourages appropriate 
regulatory compliance behaviour.  
 Risk Types 
There are factual and potential risks associated with landfill site operations. Factual risk 
appears as damage to the environment from uncontrolled waste disposal, such as vermin, 
water sources damage, fly tipping and chemical and oil damage to the land (future crops and 
ground use). Waste tips and landfill sites do give off methane, it can be seen burning and 
smelt, and this does damage the upper atmosphere.   
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Potential risk is the possibility of future damage of the kind mentioned above as well as 
chemical damage to the atmosphere that has not yet been proven. The flow of leachate into 
ground water supplies continues to be a large concern in the post-closure period.  
 Risk Longevity 
In sealed “tombs”, waste can decay for a minimum of 20-30 years resulting in methane (used 
or burnt off) and inert residue. In dry conditions the relevant waste will not decay as well, and 
thus the threat of damage can last longer. It is also possible that extraction equipment will 
decay and where site management seeks to reduce the period of decay and emissions, to 
reduce costs of equipment and loss of use of the land this can exacerbate the risks identified 
with landfill sites in their post-closure phases. 
 Who Pays 
In respect of three phases of investment in landfill sites (pre-operational, operational and 
closure), it is the site operator that has financial responsibility and therefore liability for the 
landfill site. Once the Environment Agency is satisfied that the site does not represent a 
hazard to the environment, then the operator's responsibilities in respect of maintenance, 
monitoring and control end. Insurance and longer term financial guarantees are the 
instruments that are generally in use to cover conventional environmental liabilities. This is to 
be contrasted with the absence of long term liability insurance mechanisms pertaining to 
CCS. 
 Amount 
According to industry insiders, the costs that arise in respect of planning and permitting 
consents before a landfill operation is opened for business are in the region of £2 million. 
Thus, landfill sites must have a minimum 1.5 million cubic meter minimum capacity if they 
are to be profitable at all. Profits on turnover for larger operations have been +/- 5% of annual 
turnover. These figures rest against the backdrop of the policy goal to raise landfill costs (in 
part by the Landfill Tax) with operators paying £48 tax per tonne (rising £8 per year to 2013 
at least) as a means of encouraging alternatives pertaining to reduction, reuse, recycling and 
energy from waste. There is little evidence that financial guarantees have not been sufficient 
in respect of any post closure long-term liabilities for contemporary landfill circumstances. 
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According to the Right Honourable Caroline Jackson, the Member of the European 
Parliament that steered the EU Landfill Directive through the EU Parliament, Landfill 
charges internalise these financial guarantees so that they do not represent an added cost to 
waste management firms themselves. 
 Risk Effectiveness 
By containing waste in “tombs”, the liquid leachate and waste gases are controlled and 
contained. Once isolated, they can be dealt with and separated from human activity. 
However, further to the July/August Municipal Solid Waste Management Journal, the most 
common landfill management method still has its problems as follows: 
The problem with the dry-tomb approach to landfill design is that it leaves the waste in an 
active state for a very long period of time. If in the future there is a breach in the cap or a 
break in the liner and liquids enter the landfill, degradation would start and leachate and gas 
would be generated. Therefore, dry-tomb landfills need to be monitored and maintained for 
very long periods of time (some say perpetually), and someone (normally the State 
Government) needs to be responsible for stepping in and taking corrective action when a 
problem is detected. Nevertheless, even in the United States which has a large history with 
landfills, federal legislative rules require only 30 years of post-closure monitoring by the 
landfill operator and do not require the operator to set aside funds for future corrective action. 
 Certainty 
The disposal of waste by landfill goes back to Roman times. It is an inexpensive form of 
waste disposal, but it has enduring environmental problems associated with it. Against the 
background of significant and demonstrable environmental effects with landfill sites 
including in their post-closure phases it is encouraging that most landfills are properly closed 
and de-commissioned before they come under a duty of care of the Government. In this 
context, it is appropriate that the financial guarantee – that is collected as part of landfill 
tipping fee rates – should cease to apply in connection with the site closure stage. 
The nature of the financial guarantee is such that it is mandated and administered in the legal 
jurisdiction of the UK. No insolvency issues have arisen with the vast majority of firms that 
deliver landfill services, as there is a financial fitness test that applies to such firms. 
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Moreover, the financial guarantee is normally registered with and remains on deposit with the 
regulated, major chartered bank. 
 Liquidity 
As public taxes, industrial charges and guarantees apply to landfills in the form of obligations 
to the Government that must be fulfilled as a condition of permit compliance (i.e., the right to 
operate a business which involved significant front end expenditure and hence a desire to 
recover upon said investment), there is no obvious risk of default. Moreover, even if a site 
were orphaned, in theory landfill tax revenues could be diverted to remediation objectives if 
there were the regulatory need to do so.  As remediation orders can be granted without trial, 
the legal process for obtaining compensation by way of financial guarantee is as 
straightforward as obtaining an order from a judge in chambers. For emergency remediation 
activities, this can occur on the same day as the order is filed. 
 Flexibility 
The law applies to all disposals at landfill sites, so it is not flexible in respect of compliance 
obligations. The nature of the financial guarantee is that it is operative throughout the life and 
de-commissioning of the site. As such, it is not prone to the complexity and inflexibility of 
attaching different financial guarantees (and indeed different capped amounts) to specific 
operational phases (pre-operational, operational, pre-decommissioning, de-commissioned, 
and closed). As such, financial guarantees in respect of landfills are maximally flexible in 
respect of the period to which the damage applies. There is little evidence that actual damage 
caused has exceeded the amount specified in waste management permit conditions and so 
additional payments have not arisen as a remediation requirement.  
The possibility exists of private civil action as between the site operator and neighbours that 
have occasioned damage as a result of the off-site migration of pollution from a landfill site 
but this is a matter for common law remedies (in nuisance, trespass, negligence, riparian 
rights or Rylands v Fletcher). It is not a matter for regulation as between the Government and 
the landfill site operator. Arguably, the same situation should apply in relation to CCS storage 
sites, as the Government is not traditionally seen as the locus for private law-based remedies 
as between neighbours in analogous circumstances. Such an approach has been taken to CCS 
liabilities in the Australian context. 
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3.6.3.1 EU Landfill Directive (1999) – ‘upon site closure’ comparison 
3.6.3.1.1 Operating, Before Site Closure 
Under the Landfill Directive, a site operator must produce a plan of the site and the proposed 
operations procedure, with staffing, sorting and traffic flows. There are two main issues that 
this directive looks at, the type of waste placed at the site, and the result to the local water 
aquifers and ground water. The latter must not be damaged or polluted by the liquid run-off 
or leachate. A planning or competent authority will monitor the site use and filling. 
As a site is used, the plan will show which areas of the site, often a former quarry or pit, will 
be used and in what order. This will be to allow areas furthest from the entrance to be filled 
up first, so they can be stabilised and covered as part of the process of capping and making 
the site dormant after use. However it may be that to reduce run-off, the competent authority 
wants another order of use, so no leachate gets into the ground or water courses. 
When a site is approaching closure, or when the competent authority wants to close it, the 
operator must give notice and produce a closure plan of how the site will be shut down, 
covered, waste gases and liquids collected, testing and monitoring, staffing and pollution 
control. All records must be available to the competent authority, copied or transferred, and a 
testing regime and site-monitoring plan agreed. An environmental impact statement may be 
required. 
During filling of the site there will be inspections by both operator and the competent 
authority. There must be communications between both sides, and good record keeping of the 
fill type, problems, and plans of progress showing where the fill level was at certain dates, 
with photographs. 
Site insurance will be required to meet potential obligations regarding damage, nuisance and 
long term monitoring. The fee will reflect the financial standing of the site operator. 
Depending on the site's size, samples and site monitoring may be carried out regularly by in-
house or contract technicians. Air and water samples will be collected to monitor the leachate 
and gas build up. A team may frequently engage in testing, monitoring and recording the 
findings. Smaller sites or companies may find it advantageous to use outside help from 
environmental consultancies with experience in this area. 
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Once part of the site is filled up to the agreed level, a capping layer will be applied all over 
the finished area of waste, so that it cannot blow away or attract birds and vermin. This also 
allows the technicians to move in with their gas collectors, pipes and flare points to start the 
safe removal and combustion of the methane produced, and if the methane is to be used, e.g. 
in a site generator, then the pipe work can be built for this. Methane from sewage and waste 
has been used in generators since the 1960s. 
The site operator has to demonstrate sound financial status before starting to operate a facility 
so that when the site shuts down and income stops, they are able to monitor the site and have 
the financial standing to carry all their obligations with no site income. 
 
3.6.3.1.2 After site closure 
A testing regime will have been agreed between the parties to monitor the site. This will 
mostly involve scientists, rather than disposal operatives and transport/earthmoving plant. 
Therefore, there is a change in the type and grade of staff used at each phase, from manual to 
technical. The staff who worked on the waste tip would be moved or released. The nature of 
the work has changed from construction to biological science, and the staff used need to 
change to skilled testing and laboratory technicians. 
Communication is still needed with the local planning and waste authorities, so that any 
problems with methane gas or biological leachate can be overcome. Regular meetings and 
reports are needed to inform the competent authority supervising the site that there is no risk 
to the groundwater or the atmosphere.   
The cap to the site needs to be finished and sealed to contain the methane produced, which 
occurs in a dry weather free zero oxygen zones. Methanisation of the waste is needed to 
reduce the organic parts to inert waste. Requirements are given in Article 14 in the directive. 
Methane produced by the decomposing waste tip can be piped off to burners or used in 
heating or power generation. Landfill waste sites are unlikely to be beside communities, to 
avoid infestation by vermin, so it is unlikely that the methane produced will go into area 
heating for flats and offices. 
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Insurance cover is needed for the long duration of the sealing and inspection period, possibly 
20-30 years. This would cover public and employee liability, from methane leaks to injuries, 
and to indemnify the operator or the authority from any continuing liability. 
 
3.6.3.2 Landfill Site Insurance in Operation 
Whilst the site is being filled, parts may be covered to stop waste being blown about by the 
wind, but being open, there is plenty of area for any waste gases and methane to escape to the 
air in low concentrations. Whilst in operation, the plant compacts the waste delivered by 
vehicles to the site. As there will be a height limit set by the local waste and planning 
authorities, the operator will try to put as much into the site as possible within this limit. 
There will be a number of staff and operatives at the site who will be covered by their 
employers’ insurances. Furthermore, the vehicles and the compacting plant will be covered 
by the vehicles’ insurance. Moreover, visitors and inspection testers will be covered by their 
employers insurances, unless on a public inspection visit and buildings will have insurance in 
order to cover fire and injury. 
Insurers will cover accidents but not the negligent management of the site. In the insurance 
context, unexpected build ups of methane may be acceptable as an accident, but not if it could 
have been removed safely. Furthermore, nuisance will not be covered in the insurance. 
 
3.6.3.3 After Closure 
The major difference between the closing of a landfill and its operational phase is the 
presence of people and plant whilst being filled. Once the decision to close the site is taken, 
these largely disappear. Once the plant has finally compacted the waste and put a capping 
layer over it, the vehicles, drivers, supervisors and sorting operatives move on to other work. 
There are no deliveries, except for testing by technicians and pipe and burner installation to 
remove the methane safely and landscaping staff to hide the site under vegetation. 
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Plant and site buildings are therefore removed in order to leave a largely rural area. Protection 
for testing staff and site managers with visitors would be covered by their employers’ liability 
insurance or third party liability insurance. The risks therefore partly go down in this phase, 
as there is much less activity but also go up in respect to the capping and methane creation, 
which can cause explosions. Nuisance is not covered, in order to encourage good 
management.  
Insurers need to consider only unforeseen accidents for this phase such as explosions. Bad 
management and inadequate gas removal are not covered by the insurance. As in the case of 
Middleton v Wiggins (CA 1995), the insurer successfully won an appeal that the demolition 
of a house by escaping methane was not an accident in the method of disposal, which was 
what was insured. 
 
3.6.3.4 Employee Types used in Closure of a Landfill Directive Site 
What is not often considered in relation to the operational costs of running facilities that are 
subject to an environmental permit is personnel requirements. While a myriad of staff and 
outside experts are involved in the operation phase of a site, there is a sense that de-
commissioning and closure phases require little expert time and thus little expense. The 
staffing issues in these phases have been highlighted, which are somewhat similar to the 
comparative CCS phases as a means of illustrating that this is a cost intensive aspect of site 
investment.  
On a practical note, when a landfill site closes, and is capped so it takes no further waste, 
anaerobic decomposition takes place and organic matter degrades to give off methane. As this 
is explosive and can damage neighbouring property, tests take place to provide information to 
control the site and gas build up. These tests and control meetings use different staff to the 
period when the site was operational. 
 Blue Collar Operatives: With the closure of the site, there is no longer any need for 
drivers of landfill excavators and bulldozers to compact and move waste into position.  
Thus the first difference is the loss of blue collar driving jobs, which may not be 
unskilled as driving construction plant now requires a pass. Sorters and refuse lorry 
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drivers are also not needed on site, as no waste is arriving. 
 Management: The operatives’ managers are not needed either, as there is no staff to 
be managed at this site.  However for continuity, a few of the landfill management 
staff should be employed to provide information on meetings, policy and past events. 
 Testing Technicians: As the closed landfill tip will be giving off methane, so this has 
to be collected and analysed. Air quality near the tip has to be recorded too, so any 
complaints of smells or illnesses can be met with data. The local council or planning 
authority will also want to know there are no problems here. Technicians need to 
know how to use equipment, how to record measurements, and what the process is to 
get sound data for compliance with the law and local agreements. 
 Environmental and Biochemical Laboratory Staff: Once the technicians have 
collected the samples at the site, they are taken to a laboratory, which may be on site, 
nearby, or at the premises of a testing company or environmental consultant. Staff are 
needed to test the samples, and to accurately record the data for analysis, reports and 
meetings. Tests are for gas and leachate liquid, which can damage ground water under 
the landfill. 
 Biologists and Environmentalists: Once the data has been found from the test 
samples, it needs to be presented to the local planning authority, the waste authority, 
the council, or the government ministry. Reports using the data are written by 
specialists, who can decide whether there is a problem or if there needs to be action 
taken to stop or control a problem. 
 Landscaping: With the closure of a landfill tip, the top is capped, and landscaped. 
Partly this is to stop erosion from rain and weather, and to hide the site locally, to 
reduce complaints. Landscaping staff are needed to do this job, and monitor plant 
growth, removing any dead trees, weeds or poor grass. 
 Committees: After a landfill site closes, a committee of the land owner, the site filling 
contractor, the local authority, local planners and county council, plus environmental 
advisors from government departments will want to monitor the site as waste settles. 
Reports are written for this group, so they can monitor and control the decline, 
methane emissions, and prepare for handover. 
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3.7 Summary of Regulatory and Legislative Aspects of CCS 
This chapter’s objective was to develop an understanding of the latest regulatory and 
legislative developments in the CCS industry. This research was conducted by studying 
specific risk-related financial and regulatory issues with regards to CCS as well as the ways 
in which regulatory and legislative aspects of CCS are addressed in other jurisdictions and the 
lessons that should be learnt from them. Furthermore, this chapter has also compared the oil 
and gas, nuclear and waste management industries with the CCS industry with regards to the 
types of risks involved in them and the ways in which those risks are addressed along with 
the different ways by which they obtain insurance against the risks. 
Real-world examples of flexible approaches to CCS regulation can be seen in the case of 
Norway, Australia, Canada and the USA. Norway has incentivised CCS by legislating a 
carbon emissions tax of €40 t/CO2. Furthermore, CCS is regulated both under the Norwegian 
Pollution Act and the Petroleum Act, at present however, responsibility for leakages is not 
satisfactorily regulated under Norwegian law. In Australia, the long term liability associated 
with the storage of CO2 is covered under the Research Development and Demonstration 
approval provision under the Victorian Environment Protection Act, which recognises that 
more comprehensive legislative cover would be necessary in the future for any commercial 
geo-sequestration projects. Moreover, Canadian legislation, on the other hand, has taken the 
approach of issuing closure certificates under a new CCS Act with the Government, of the 
province in question, assuming responsibility for the stored CO2.  
The US EPA has adopted a flexible regulatory approach and has finalised requirements for 
CCS through the development of permitting for a new class of storage wells (Class VI) to be 
used specifically for geological storage of CO2. Furthermore, the EPA has proposed a default 
50-year time-frame for CCS liability with the provision that the acting EPA Director may 
shorten or lengthen that period based on risk data gathered during the permitting process. In 
addition, this new permitting system will allow for financial guarantees for CCS to be chosen 
from a variety of different options which would allow for greater market competition and 
rapid deployment of lower-cost solutions in the CCS industry. 
Within the EU, Netherlands and Germany’s view towards CCS regulation are seen to be 
progressive whilst adhering to the letter of the CCS Directive. The Government of the 
Netherlands plans to implement the CCS Directive by amending the Netherlands Mining Act, 
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which means that CCS would operate under a Permitting regime (similar to that of the US). 
Preliminary analysis indicates that liability will lie with the storage license holder, up to the 
point of the license expiration. If at that point there is a legal successor, or the materials are 
proven to be definitively left in the subsoil, the liability would be removed from that license 
holder. 
The German Government has indicated that it will adopt a draft act on CCS which would 
allow it to conduct extensive testing of the technology on the basis of which further requisite 
implementation and legislation will be drafted. The Act is expected to include the possibility 
that after a period of 30 years from the decommissioning of a plant, and thus about 80 years 
after its start-up, operators may transfer their responsibility to the Federal Government (once 
the operator has established proof of the long-term safety of the storage site). Notably, the 
CCS Demonstration Project Network which is sponsored by the European Commission has 
also expressed the belief that long-term CCS liability will be dealt with in the manner of oil 
spills – with “the state assuming liability after a regulated abandonment process”. 
Aside from other self-evident conclusions, what appears from examining the schemes related 
liability case studies in the nuclear, oil and gas and waste management industries, are more 
sophisticated approaches to risk management and financial liability sharing. By in large, 
capped liability schemes are a feature within said case studies and much more investment 
certainty is in place, even though the risk profiles of these sectors are at least as high as for 
carbon capture and storage. Furthermore, the nuclear industry actually features a much higher 
overall risk profile. Additionally, what is also evident for these sectors is a much more 
receptive response from the insurance sector, which is, arguably, one lynchpin to the long 
term success of the CCS sector. 
The next chapter will review and analyse the latest legislative and regulatory developments 
and the underlying policy with regards to the CCS industry and the long-term liability of CO2 
storage in general. Furthermore, the next chapter shall explore some financial and regulatory 
liability issues with regards to CCS along with some forward looking scenarios followed by a 
comparison of risks between the CCS industry and Oil and Gas, Waste Management and 
Nuclear industries. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and describes the methods developed and used throughout this study 
from data collection to risk ranking and characterization. This study has explored the ways in 
which the environmental risks associated with the storage phase of the CCS chain can be 
calculated and/or estimated using different methods. This has been achieved using the 
following three different systems engineering techniques:   
1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
2. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
3. Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) 
Background information to the said three methods has been given in the relative sections of 
chapter 2 of this thesis. Furthermore, the ways in which these three methods work in order to 
quantify the risks have also been described in this chapter. In summary, the structure of this 
chapter is as follows: 
 Section 4.2 (Methodological Framework) describes the overall methodological 
framework of this thesis and the way in which chapters and section work together 
towards the final conclusion of the research. 
 Section 4.3 (Fault Tree Analysis, FTA) describes the ways in which the FTA 
method works and can be used in order to map the risks associated with CO2 storage. 
 Section 4.4 (Analytical Hierarchy Process, AHP) gives an overview of the way in 
which this method has been used in order to rank the risk elements within the storage 
phase of CCS and provide us with the significance of each risk in comparison to 
others. 
 Section 4.5 (Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process, FAHP) uses the fuzzy logic and 
fuzzy set theory in order to calculate the importance and the criticality of the risks 
mapped in this chapter in order to overcome the problem of potentially imprecise 
judgements and preferences of the experts used in this study. 
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4.2 Methodological framework 
The risks associated with the geological storage of carbon dioxide will be quantified using the 
FTA, AHP and FAHP methods in conjunction with each other. The way that this analysis is 
going to be carried out is as follows. Firstly, using the FTA method and having studied the 
available literature in this area, the risks that can potentially lead to the eventual failure of the 
caprock hence causing the stored carbon dioxide to leak from underground reservoirs, have 
been outlined and presented as a fault tree (shown in figure 7 of section 4.3). The risk events 
shown in figure 7 were presented to experts within academia and industry who were active in 
the field of underground storage of CO2. An internet based expert survey was presented to 
relevant experts via email and social media tools such as Twitter. Furthermore, the expert 
survey was widely advertised to the experts in relevant conferences, events and by sending it 
by email through academic research centres and networks such as the UK CCS Research 
Centre. Detailed information regarding the way in which the surveys were designed, the 
reasons behind the development of the questions and sending it to the experts have been 
given in chapter 5 of this thesis. This will be done in order to find out which one of the said 
risks is significant enough for the insurance industry and regulator to have to allocate more 
resources to try and reduce them when evaluating the risks. The chosen experts used the AHP 
method in order to rank the risk events in comparison to each other in a pair-wise manner. 
The FTA method along with the expert consultation partially provided the input for the 
overall quantitative risk analysis methodology of this research. As it was expected at the 
beginning of this project, the FTA method and the expert surveys also provided the input for 
the AHP and FAHP methods. The AHP method calculated different importance weights for 
different risk elements within the fault tree of figure 7. Moreover, the output of the AHP 
method was also used as input for the FAHP method.  
Figure 6 shows a flowchart of the methodological framework for this study. As it is shown in 
the flowchart, this study includes an iterative process in a sense that the results obtained from 
the quantitative analyses will be used in order to identify the gaps in knowledge associated 
with CO2 storage. At this stage, if it is concluded that there is a gap in the knowledge 
gathered so far in the literature review of this study, then the process will refer back to the 
available literature in order to fill those gaps. Having said this, it is not going to be possible to 
fill all the gaps in knowledge and calculate all the risks involved in CO2 storage.  
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4.2.1 Expected Outcomes 
As it was explained previously, there is currently no standard regime for insuring commercial 
scale CO2 storage facilities owing to the fact that there is not enough information with 
regards to the type of risks involved in the technology of geological storage of CO2 and the 
likelihood of occurrence of those risks. 
One means of developing greater confidence in the technology is for regulators to cultivate a 
sense that CCS is not a high risk activity. In turn, this will lead to the development of a 
nascent CCS insurance market which in turn would solve a range of current stakeholder 
challenges around risk and liability. 
With regards to the CO2 storage facility insurance, Zurich Insurance Group Ltd. recently 
announced that they have developed insurance mechanisms called ‘Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration Liability Insurance’ and ‘Geologic Sequestration Financial Assurance’ 
(Ecologist, 2009). The former includes liabilities from pollution events and geomechanical 
liabilities that might arise during the injection phase whereas the latter guarantees a source of 
finance to manage affairs after closure of the plant including when a cap is being placed on 
the closed well and monitoring after closure (Ecologist, 2009).  
Whilst these types of policies are beneficial and can potentially motivate the CCS industry to 
undertake this activity, their drawback is that even though the former insurance policy covers 
the CO2 capture facility during the operation phase of the power plant, the latter policy solely 
covers the storage facility for 10 to 30 years after the wells have been sealed off. However, 
the entire logic behind the use of this technology in the first place was that CO2 would be 
injected into saline aquifers or depleted oil and gas fields and remains there for centuries to 
come with minimal long-term risk of leakage. The reason as to why this matter may cause the 
CCS industry to become nervous is because of the lack of knowledge with regards to the 
existence of companies and/or Governments that were responsible for the CO2 injection in 
the first place decades after the storage well has been sealed off. 
Therefore, in order for regulators to be able to legislate more effectively and in favour of the 
CCS technology and as a result persuade the insurance industry to insure storage facilities to 
cover the long-term risks, they would have to have extensive knowledge of the type of risks 
involved in the CO2 storage technology. In doing so, insurance bodies have to be able to 
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understand and therefore prioritise the risks in accordance with their relative importance and 
criticality. Not only this enables them to make sure more effort is put in managing the more 
important risks but also enables them to allocate more resources to more important risks in 
case of a disaster of some sort which results in CO2 leakage from storage reservoirs. 
One of the aims of this research was to explore different methods that can be used in order to 
assess the risks associated with storage of CO2 from a qualitative point of view as well as a 
quantitative one. In doing so, it was initially expected that the methods used in this study in 
order to quantify the risks would provide different results to each other since they work in 
parallel to each other. In other words, they each quantify the risks from a different point of 
view. 
It was further expected that having analysed the results of the quantitative risk analysis from 
the methods described within this chapter, conclusions can be drawn that could benefit the 
insurance industry and regulators. This would be in the form of recommendations to the said 
stakeholders with regards to the probability of occurrence of the risks when storing CO2 
underground and the criticality of those risks should they occur.  
The said methods were expected to mathematically and objectively calculate the significance, 
importance and likelihood of the risks associated with each different scenario when storing 
CO2 in comparison with each other. In doing this, one can judge which risks to take and 
which ones to avoid under uncertainly. This relative assurance can help the insurance 
companies and regulators better understand the risks and hence adjust their current terms and 
premiums and legislate more effectively to address the risks of carbon dioxide storage. Figure 
6 outlines the methodological framework in a schematic manner. 
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Figure 6, Methodological framework of this research 
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4.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is a method that has been employed successfully in assessing the impacts 
of other projects with similar risks as those involved in CCS. Consequently, this method can 
be used in analysing the impacts of different failure events related to CCS especially after 
CO2 has been injected into the reservoir. The FTA method is a presentation of the events that 
can have devastating impacts to humans’ health and the environment at large (Sharma, 2008). 
The events are connected to bring out the relationship of the events to the risks. Figure 7 
represents the use of fault trees in CCS.  
The FTA method has been successfully used in many industries which are similar in terms of 
risk profiles to the CCS industry such as Nuclear, Chemical and Waste Management 
industries. For example, in the nuclear industry, FTA has been used in order to calculate the 
probability of a nuclear power plant safety device being unavailable when needed and to 
calculate the probability of a nuclear power plant accident. Moreover, in the chemical 
industry FTA has been used to evaluate a chemical process and determining where to monitor 
the process and establish safety controls. 
In the fault tree of this section (figure 7), all the events that can lead to the migration of the 
stored CO2 into the subsurface have been presented. The consequence of high pressure during 
the injection is likely to induce fracturing of the subsurface rocks. However, the impact of 
this leakage could be localised and limited in time given that pressure is expected to get 
diminished after a few decades after injection stops. Furthermore, the sub surface rock could 
fracture at the interface of the storage and caprock leading to leakage of carbon dioxide 
through the caprock (Van, 2006). The fault tree in figure 7 clearly shows that overpressure 
could lead to reopening of previously existing fractures and especially were pre-existing but 
had not been identified. At lower parts of the fault tree, a description of all the events and 
processes that could occur at the injection level taking into account both normal situations 
and altered situations can be found. Normal situations are outlined by Farret et al. to include 
the degradation of the cement lining with passage of time, which may result from various 
reasons such as usual ageing, chemical reaction with brine while altered situations include 
poor quality of cement and the junctions on the injection and storage interface. A fault tree 
shows the probable interactions that may occur; consequently initiating migration of CO2 
during the storage phase of CCS. Another advantage of this type of analysis is that it can help 
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in defining interactions between activities and occurrences before they are integrated into a 
numeric model. The software used in fault tree analysis is usually linked to a database where 
occurrences can be categorized effectively (Farret et al., 2011). These categories could 
include mechanical processes, chemical processes, thermal processes or categories of those 
events which could occur in the short term and those which take long to be witnessed.  
This method enables us to analyse the risks associated with CO2 storage in different ways 
such as: 
 Assessing the impact of changing the loss resulting from each event into a 
distribution, rather than assuming a fixed amount 
 Assessing the impact if mitigating actions could be developed for certain events, so 
that, e.g., the amount of loss were reduced if these events occur (or the probabilities of 
events are reduced or both) 
 Creating dependencies or correlations between the occurrence (and/or magnitude) of 
some of the events 
 Replacing the Binomial distribution with a Poisson distribution so that each event 
could occur more than once per period. 
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Figure 7, Events that can potentially be combined together in order to contribute towards the leakage of CO2 from the caprock 
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For simplicity purposes, each risk element has been renamed as below. 
 
 
Risk Element 
A Percolation of CO2 through the caprock 
B Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
C Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection wall 
D Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
  
a1 Migration of CO2 through the caprock (Darcy flow) 
a2 Diffusion of CO2 (possible initiation of other mechanisms) 
  
b1 Fracturation of the caprock 
b2 Non-permeable fault that becomes permeable 
b3 Pre-existing fracture of the caprock 
  
c1 Vertical migration of CO2 through fractures in cement 
c2 Vertical migration of CO2 at cement/casing interface 
c3 Vertical migration of CO2 at cement/rock interface 
c4 Vertical migration of CO2 through EDZ 
c5 Migration of CO2 through cement matrix (cement wall) 
  
d1 Leakage of CO2 through a monitoring well 
d2 Leakage of CO2 through an exterior well 
Table 7, Name of risk elements in simplified form 
 
The fault tree designed in this section of the thesis (figure 7) shows the potential risk events 
that could possibly cause the stored CO2 in the reservoirs to leak through the caprock. The 
said risk events forming the fault tree have been generated from studying the CCS related 
literature in general. Table 7 was generated containing the first and second level in the risk 
hierarchy of the fault tree in order to simplify the calculation process of the 
probability/likelihood of CO2 leakage through the caprock.  
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4.4 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
4.4.1 How the AHP operates 
AHP was invented based on four basic principles. Therefore, all the calculations, rules and 
regulations are based on these principles. They are as follows: 
 
1. The inverse condition: If the preference of element A to element B is equal to m, then 
the preference of element B to element A is 
m
1
. 
2. The homogeneous condition: Element A and element B have to be homogeneous and 
comparable. In other words, either element cannot be infinite or zero times better than 
the other. 
3. Dependence: A hierarchical element can be attached and dependent in a linear manner 
to its upper element and this dependency can continue to higher levels. 
4. Expectations: Whenever a change occurs in the hierarchical structure, the evaluation 
process has to be done again. 
 
When you combine individual performance indicators to one key performance indicator, you 
can give each one a different weight. Now the question is how to derive the weights. AHP 
derives ratio scales from paired comparisons. It also allows for some small inconsistency in 
judgments. As an input you can use actual measurements or subjective opinions such as 
satisfaction feeling or appearance. The output of this method is ratio scales and a consistency 
index. The method is based on the solution of an Eigen value problem; the ratio scales result 
from Eigen vectors and the consistency index from the Eigen value. 
The process is performed in several steps, which are as follows: 
1. A hierarchy tree has to be created defining the Objective, Criteria and sub-criteria.  
2. The Decision Making Matrix has to be created based on Saaty’s nine point scale 
which is presented in table 8. 
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Intensity of 
Importance 
Invers of Intensity 
of the Importance 
Definition Explanation 
9 1/9 Extreme importance 
The evidence favouring one 
element over another is of the 
highest possible order of 
affirmation 
7 1/7 
Very strong 
importance 
One element is favoured very 
strongly over another and its 
dominance demonstrated in 
practice 
5 1/5 Strong importance 
Experience and judgment 
strongly favour one element 
over another 
3 1/3 Moderate importance 
Experience and judgment 
slightly favour one element 
over another 
1 1 Equal importance 
Two elements contribute 
equally to the objective 
2, 4, 6 and 8 1/2, 1/4, 1/6 and 1/8 
When compromise is needed. Can be used to express 
intermediate values 
1.1, 1.2, etc. 1/1.1, 1/1.2, etc Elements that are very close in importance 
Reciprocals 
If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal 
value when compared with i. 
Rationales 
Ratios arising from the 
scale 
If consistency were to be 
forced by obtaining n 
numerical value to span the 
matrix 
Table 8, Fundamental importance scales in AHP (Chen et al., 2007) 
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3. The Pair-wise Comparison Matrix is created by comparing the elements within the 
decision making matrix in a pair-wise manner in order to determine the relative 
importance of the elements with respect to each other. The pair-wise comparison 
matrix for n elements is presented in equation 6. 
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Equation 6, AHP: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix 
 
Where:  
 The element aij can be interpreted as the degree of preference of the i
th
 attribute over 
the j
th
 attribute and vice versa.  
 aij is the preference of element i to element j and vice versa for aij. i and j vary at 
natural numbers set.  
 
4. A Consistency Ratio (CR) is calculated using equation 7. 
 
 RICICR /100  
Equation 7, AHP: Consistency Ratio 
 
where CR  is consistency ratio, CI  is consistency index, RI  is random index and n is the 
number of columns. If CI/RI < 0.10, it means that the degree of consistency is satisfactory. If 
however, CI/RI > 0.10, it means that the degree of consistency is not satisfactory. As a result, 
the AHP comparisons may not have reliable results (Liang, 2003). Furthermore, if CI and CR 
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are satisfactory, then the preferences are calculated based on normalized values. On the other 
hand, the procedure has to be repeated until the results fall in the desired range. 
5. In this step, the pair-wise comparison matrix is normalised by dividing each element 
of a column by the sum of all elements within that column. As a result, the sum of all 
rows within the normalised matrix will be equal to 1. A normalised pair-wise matrix 
is demonstrated in equation 8. 
 
R =
r11 r12 r1J
r21 r22 r2J
rn1 rn2 rnJ
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;i =1,2,...,n; j =1,2,..., J
 
Equation 8, AHP Normalised Pair-wise Matrix 
 
6. In this step, the Relative Weight of each element has to be determined by calculating 
the arithmetic average of each row.  
7. As a result of multiplication of the amount of relative weights of each element by the 
weights of the criteria of the higher levels, the Elements Weight Vector is obtained. 
This vector is demonstrated in equation 9. 
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Equation 9, AHP: Element Weight Vector 
Where wi is the weight of the i
th
 element.  
The inconsistency ratio is calculated in order to define the level of consistency of judgments 
of the decision makers. The inconsistency ratio is calculated using equation 10. 
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Equation 10, AHP: Inconsistency Ratio 
Where λmax is the highest eigenvalue of the pair-wise comparison matrix. Generally, the 
closer the inconsistency index it is to zero, the greater the consistency will be. Therefore, 
within the AHP, this index has to be lower than 0.1 in order for the AHP results to be 
considered as consistent.  
 
How to calculate the weights 
In AHP, each element in each level is paired together with its corresponding element in the 
higher level and then their weights are calculated in comparison with each other. This weight 
is called the “local priority”. Furthermore, as a result of combining the local priorities 
(relative weights), the final weight of each item is determined. This weight is called “overall 
priority”. In this method, experts within the specific field of study, use their judgement in 
order to compare the elements in a pair-wise manner. The options that they have in order to 
compare the elements with each other can be seen in figure 8. 
Figure 8, shows a graphical representation of the way in which different weights are assigned 
to different criteria in the AHP.  
 
 
Figure 8, Weight assigning system used in the AHP 
 
In the first instance, a graphical representation (such as a Tree Diagram) of the problem has 
to be constructed. This diagram has to include the Objective, Criteria and sub-criteria. Figure 
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7 shows a tree diagram constructed during the course of this study. It shows some of the main 
events that can be combined together in different ways in order to lead to other events (more 
serious/significant) and then eventually lead to the leakage of CO2 through the caprock.  
The way in which figure 7 should be interpreted is to consider each event box at the lower 
end of the tree diagram and follow it through towards the beginning of the diagram in order 
to inspect the hazards that the chosen event boxes can potentially cause. The diagram has 
been illustrated using four different colours which correspond to the four main hazards that 
can lead to the eventual leakage of CO2 through the caprock. Furthermore, all the other event 
boxes that lead to the main event boxes are of the same colour. 
As described in section 3.1.3 of this chapter, if the preference of element “A” to element “B” 
is “m”, then the preference of element B to element A shall be “
m
1
”. In other words, we start 
to compare element “A” with element “B” using a scale ranging from 9 to 1/9. Number 1 
means that both criteria have the same importance and they are equal. On the other hand, 
number 9 means that criterion “A” is nine times more important/significant than criterion “B” 
and therefore, 1/9 means that criterion “B” is nine times more important than criterion “A”.  
As a result of these calculations, a ranking is obtained which shows the alternative that has 
the highest value which has to be chosen as the preferred choice.    
 
4.5 Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) 
In this research project, the FAHP method is used in order to rank the different risks within 
the fault tree developed earlier in this chapter (section 4.3). Similar to the conventional AHP 
method, the Fuzzy AHP method also involves the creation of a hierarchy that includes a set 
of alternatives,  miM i ,,2,1  , criteria that are used for evaluation purposes, 
 njC j ,,2,1  , and a final weighting vector,  nwwww ,, 21   (Pan, 2008). 
Furthermore, the pair-wise comparison matrices have to be converted to fuzzy pair-wise 
comparison matrices. In order to produce these matrices, the pair-wise comparison matrices 
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that were used for the AHP method in section 4.4 of this chapter are going to be used. These 
matrices are created in the exact way that the AHP matrices are created.  
This step involves the pair-wise comparison of the members of the decision making matrix. 
These pair-wise comparison matrices are created in order to determine the relative 
preferences of the alternatives with respect to each other. The structure of a generic pair-wise 
comparison matrix comparing the different alternatives of a decision is shown in equation 11. 
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Equation 11, FAHP: Comparison matrix 
 
The Consistency Index (CI) which evaluates the inconsistency of pair-wise comparisons is 
calculated using equation 12. 
1
max



n
n
CI

 
Equation 12: FAHP: Consistency Index (CI) 
 
where   is an eigenvalue of matrix A and n is the number of columns. In addition, a 
Consistency Ratio (CR) is calculated using equation 13. 
 
 RICICR 100  
Equation 13: FAHP: Consistency Ratio (CR) 
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where CR is the consistency ratio, CI  is the consistency index and RI  is random index.  
Furthermore, following the construction of the hierarchy, Chen and Yang’s table (table 8) can 
be modified to accommodate the Fuzzy AHP technique which is illustrated as table 9. 
 
Intensity of 
Importance 
Definition Explanation 
(8, 9, 10) Extreme importance 
The evidence favouring one element 
over another is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation 
(6, 7, 8) Very strong importance 
One element is favoured very strongly 
over another and its dominance 
demonstrated in practice 
(4, 5, 6) Strong importance 
Experience and judgment strongly 
favour one element over another 
(2, 3, 4) Moderate importance 
Experience and judgment slightly favour 
one element over another 
(1,1,1) Equal importance 
Two elements contribute equally to the 
objective 
(1,2,3); (3,4,5); (5,6,7) 
and (7,8,9) 
When compromise is needed. Can be used to express intermediate values 
(0.1,1.1,2.1); 
(0.2,1.2,2.2) etc. 
Elements that are very close in importance 
Reciprocals 
If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it when compared 
with activity j, then j has the reciprocal value when compared with i. 
Rationales Ratios arising from the scale 
If consistency were to be forced by 
obtaining n numerical value to 
span the matrix 
Table 9, Fundamental fuzzy importance scales in FAHP  
 
The way in which the FAHP method works is as follows: 
1. First step is comprised of the creation of the fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix. In 
this step, pair-wise comparison matrices are established using the fuzzy concept and 
the triangular fuzzy number using the AHP method. 
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2. According to Enea and Piazza, the most important innovation by Chang was the 
application of the extent analysis to calculate the synthetical degree value (Sk) (Enea 
and Piazza, 2004). The way in which extant analysis works is that it supports the 
decision amongst different goals, which could be in contrast. Chang’s proposal 
defined the value of the fuzzy synthetic extent using the standard fuzzy arithmetic as 
shown in equation 14.  
The calculation of the amount of Sk is as follows. In this step, the Sk amount which is a 
TFN is calculated for each row of the pair-wise comparison matrix using equation 14. 
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Equation 14, FAHP: Synthetic extent with respect to the i
th
 object 
 
where k is the number of each row, i and j are indices of the alternative and attribute 
respectively. 
3. The third step consists of the computation of the degree of possibility. In this step, the 
degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk is calculated. If Mi and Mj are two 
TFNs, then the degree of possibility of Mi to Mj is calculated using equation 15. 
 
),,(),,( jjjjiiii umlMumlM   is defined as: 
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Equation 15, FAHP: Degree of possibility 
 
The degree of possibility can be equivalently expressed as follow: 
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Equation 16, FAHP: Equivalent form of the degree of possibility 
Where Mi = (li, mi, ni), Mj = (lj, mj, nj) and V(Mi ≥ Mj) is the degree of possibility of Mi to Mj. 
Moreover, figure 9 shows the degree of possibility.  
 
 
Figure 9, FAHP: Degree of possibility (Büyüközkan et al., 2004) 
 
The degree of possibility of a TFN from other TFNs is calculated using equation 17. 
      kk MMVMMVMMMV  12121 ,,,   
Equation 17, FAHP: Degree of possibility of a TFN from other Sk TFNs 
where k is the index of the last TFN. 
4. In the fourth step, the weights of the different criteria are calculated using equation 
18. 
 148 
     iknkkiSSVMinxW kii  ;,,2,1;,,2,1,    
Equation 18, FAHP: Caluclation of the weights 
 
where  ixW   is the desired weight.  
Furthermore, the vector of the weight is calculated using equation 19. 
      TncWcWcWW  ,,, 21   
Equation 19, FAHP: Vector of weight 
where W   is the vector of the weight of the attributes. 
 
5. In this step, the vector of the weight of the normalized attributes is obtained. 
Moreover, the vector of the weight of the normalized attributes is created when 
equation 20 is applied. 
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Equation 20, FAHP: Vector of normalised attributes 
where i is the index of each attribute and n is the number of all attributes. 
 
6. This step contains the calculation of the relative importance coefficients of the 
alternatives and ranking them. The relative importance coefficients are produced by 
multiplying the weights of the attributes to the achieved weights of the alternatives 
with respect to each attribute. Furthermore, it is concluded in this step that an 
alternative which has a greater relative importance coefficient, has the most 
significance amongst alternatives.  
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The next chapter describes the way in which the stakeholder consultation stage of this 
research took place using expert surveys that were sent out to the experts within academia 
and the CCS industry. Chapter 5 also explains how the results of the surveys are going to be 
interpreted in a way that they would be useful for the risk analysis sections described in 
chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERT 
CONSULTATION 
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5 EXPERT CONSULTATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As part of this research project, an expert survey was designed and presented to expert 
individuals within the field of carbon dioxide storage under geological formations. 
Furthermore, the expert survey was sent to experts within academia and the CCS industry.  
This chapter outlines the way in which the expert survey was designed, conducted and the 
means by which it was presented to the experts. Furthermore, the ways in which that the 
survey results were used to conduct the quantitative risk analysis has also been described. 
 
5.2 Carbon Dioxide Storage Experts 
The strategy behind the selection of the participants within this study was to choose the 
national and international experts, institutions and companies that had expertise and 
specialised in the field of carbon dioxide storage underground based on previous projects 
that they had been involved in as well as on-going ones. 
When distributing the surveys, it was made sure that to the extent that was possible, they 
were distributed evenly within experts that were active in academia and the CCS industry. 
Furthermore, to the extent to which was possible, the survey was also distributed evenly 
within national and international experts. This was done in order to obtain a balanced 
expert opinion with regards to the questions within the survey. However, despite 
presenting the survey evenly amongst national and international experts, disappointingly 
the international experts and companies did not take part in the study to the extent that was 
expected.  
Table 133 (Appendix III) shows a list of national and international experts that were 
chosen to take part in this research project. Moreover, the rationales behind the inclusion 
of said experts within this study have also been included in table 133.  
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National and international companies, institutions and research centres were chosen based 
on the expertise of their members in the field of CO2 storage. Furthermore, since these 
companies were different in size in comparison to each other, therefore, in some cases 
more than one expert contributed to the survey.  
 
5.3 Means of Contacting the Experts 
The survey was designed, published on www.surveymethods.com and distributed amongst 
industrial and academic experts that were chosen (shown in table 133 of Appendix III) via 
email and social media such as Twitter. Furthermore, experts within the field of CO2 
storage were also approached in two CCS related conferences namely the 11
th
 International 
Conference on Greenhouse Gas Technologies (GHGT-11)
4
 which was held from 18
th
 of 
November to 22
nd
 of November 2012 in Kyoto − Japan (The GHGT 2012 conference was 
attended by 1293 delegates) and the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre’s 
(UKCCSRC) Early Career Researcher Annual Meeting 2013 which was held from 1
st
 of 
July to 2
nd
 of July 2013 in Newcastle − UK. 
Some of the experts were contacted and recruited directly whereas some other ones were 
contacted and recruited indirectly using targeted advertisements through social media and 
emails through academic research centres. For example, the UKCCSRC advertised 
extensively for the expert survey by sending emails with a link to the survey to their 
research centre members as well as their network members inviting them to take part in the 
survey of this study. The UKCCSRC’s network members consist of some 900 
international experts across all CCS related topic areas within academia, industry and 
governmental organisations (Cathcart, 2013). In addition, the UKCCSRC posted a 
message on their Twitter account advertising the survey of this research which can be seen 
in figure 10. Furthermore, the same message was also advertised on UKCCSRC’s website5 
− which was exclusively available to the centre’s members − as well as on their blog. 
                                                 
4
 http://www.ghgt.info/index.php/Content-GHGT11/ghgt-11-overview.html 
5
 http://www.ukccsrc.ac.uk/ 
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Figure 10, Twitter message posted by UKCCSRC advertising the expert survey 
 
5.4 Expert Survey Design 
The expert survey was designed using the Survey Methods Inc.
6
. Furthermore, amongst 
different packages within the company, the “Advanced” package was purchased due to the 
relative length and sophisticated nature of the survey.  
The survey was designed in a way that required the experts to answer 22 questions. 
Furthermore, each question presented a potential failure mechanism (risk event) at the 
beginning of the question followed by two potential sub-events. Based on their expertise, 
the experts were asked to select the option that they believed was more likely to cause the 
occurrence of the main risk event in that particular question. Moreover, they were also 
asked to state to what extent that sub-events/sub-risk was more likely to cause the failure 
of the main risk event in question using the scale that was given to them. This scale can be 
seen in table 11 created by Chen and his colleagues in 2007. Furthermore, the format of 
the survey was such that the experts were first asked to make their pairwise comparisons 
between the risk events and then comment on their selection in the following question.  
Table 10 shows an example of the type of survey that was distributed to the experts. As 
evident from the table, experts were asked to rank risk elements in comparison with each 
other in a pair-wise manner using the scales outlined in table 11. 
                                                 
6
 www.surveymethods.com 
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Table 10 merely shows one of the questions within the expert survey. The complete survey 
can be seen in section 10.2.1 (Appendix II).  
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Pair-wise comparison of the main criteria: 
Please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal 
probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important and probable than the other one.  
Please use the scale below to rank the risks from 1 to 9. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Percolation of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Percolation of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Percolation of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
or B: Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
or B: Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 
or B: Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Table 10, an example of the type of surveys used in the stakeholder consultation stage
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As evident from table 11, the scale that experts used in order to complete the survey 
consisted of numbers ranging from 9 to 1/9. The rationale for using such ranking system 
has been given in section 4.4 of the Methodology chapter. 
Intensity of 
Importance 
Invers of Intensity 
of the Importance 
Definition Explanation 
9 1/9 Extreme importance 
The evidence favouring one 
element over another is of the 
highest possible order of 
affirmation 
7 1/7 
Very strong 
importance 
One element is favoured very 
strongly over another and its 
dominance demonstrated in 
practice 
5 1/5 Strong importance 
Experience and judgment 
strongly favour one element 
over another 
3 1/3 Moderate importance 
Experience and judgment 
slightly favour one element 
over another 
1 1 Equal importance 
Two elements contribute 
equally to the objective 
2, 4, 6 and 8 
1/2, 1/4, 1/6 and 
1/8 
When compromise is needed. Can be used to express 
intermediate values 
1.1, 1.2, etc. 1/1.1, 1/1.2, etc Elements that are very close in importance 
Reciprocals 
If activity i has one of the above numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal 
value when compared with i. 
Rationales 
Ratios arising from the 
scale 
If consistency were to be 
forced by obtaining n 
numerical value to span 
the matrix 
Table 11, Fundamental importance scales in AHP (Chen et al., 2007) 
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Figure 11 shows an outline of all the risk events (on the first and second level of the 
overall risk tree of figure 7, section 4.3) that could potentially cause the leakage of CO2 
from storage reservoirs.  
The questions within the expert survey (Appendix II) were designed in a way that enabled 
the experts to compare each risk element within figure 11 with other risk elements in a 
pair-wise way. In addition, it has to be noted that expert stakeholders were asked to 
complete the surveys taking into account only the first and second level in the overall risk 
hierarchy of the fault tree in order to simplify the calculation process of the 
probability/likelihood of CO2 leakage through the caprock. Figure 11 shows the said 
simplified version of the overall fault tree developed in this research. 
This exercise was carried out in order to obtain a ranking system for the potential risks that 
can cause the leakage of the stored CO2 from underground storage reservoirs. As explained 
before, this ranking is performed based on the importance and criticality of the said risks. 
The experts performed this ranking procedure using Saaty’s importance scales system 
(table 10). A full explanation with regards to the way in which the pair-wise comparisons 
have to be carried out and the reasons behind this procedure has been given in chapters 2 
and 4 (Risk Analysis and Methodology chapters respectively). 
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Figure 11, all the events (1
st
 and 2
nd
 levels) that can lead to the migration of the stored CO2 into 
the subsurface 
 
 
Figure 12, the objective and the criteria within the main fault tree of this project 
 
CO2 Leakage 
from Storage Site 
Percolation of 
CO2 through the 
caprock 
Migration through 
the caprock 
(Darcy flow) 
Diffusion 
Migration along a 
fracture or 
permeable zone 
Fracturation of the 
caprock 
Non permeable 
fault that becomes 
permeable 
pre-existing 
fracture of the 
caprock 
Leakage through 
or along the 
injection well 
Vertical migration 
through fractures 
in cement 
Vertical migration 
at cement/casing 
interface 
Vertival migration 
through EDZ 
Vertical migration 
at cement/rock 
interface 
Leakage through 
other wells 
Through a 
monitoring well 
Through an 
exterior well 
Objective 
Criteria 
Sub-Criteria 
CO2 Leakage from 
Storage Site 
Percolation of CO2 
through the caprock 
(element 1) 
Migration along a 
fracture or permeable 
zone (element 2) 
Leakage through or 
along the injection 
well (element 3) 
Leakage through 
other wells (element 
4) 
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A sample of the expert survey which was sent to the experts along with the email message 
that accompanied the survey inviting the experts to take part have been attached as 
appendices of this thesis (Appendix III).  
The sample survey shows the format of the survey, the ways in which questions were 
asked from the experts and the choices/options that they had whilst answering the 
questions.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
As part of this research project, an expert survey was designed and presented to carbon 
dioxide storage experts within academic institutions and companies that were active in the 
CO2 storage field (name of experts have been shown in table 133 of Appendix III). The 
experts were asked to compare different risk events associated with the leakage of CO2 
from underground storage reservoirs in a pairwise manner. Moreover, they were asked to 
do so in order to assess the risk elements presented within the fault tree (developed and 
presented in figure 7 of section 4.3) and subsequently rank them in accordance with their 
significance in comparison to each other towards the leakage of CO2 from storage 
reservoirs.  
The results obtained following expert consultation have been used as input parameters for 
the two risk analysis methods described in detail in sections 2.6 and 2.7 of chapter 2 and 
sections 4.4 and 4.5 of chapter 4. 
These methods, namely AHP and FAHP were used in order to quantitatively estimate the 
effect that each risk element had on the eventual risk element (at the top of the fault tree) 
which is the leakage of CO2 from underground storage reservoirs.  
To the extent that was possible, it was made sure that the survey was distributed evenly 
amongst national and international experts within academia and the industry. 
Disappointingly however, not as many international experts took part in this study as it 
was anticipated in comparison with national experts.  
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Expert stakeholders were asked to complete the surveys taking into account only the first 
and second level in the overall risk hierarchy in order to simplify the risk analysis 
calculation process. In retrospect however, it would have been easier in survey terms to 
only focus upon risks on the first level of the fault tree, carry out the risk analysis 
procedure, interpret the results of the AHP and AHP Fuzzy calculations to trace the source 
of the risk and then perhaps apply the same procedure to the second, third and fourth levels 
in future research. 
 
5.5.1 Filtering the responses 
Overall, the survey was responded to by 55 reliable experts. In other words, there were 
instances that some participants answered the survey in a way that was not reliable. For 
example, some participants selected either number 9 or number 1 on the scale described in 
table 10 for all of the questions within the questionnaire in order to express their personal 
opinion/objection towards the CCS technology in general. The reason as to why it was 
decided that the said responses were not reliable is that, as mentioned in the methodology 
chapter, within the methods used, choosing number 9 signifies the fact that one risk is 
extremely more significant or important than the other one. In this case, it does not make 
sense that one would choose number 9 for all the risks. Moreover, choosing number 1 for 
all the risks signifies the fact that all the risks are equally significant and important which 
again is inaccurate. 
The said problem was further confirmed by studying the comments that they had made 
within the survey. For example, one participant stated in the comments area that: “At 
present there is not enough known about the risk of leakage or leakage methods to provide 
any adequate analysis of the importance of one method from another. In that sense they are 
all equally important.” 
Responses such as the ones above were discarded since they were all in contradiction with 
each other and therefore were categorised as unreliable results. 
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The next chapter presents the results that were obtained as a result of using the output of 
the expert survey as input parameters for the quantitative risk analysis techniques used in 
this research project. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS
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6 RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the results of the analyses carried out during the course of this research 
project in order to quantify the risks associated with the storage of CO2 under geological 
formations. Furthermore, this chapter includes the results obtained using the AHP and Fuzzy 
version of the AHP techniques in order to assess the criticality and importance of individual 
risk elements involved within the storage phase of CCS technology. The results will be 
presented in separate sub-sections depending on the method used to obtain them.  
 
6.2 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The AHP method was used in order to quantify the importance of each risk element within 
the fault tree shown in figure 7 (section 4.3) of the Methodology chapter (chapter 4) in 
comparison with other risk elements. Figure 13 shows a tree diagram representing all the 
events (on the first and second levels of the fault tree of figure 7) that can lead to the 
migration of stored CO2 from underground storage reservoirs into the subsurface. In order to 
achieve this goal, the importance and criticality of the risk events on the first and second 
levels of the diagram have been calculated using the output data from the expert consultation 
stage of the project and the AHP method. Furthermore, as described before in chapter 4, the 
results obtained from the expert consultation stage of the research have been used as input 
parameters for the techniques used in this research. 
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Figure 13, Events (1
st
 and 2
nd
 levels) that can lead to the migration of stored CO2 into subsurface 
 
As described in chapter 5 of this thesis, an internet based academic survey was developed and 
presented to academic and industry experts within the field of CO2 storage under geological 
formations. 
The output of the surveys were then analysed and used as input parameters for the AHP 
algorithm. As explained in chapter 5, experts were asked to compare the risks that CO2 
storage can potentially entail in a pairwise manner in comparison to other risks within the 
main fault tree of figure 7. 
Table 12 shows the selected branch of the tree diagram of figure 13 in a matrix form. Where,  
1. X1, represents the “percolation of CO2 through the caprock”, 
2. X2, represents the “migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone”, 
3. X3, represents the “leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well”, and 
4. X4, represents the “leakage of CO2 through other wells”. 
CO2 Leakage from 
Storage Site 
Percolation of CO2 
through the caprock 
Migration through 
the caprock (Darcy 
flow) 
Diffusion 
Migration along a 
fracture or permeable 
zone 
Fracturation of the 
caprock 
Non permeable fault 
that becomes 
permeable 
pre-existing fracture 
of the caprock 
Leakage through or 
along the injection 
well 
Vertical migration 
through fractures in 
cement 
Migration through 
cement/casing matrix 
(cement wall) 
Vertical migration at 
cement/casing 
interface 
Vertival migration 
through EDZ 
Vertical migration at 
cement/rock interface 
Leakage through 
other wells 
Through a 
monitoring well 
Through an exterior 
well 
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5. an, represents the importance scales developed by Saaty which have been illustrated 
in table 7 of section 4.3 (Saaty, 1978b). 
It should be noted that, for example, a12 refers to the comparison of the element in row 1 and 
column 2 of the matrix. 
 
 X1 X2 X3 Xn 
X1 a11 a12 a13 a1n 
X2 a21 a22 a23 a2n 
X3 a31 a32 a33 a3n 
Xn an1 an2 an3 ann 
Table 12, General form of the matrix completed by the industrial and academic experts 
 
Experts assigned numbers to each risk element in accordance to their importance, criticality 
and preference with respect to the ultimate goal which was the leakage of CO2 through the 
caprock of the storage reservoir. Furthermore, they were asked to rank each pair of elements 
in comparison with the other element. Table 12 is a generic matrix that was completed using 
the experts’ answers to the questions that they were asked during the stakeholder consultation 
phase of this project. 
The final weight of each item in a hierarchical process is obtained by adding the results of the 
multiplication of each criterion’s weight. The weights of the criteria reflect the importance of 
setting the goal and the weight of each element compared to the criteria represents its 
importance in that criteria.  
There are many ways in which the local priorities can be estimated. However, one of the most 
accurate and common ones is by using the arithmetic average method. The arithmetic average 
method is performed in three steps. These steps are the following: 
Step 1: The numerical values of the elements are added to each other.  
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 X1 X2 X3 Xn 
X1 1 a12 a13 a1n 
X2 a21 1 a23 a2n 
X3 a31 a32 1 a3n 
Xn a41 a42 a43 1 
Sum of 
columns 
1+a21+a31+an1 a12+1+a32+an2 a13+a23+1+an3 a14+a24+a34+1 
Table 13, AHP matrix showing the addition of numerical values 
 
Step 2: In order to normalise the elements of the matrix, each element in the pair-wise 
comparisons has to be divided by the sum of all elements. 
 X1 X2 X3 Xn 
X1 1 / (1+a21+a31+an1) a12 / (a12+1+a32+an2) a13 / (a13+a23+1+an3) a14 / (a14+a24+a34+1) 
X2 a21 / (1+a21+a31+an1) 1 / (a12+1+a32+an2) a23 / (a13+a23+1+an3) a24 / ( a14+a24+a34+1) 
X3 a31 / (1+a21+a31+an1) a32 / (a12+1+a32+an2) 1 / (a13+a23+1+an3) a34 / ( a14+a24+a34+1) 
Xn a41/(1+a21+a31+an1) a42 / (a12+1+a32+an2) a43 / (a13+a23+1+an3) 1 / ( a14+a24+a34+1) 
Table 14, AHP matrix showing the normalised numerical values 
 
Step 3: In the third step of this process, the average value for each row of the normalised 
comparison matrices have to be calculated. 
 X1 X2 X3 Xn Average 
Weight 
(%) 
X1 1 / (1+a21+a31+an1) a12 / (a12+1+a32+an2) a13 / (a13+a23+1+an3) a14 / (a14+a24+a34+1) B1 B1*100 
X2 a21 / (1+a21+a31+an1) 1 / (a12+1+a32+an2) a23 / (a13+a23+1+an3) a24 / ( a14+a24+a34+1) B2 B2 *100 
X3 a31 / (1+a21+a31+an1) a32 / (a12+1+a32+an2) 1 / (a13+a23+1+an3) a34 / ( a14+a24+a34+1) B3 B3*100 
Xn a41/(1+a21+a31+an1) a42 / (a12+1+a32+an2) a43 / (a13+a23+1+an3) 1 / ( a14+a24+a34+1) Bn Bn*100 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100 
Table 15, AHP matrix showing the average value of each normalised row 
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Having performed the said steps, one can obtain a weight for each risk element using the 
AHP algorithm in order to inspect which risks are of higher significance and criticality and 
therefore need to be taken into account more in comparison with less significant ones. 
The way in which AHP works is that it first calculates the weights and the subsequent 
rankings of the criteria with respect to the objective or goal. Secondly, it compares the 
alternatives pair-wise with respect to other alternatives within the fault tree and as a result 
calculates a subsequent weight for the alternatives. 
All the other risk elements within the fault tree were analysed in the same way as above. 
Moreover, risk elements were analysed and compared with one another with respect to the 
ultimate goal which was the leakage of CO2 from the storage reservoir. 
The said analyses were carried out using the “Expert Choice” software which was acquired 
for use within this research. The first criterion that was used within the software and the final 
results of the AHP method are shown below. In addition, the step by step calculation that was 
carried out using the Expert Choice software has been given in section 10.1.3 of Appendix I 
of this thesis. 
Figure 14 shows criterion “a1”, Migration of CO2 through the caprock (Darcy flow), being 
analysed using the numerical scale of the AHP technique. On the other hand, figure 15 shows 
the same analyses with a different scale. Moreover, in the case of figure 15, the linguistic 
equivalent of the numerical scale has been used. 
Note 1: Refer to table 8 of section 3.4.1 for a full list of linguistic equivalents of the 
numerical values in AHP method’s scale. 
During this process, each alternative, namely “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” were compared to each 
other with respect to the criteria, “a1”, “a2”, “b1”, “b2”, “b3”, “c1”, “c2”, “c3”, “c4”, “c5”, “d1” 
and “d2”. 
Note 2: For a full list of equivalents for the risk elements within the fault tree of this study, 
refer to table 7 of section 4.3. 
Note 3: Numbers in “Red” represent the invers function in AHP. 
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Figure 14, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “a1”using a numerical scale 
 
Figure 15 shows the final weight of each alternative with respect to criterion a1. The same 
analyses have been carried out for other criteria, i.e. a2”, “b1”, “b2”, “b3”, “c1”, “c2”, “c3”, 
“c4”, “c5”, “d1” and “d2” in appendix I of this thesis. 
 
Figure 15, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “a1” using a linguistic scale 
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Figure 16, Final weight of alternatives with respect to”a1” 
 
Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20 show the final steps of the AHP method which was implemented 
using the Expert Choice software. Moreover, they show the comparison matrix of the criteria 
using the numerical scale, comparison matrix of the criteria using the linguistic scale and the 
weight of each criterion in comparison to other criteria respectively. 
 
Figure 17, Expert Choice workspace 
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Figure 18, Comparison of each criterion with respect to other criteria using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 19, Comparison of each criterion with respect to other criteria using a linguistic scale 
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Figure 20, Final weight of each criterion with respect to other criteria 
 
  
Figure 21 shows the final weight for each main risk element within the fault tree of this study 
obtained as a result of using the AHP technique. 
 
 
Figure 21, Final weight of the alternatives with respect to each other 
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Furthermore, tables 16 and 17 show the weight and the subsequent rank of the different risk 
elements that were analysed in this research using the AHP technique. 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives 
A 0.125 
B 0.108 
C 0.378 
D 0.389 
Table 16, Weight of the risks using AHP 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives Rank 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock (A) 3 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone (B) 4 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well (C) 2 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells (D) 1 
Table 17, Ranking of the risks using AHP 
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6.3 Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) 
As mentioned before, the Fuzzy AHP method was used in order to account for the inherent 
subjectivity and ambiguity that comes with human judgment. As such, the FAHP provided a 
type of sensitivity analysis in order to inspect whether or not the results of the AHP method 
would change should the input parameter be varied slightly.  
In this section, similar to the results of the AHP method, the first criterion that was used 
within the calculation steps for the FAHP method and the final results of the FAHP method 
are shown. In addition, the step by step calculation that was carried out using the said 
technique has been given in section 10.1.4 of Appendix I of this thesis. 
Table 18 shows the fuzzified version of the comparison matrix of the risks that were studied 
and shown in figure 7. Tables 19 to 26 show the different steps that have to be taken in order 
to calculate the weights of the criteria using the fuzzy analysis. 
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AHP Fuzzy 
 
a1 a2 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 d1 d2 
a1 (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (5,6,7) (1,2,3) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/7,1/6/1/5) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/7,1/6,1/5) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/7,1/6,1/5) (1/8,1/7,1/6) 
a2 (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1,1,1) (4,5,6) (2,3,4) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/7,1/6,1/5) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/7,1/6,1/5) 
b1 (1/7,1/6,1/5) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1,1,1) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/8,1/7,1/6 (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/5,1/4,1/3) 
b2 (1/3,1/2,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (3,4,5) (1,1,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) 
b3 (2,3,4) (2,3,4) (6,7,8) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (1/7,1/6/1/5) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1/7,1/6,1/5) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/3,1/2,1) 
c1 (5,6,7) (4,5,6) (3,4,5) (4,5,6) (5,6,7) (1,1,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1,1,1) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) 
c2 (4,5,6) (3,4,5) (2,3,4) (3,4,5) (6,7,8) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,2,3) (3,4,5) (1,2,3) 
c3 (5,6,7) (3,4,5) (3,4,5) (4,5,6) (3,4,5) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (3,4,5) (4,5,6) (3,4,5) 
c4 (2,3,4) (2,3,4) (3,4,5) (2,3,4) (6,7,8) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) (2,3,4) (2,3,4) 
c5 (3,4,5) (5,6,7) (4,5,6) (6,7,8) (5,6,7) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) (3,4,5) (2,3,4) 
d1 (5,6,7) (4,5,6) (3,4,5) (1,2,3) (2,3,4) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
d2 (6,7,8) (5,6,7) (4,5,6) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 18, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for the studied risks within this project 
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Row Number 

n
j
klM
1
 
1 (10.42, 13.76, 17.35) 
2 (8.77, 11.23, 14.07) 
3 (3.05, 3.54, 4.37) 
4 (6.33. 8.13, 11) 
5 (14.32, 18.70, 23.57) 
6 (3.25, 39.33, 48.50) 
7 (27.33, 37.50, 48.00) 
8 (31.33. 39.50, 48.00) 
9 (23.25, 32.33, 41.50) 
10 (30.12, 37.58, 45.83) 
11 (18.07, 24.37, 30.92) 
12 (20.70, 26.42, 33.33) 


n
j
kl
m
i
M
11
 (223.93, 292.40, 366.43) 
1
11









n
j
kl
m
i
M  (0.0027, 0.0034, 0.0044) 
Table 19, Sum of TFNs of each row of the Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix in order to obtain the 
Fuzzy synthetic extent, Sk 
 
Row Number 
1
111








 
n
j
ij
m
i
n
j
klk MMS  Sk 
1 (10.42, 13.76, 17.35) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.02844, 0.04706, 0.07748) 
2 (8.77, 11.23, 14.07) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.02393, 0.03842, 0.06282) 
3 (3.05, 3.54, 4.37) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.00833, 0.01212, 0.01950) 
4 (6.33. 8.13, 11) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.01726, 0.02779, 0.04912) 
5 (14.32, 18.70, 23.57) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.03908, 0.06396, 0.10524) 
6 (3.25, 39.33, 48.50) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.08255, 0.13452, 0.21658) 
7 (27.33, 37.50, 48.00) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.07459, 0.12825, 0.21435) 
8 (31.33. 39.50, 48.00) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.08551, 0.13509, 0.21435) 
9 (23.25, 32.33, 41.50) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.06345, 0.11058, 0.18532) 
10 (30.12, 37.58, 45.83) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.08219, 0.12854, 0.20467) 
11 (18.07, 24.37, 30.92) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.04930, 0.08333, 0.13806) 
12 (20.70, 26.42, 33.33) * (0.00272, 0.00342, 0.00446) (0.05649, 0.09035, 0.14885) 
Table 20, Achieved TFNs for Sks of each row of the Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix
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Criteria TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
a1 
1 1.00 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.25 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.13 10.42 223.93 0.00272 0.02844 
2 1.00 3.00 6.00 2.00 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.14 13.76 292.40 0.00342 0.04706 
3 1.00 4.00 7.00 3.00 0.50 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.50 0.33 0.20 0.17 17.35 366.43 0.00446 0.07748 
a2 
1 0.25 1.00 4.00 2.00 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.17 0.14 8.77 
 
0.00272 0.02393 
2 0.33 1.00 5.00 3.00 0.33 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.17 11.23 
 
0.00342 0.03842 
3 0.50 1.00 6.00 4.00 0.50 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.20 0.25 0.20 14.07 
 
0.00446 0.06282 
b1 
1 0.14 0.17 1.00 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.20 3.05 
 
0.00272 0.00833 
2 0.17 0.20 1.00 0.25 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.25 3.54 
 
0.00342 0.01212 
3 0.20 0.25 1.00 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.33 4.37 
 
0.00446 0.01950 
b2 
1 0.33 0.25 3.00 1.00 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.33 0.25 6.33 
 
0.00272 0.01726 
2 0.50 0.33 4.00 1.00 0.33 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.33 0.14 0.50 0.33 8.13 
 
0.00342 0.02779 
3 1.00 0.50 5.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.17 1.00 0.50 11.00 
 
0.00446 0.04912 
b3 
1 2.00 2.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.33 14.32 
 
0.00272 0.03908 
2 3.00 3.00 7.00 3.00 1.00 0.17 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.17 0.33 0.50 18.70 
 
0.00342 0.06396 
3 4.00 4.00 8.00 4.00 1.00 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.20 0.50 1.00 23.57 
 
0.00446 0.10524 
c1 
1 5.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 30.25 
 
0.00272 0.08255 
2 6.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 39.33 
 
0.00342 0.13452 
3 7.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 48.50 
 
0.00446 0.21658 
c2 
1 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 3.00 1.00 27.33 
 
0.00272 0.07459 
2 5.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 0.50 2.00 4.00 2.00 37.50 
 
0.00342 0.12825 
3 6.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 8.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 48.00 
 
0.00446 0.21435 
c3 
1 5.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 31.33 
 
0.00272 0.08551 
2 6.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 39.50 
 
0.00342 0.13509 
3 7.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 48.00 
 
0.00446 0.21435 
c4 
1 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 6.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 23.25 
 
0.00272 0.06345 
2 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 7.00 0.33 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 32.33 
 
0.00342 0.11058 
3 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 8.00 0.50 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 41.50 
 
0.00446 0.18532 
c5 
1 3.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 5.00 0.25 0.33 0.20 0.33 1.00 3.00 2.00 30.12 
 
0.00272 0.08219 
2 4.00 6.00 5.00 7.00 6.00 0.33 0.50 0.25 0.50 1.00 4.00 3.00 37.58 
 
0.00342 0.12854 
3 5.00 7.00 6.00 8.00 7.00 0.50 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 45.83 
 
0.00446 0.20467 
d1 
1 5.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.20 1.00 1.00 18.07 
 
0.00272 0.04930 
2 6.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.33 0.25 1.00 2.00 24.37 
 
0.00342 0.08333 
3 7.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.33 1.00 3.00 30.92 
 
0.00446 0.13806 
d2 
1 6.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.33 1.00 20.70 
 
0.00272 0.05649 
2 7.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.50 1.00 26.42 
 
0.00342 0.09035 
3 8.00 7.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 33.33 
 
0.00446 0.14885 
Table 21, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for the studied risks within this project along with achieved TFNs for the Sks
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Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0284 0.0471 0.0775 
S2 0.0239 0.0384 0.0628 
S3 0.0083 0.0121 0.0195 
S4 0.0173 0.0278 0.0491 
S5 0.0391 0.0640 0.1052 
S6 0.0826 0.1345 0.2166 
S7 0.0746 0.1283 0.2143 
S8 0.0855 0.1351 0.2143 
S9 0.0634 0.1106 0.1853 
S10 0.0822 0.1285 0.2047 
S11 0.0493 0.0833 0.1381 
S12 0.0565 0.0903 0.1489 
Table 22, TFN values of Sk for each criteria 
Using equation 32 in section 4.7, the degree of possibility is calculated.  
)( 21 MMV   
s1 >= s2 1 s4 >= s1 0.517754 s7 >= s1 1 s10 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 1 s4 >= s2 0.703314 s7 >= s2 1 s10 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 1 s4 >= s3 1 s7 >= s3 1 s10 >= s3 1 
s1 >= s5 0.694343 s4 >= s5 0.217345 s7 >= s4 1 s10 >= s4 1 
s1 >= s6 0 s4 >= s6 0 s7 >= s5 1 s10 >= s5 1 
s1 >= s7 0.034314 s4 >= s7 0 s7 >= s6 0.954586 s10 >= s6 0.953280 
s1 >= s8 0 s4 >= s8 0 s7 >= s8 0.949587 s10 >= s7 1 
s1 >= s9 0.180894 s4 >= s9 0 s7 >= s9 1 s10 >= s8 0.947859 
s1 >= s10 0 s4 >= s10 0 s7 >= s10 0.997848 s10 >= s9 1 
s1 >= s11 0.437141 s4 >= s11 0 s7 >= s11 1 s10>= s11 1 
s1 >= s12 0.326527 s4 >= s12 0 s7 >= s12 1 s10>= s12 1 
s2 >= s1 0.799166 s5 >= s1 1 s8 >= s1 1 s11 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 1 s5 >= s2 1 s8 >= s2 1 s11 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 1 s5 >= s3 1 s8 >= s3 1 s11 >= s3 1 
s2 >= s5 0.481687 s5 >= s4 1 s8 >= s4 1 s11 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s6 0 s5 >= s6 0.243302 s8 >= s5 1 s11 >= s5 1 
s2 >= s7 0 s5 >= s7 0.322815 s8 >= s6 1 s11 >= s6 0.520257 
s2 >= s8 0 s5 >= s8 0.217153 s8 >= s7 1 s11 >= s7 0.585585 
s2 >= s9 0 s5 >= s9 0.472693 s8 >= s9 1 s11 >= s8 0.503816 
s2 >= s10 0 s5 >= s10 0.263062 s8 >= s10 1 s11 >= s9 0.732509 
s2 >= s11 0.231257 s5 >= s11 0.742760 s8 >= s11 1 s11 >= s10 0.552790 
s2 >= s12 0.108587 s5 >= s12 0.648844 s8 >= s12 1 s11 >= s12 0.920852 
s3 >= s1 0 s6 >= s1 1 s9 >= s1 1 s12 >= s1 1 
s3 >= s2 0 s6 >= s2 1 s9 >= s2 1 s12 >= s2 1 
s3 >= s4 0.124974 s6 >= s3 1 s9 >= s3 1 s12 >= s3 1 
s3 >= s5 0 s6 >= s4 1 s9 >= s4 1 s12 >= s4 1 
s3 >= s6 0 s6 >= s5 1 s9 >= s5 1 s12 >= s5 1 
s3 >= s7 0 s6 >= s7 1 s9 >= s6 0.811063 s12 >= s6 0.600137 
s3 >= s8 0 s6 >= s8 0.9956700 s9 >= s7 0.862382 s12 >= s7 0.662060 
s3 >= s9 0 s6 >= s9 1 s9 >= s8 0.802852 s12 >= s8 0.586035 
s3 >= s10 0 s6 >= s10 1 s9 >= s10 0.851719 s12 >= s9 0.808450 
s3 >= s11 0 s6 >= s11 1 s9 >= s11 1 s12 >= s10 0.635780 
s3 >= s12 0 s6 >= s12 1 s9 >= s12 1 s12 >= s11 1 
s1 >= s2 1 s4 >= s1 0.517754 s7 >= s1 1 s10 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 1 s4 >= s2 0.703314 s7 >= s2 1 s10 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 1 s4 >= s3 1 s7 >= s3 1 s10 >= s3 1 
s1 >= s5 0.694343 s4 >= s5 0.217345 s7 >= s4 1 s10 >= s4 1 
Table 23, FAHP: Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for the TFNs 
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V(Mi ≥ Mj) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 
S1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6943 0.0000 0.0343 0.0000 0.1809 0.0000 0.4371 0.3265 
S2 0.7992 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4817 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2313 0.1086 
S3 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S4 0.5178 0.7033 1.0000 1.0000 0.2173 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S5 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2433 0.3228 0.2172 0.4727 0.2631 0.7428 0.6488 
S6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9957 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S7 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9546 1.0000 0.9496 1.0000 0.9978 1.0000 1.0000 
S8 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8111 0.8624 0.8029 1.0000 0.8517 1.0000 1.0000 
S10 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9533 1.0000 0.9479 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S11 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5203 0.5856 0.5038 0.7325 0.5528 1.0000 0.9209 
S12 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6001 0.6621 0.5860 0.8085 0.6358 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 24, FAHP: The achieved amounts of Sk 
Using equation 17 and equation 18, the weights of the criteria and the vector of the weights is 
calculated as follows: 
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min S1 >= S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.0000 0.0000 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.0000 0.0000 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.0000 0.0000 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.0000 0.0000 
min S5 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.2172 0.0362 
min S6 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.9957 0.1659 
min S7 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12 0.9496 0.1582 
min S8 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S9, S10, S11, S12 1.0000 0.1666 
min S9 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S10, S11, S12 0.8029 0.1337 
min S10 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S11, S12 0.9479 0.1579 
min S11 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S12 0.5038 0.0839 
min S12 >= S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11 0.5860 0.0976 
Table 25, FAHP: Calculation of the weights of the criteria 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
 a1 a2 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 d1 d2 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2172 0.9957 0.9496 1.0000 0.8029 0.9479 0.5038 0.5860 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0362 0.1659 0.1582 0.1666 0.1337 0.1579 0.0839 0.0976 
Table 26, FAHP: Vector of the weights of the criteria 
 
 179 
Tables 27 to 33 show the way in which the same calculations take place with regards to 
criterion a1 of this study. The step by step calculation of the remaining criteria, i.e. a2 to d2, is 
shown in section 10.1.4 of appendix I. 
 
Migration through the caprock (a1) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (6,7,8) (7,8,9) (7,8,9) 
B (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
C (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
D (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 27, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria a1 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 6.00 8.00 7.00 22.00 31.35 0.0274465 0.60382 
2 1.00 7.00 9.00 8.00 25.00 34.38 0.0290875 0.72719 
3 1.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 27.00 36.43 0.0319007 0.86132 
B 
1 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.13 
 
0.0274465 0.08577 
2 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.14 
 
0.0290875 0.09142 
3 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.17 
 
0.0319007 0.10102 
C 
1 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.11 
 
0.0274465 0.08539 
2 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.11 
 
0.0290875 0.09049 
3 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.13 
 
0.0319007 0.09969 
D 
1 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.11 
 
0.0274465 0.08539 
2 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.13 
 
0.0290875 0.09090 
3 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.14 
 
0.0319007 0.10026 
Table 28, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria a1 
 Sk 
  l m u 
S1 0.6038 0.7272 0.8613 
S2 0.0858 0.0914 0.1010 
S3 0.0854 0.0905 0.0997 
S4 0.0854 0.0909 0.1003 
Table 29, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria a1 
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s1 >= s2 1 s3 >= s1 0 
s1 >= s3 1 s3 >= s2 0.937787 
s1 >= s4 1 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 0 s4 >= s1 0 
s2 >= s3 1 s4 >= s2 0.965391 
s2 >= s4 1 s4 >= s3 1 
Table 30, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to a1 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S2 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S3 0.0000 0.9378 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 0.0000 0.9654 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 31, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria a1 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 1.0000 1 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0000 0 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.0000 0 
Table 32, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria a1 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
wi 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 33, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria a1 
 
Tables 34, 35 and 36 show the final weight of criteria and alternatives that have been 
obtained and the final ranking of the risks associated with CO2 storage underground as a 
result of using the FAHP method. 
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c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0362 0.1659 0.1582 0.1666 0.1337 0.1579 0.0839 0.0976 
A 1.0000 0.8507 0.6625 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
B 0.0000 0.0000 0.3375 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
C 0.0000 0.0837 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5659 0.7931 0.6497 0.5360 0.6055 0.0908 0.0000 
D 0.0000 0.0656 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4341 0.2069 0.3503 0.4640 0.3945 0.9092 1.0000 
Table 34, Weights of the criteria and alternatives using FAHP 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives 
A 0.036174315 
B 0 
C 0.502447843 
D 0.461377843 
Table 35, Weight of the alternatives with respect to the criteria using FAHP 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives Rank 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock (A) 3 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone (B) 4 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well (C) 1 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells (D) 2 
Table 36, Final weight of the risk elements using the FAHP method
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7 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the results obtained as a result of the risk modelling conducted during 
the course of this study followed by the ways in which the modelling approach of this study 
can potentially play a significant role in analysing and estimating the risks associated with 
underground storage of CO2 in future as well as current projects. 
The following is the way in which the European Commission currently performs risk analysis 
and risk management for geological storage of CO2 and therefore recommends the CCS 
industry to do so too. The EU Commission in its Guidance Document 1 (GD1)
7
 recognises 
that the current level of knowledge with respect to the risk analysis of CO2 storage sites is 
limited and as a result states that: “the overall approach is to identify and mitigate any 
significant risks; The CA should recognise that operators must undertake site-specific 
approaches in their risk assessment and management (European Parliment, 2011a).” 
However, in order to provide a benchmark and a basis for risk analysis and risk management 
for the storage site operators and the insurance industry, the EU Commission makes use of 
the approach used in the CO2QUALSTORE report
8
 which has been adapted in accordance 
with the needs of the CCS Directive. 
According to the CCS Directive, CO2 storage sites should only be selected, used and operated 
where there is no significant risk of leakage and that the stored CO2 should be permanently 
contained  (European Commission, 2009). Significant risk is defined in the CCS Directive’s 
Article 3(18) as meaning “a combination of probability occurrence of damage and a 
magnitude of damage that cannot be disregarded without calling into question the purpose of 
the Directive as far as the storage site is concerned” (European Commission, 2009).  
                                                 
7
 EUROPEAN PARLIMENT 2011a. Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide Guidance Document 1 (GD1): CO2 Storage Life Cycle Risk Management Framework. In: 
COMMISSION, E. (ed.). Official Journal of the European Union: European Commission. 
8
 DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) 2010. CO2QUALSTORE Report - Guideline for Selection, 
Characterization and Qualification of Sites and Projects for Geological Storage of CO2. 
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Therefore, according to the CCS Directive, the risks have to be analysed and determined as to 
how significant they are and if deemed significant, to what extent do they need to be 
addressed by storage site operators and considered by the insurance industry when insuring 
CO2 storage sites. 
 
7.2 Risk Analysis Methods Proposed by the European Commission in 
Guidance Documents 1 and 4 
As mentioned in section 7.1, the CCS Directive makes use of a modified version of risk 
assessment and risk management technique used by the CO2QUALSTORE report in order to 
perform risk assessment for the lifecycle of CO2 storage sites in general. 
The proposed risk analysis and risk management approach used in the CCS Directive is 
divided into three steps, Overall Risk Management Process, Interaction between Operator and 
Competent Authorities and Risk Management at different project phases.  
The following framework has then been provided for the overall risk management process in 
geological storage of CO2 (European Commission, 2009): 
 Risk identification and assessment 
 Risk ranking 
 Risk management measures 
Risk identification and assessment entails the identification, assessment and characterisation 
of potential hazards and risks towards the containment of CO2 in underground storage sites, 
exposure and effects assessment (European Parliment, 2011a). 
Furthermore, risk ranking means to rank and categorise the identified risks and hazards based 
on a standard matrix of probability and severity of outcome (see Figure 22). This step 
consists of two options: Significant or Insignificant. The next step is to describe and evaluate 
preventive and corrective measures that can be used to manage the risks (Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV), 2010). 
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The EU Commission recognises and mentions in GD1 that while its risk analysis framework 
is based on a modified version of the CO2QUALSTORE guideline, operators can also use 
other risk analysis and risk management methods, as long as they comply with the 
requirements of the CCS Directive. 
 
7.2.1 EU Commission Guidance Document 1 (GD1) Risk Ranking Mechanism 
As mentioned before, risk ranking is one of the most important elements in risk analysis since 
it enables the storage facilities’ operators to be able to identify which risks are significant and 
which ones are insignificant. In addition, this also enables insurance companies to assess the 
risks of CO2 storage more effectively at any given storage facility and therefore devise 
insurance policies that are more in favour of the CCS industry. 
The EU Commission’s CCS GD1 already provides a risk ranking mechanism that can be used 
by the CCS industry. This mechanism is described below. 
The proposed method for ranking the risks associated with CO2 storage is to categorise the 
risks using a standard matrix of probability and impact/severity of occurrence (shown in 
figure 22). 
  
Figure 22, Risk Management Framework used in CCS GD1 (Det Norske Veritas (DNV), 2010) 
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The initial ranking, based on the risk identification stage, may be supported by the analysis 
carried out in the risk assessment step. The aim of this process is to characterize the potential 
significance of each risk along with its probability of occurrence and consequences should it 
occur. The relative significance of each risk should then be characterized, prioritised and 
placed in either the significant or insignificant categories. GD1 describes insignificant risks 
as “ones that are broadly regarded as not posing a significant danger to human health or 
environment” (European Parliment, 2011b). Furthermore, it describes significant risks as 
“ones that must be reduced to insignificant through implementation of risk reducing measures 
in order to gain project approval, or to meet anticipated conditions for site closure (European 
Parliment, 2011b). 
In general, it is recommended by the GD1 that in order to avoid disappointment, the ranking 
takes place conservatively owing to the fact that there is a high level of uncertainty with 
regards to the probability of leakage and the likelihood effects that a potential leakage may 
entail. Furthermore, the pessimistic end of severity and probability of occurrence scale have 
to be taken into account in order to ensure avoidable leakages of CO2 from the storage 
reservoirs do not occur.  
On the other hand however, one has to make sure that they avoid being biased when 
analysing and assessing the risks. Moreover, the risks have to be managed and downgraded 
effectively as more knowledge about particular CO2 storage sites becomes available and 
uncertainties are reduced. 
 
7.3 Addressing Risks in EU Commission Guidance Document 4 (GD4) 
As mentioned in section 3.4.3 of this thesis, by virtue of the inclusion of geological storage 
sites under Annex I of the Emissions Trading Directive, installations will be required to 
surrender allowances for any emissions from the site (including leakage) as calculated 
pursuant to the Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines for CCS. The amount of the Financial 
Security for this obligation can be based on the potential total tons of emissions, including 
due to leakage(s), multiplied by the market cost of purchasing an equivalent amount of 
allowances. This calculation will require estimates for the total tons of emissions that may be 
 187 
released (including due to leakage(s)), the timing of emissions, and cost of allowances when 
releases occur.  
It is worth noting that European Commission’s GD4 has exercised language that specifically 
did not recommend the determination of FS (for the surrender of allowances due to leakages) 
by multiplying the estimated amount of funds by the probability that the scenario occurs. 
Now, a “realistic and appropriate middle ground scenario taking into account of all available 
evidence of the site-specific risk profile is used” is recommended. In addition, GD4 contains 
a method for the “calculation of the potential leakage amount based on a probability 
distribution of the amount of leakage from the storage complex” where ”there is a proposed 
use of probability distribution for determining the size of a leakage (not the probability that it 
will occur)”. Furthermore, it gives regulators the choice of choosing a risk percentile for the 
size of the leakage to be used instead as an estimate, instead of an inflexible 25% default 
contingency for FS. Furthermore, there is specific mention of the fact that FS amounts may 
now be updated “in case of leakage or significant irregularities, or where the monitoring plan 
is updated pursuant to Annex II of the CCS Directive”. For example, in the UK, the 
Environment Agency adds a contingency of about 40-50% in determining the minimum 
amount of the FS for transfrontier movements of hazardous waste (European Parliment, 
2011d). Owing to the fact that there is little experience in the field of geological storage of 
CO2, GD4 suggests for the storage site operators to estimate the said amount of FS based on 
the following: 
 A conservative estimate of the maximum portion of CO2 that can be leaked from 
storage sites, which in most scenarios would be less than 100%; 
 A calculation of the potential leakage amount based on a probability distribution of 
the amount of leakage from the storage site taking into account the geological 
characteristics of the site, facility design, monitoring programme and statistical 
modelling (European Parliment, 2011d). 
 
7.3.1 An Industry View of EU Commission CCS Guidance Document 4 (GD4) 
Financial Security and Contribution Articles are of particular concern. Guidance interpreted 
as requiring uncapped, uncertain liability which would be a major barrier to industry 
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participation. Provision of security for worst case scenario as well as 25% contingency would 
make operator risk entirely disproportionate especially as the Competent Authority would 
have already assessed the operator as being fit and proper as well as commented on the 
suitability of the proposed storage site as part of the permitting process. They propose 
required security and additional contingency measures to be assessed on a site-by-site basis. 
Also highlighted is the need to distinguish liabilities between the demonstration and 
commercialization phases as demonstration projects will be facing first-of-a-kind issues. 
Probabilistic risk management is already being used in evaluating energy sector technologies 
by both industry and government. Furthermore, any risk to the CA would be spread to many 
storage sites, therefore having a financial security based on worst case scenario for each 
storage site is disproportionate to the risk. Alternatively, arrangements can be made that 
would take into account risk exposure and each storage site operator would pay a risk 
adjusted payment based on storage site assessment. Money would go into a central fund held 
by CA.  
Propose that if Member State has issued a permit to the operator, assume that there is very 
low risk of that site leaking (issues of oil wells past and access to information is made 
public). 
Inclusion of storage sites within ETS exposes storage site operator to further significant 
financial risk. In the event of leakage, submit allowances for CO2 leaked. However, the 
ability of operator to hedge the exposure to allowance price volatility is significantly limited. 
A reasonable suggested compromise would be for the operator and the competent authority to 
agree to a shared risk profile, perhaps through an insurance mechanism which would allow 
risk exposure to be capped for operator. Examples of this can be seen in current proposals in 
the UK for capping risk of nuclear risk management where the CA is proposing the fixing of 
a fee in advance that includes a risk premium, but ultimately caps the exposure for operators. 
As currently drafted, GD4 could require the operator to make an accounting provision 
equivalent to value of stored CO2. This would be a significant uncertain liability for the 
operator and would discourage investment. Furthermore, the financial strength of operator 
should be taken into account when agreeing an acceptable method such that greater financial 
strength should provide greater latitude to the operator. 
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7.4 Proposed Risk Analysis Mechanism 
The risk ranking section within the risk analysis method used in GD1 will not be able to act 
as the optimum solution in real life CCS projects since its outcome only states whether a risk 
is significant or insignificant. On the other hand, not only the risk ranking techniques used in 
this project enable CCS stakeholders to assess the significance of risks, they also enable them 
to determine the extent to which the risks are significant or insignificant in comparison to 
each other. Therefore, the techniques use in this thesis enable storage site operators to assess 
the probability of occurrence of risks having studied the significance of them in comparison 
to each other and decide accordingly. In other words, CCS GD1 is only able to determine 
storage site operators’ decisions based on absolute values, i.e. significant or insignificant. On 
the other hand however, the techniques used in this research assist storage site operators in 
decision making when it comes to dealing with uncertainty and choosing the optimum 
decision. Moreover, the proposed methods work in conjunction with each other in order to 
calculate the significance and likelihood of occurrence of the risks of leakage or hazards that 
may prevent complete and permanent containment of CO2 in storage reservoirs in comparison 
with each other. After this, it is the storage site operators’ responsibility to make decisions 
based on the specific location of the storage site, local population density, the nature of the 
biosphere, atmospheric dispersal and whether the site is onshore or offshore (European 
Parliment, 2011c). The composition of the CO2 stream should also be taken into 
consideration (see Chapter 3 of EU Commission’s Guidance Document 2 (GD2) for more 
discussion)
9
. 
The GD1 recommends making use of focus groups and brainstorming sessions amongst a 
group of participants in order to assess the probability, likelihood and potential impact of the 
risks. It further states that, in order to avoid bias, the participants should be chosen from 
experts that have detailed knowledge of the particular CCS project in question as well as 
participants who are not viewed as experts in the CCS technology. This is sensible. 
Hence, similar to the GD1 risk assessment method, this research project also makes use of 
expert opinion in order to perform the risk analysis techniques. However, this project has 
                                                 
9
 EUROPEAN PARLIMENT 2011b. Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide Guidance Document 2 (GD2): Characterisation of the Storage Complex, CO2 Stream 
Composition, Monitoring and Corrective Measures. In: COMMISSION, E. (ed.). European Commission,. 
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only relied upon opinions of national and international experts in the field of geological 
storage of CO2. Equally, it has mathematically devised a risk rating system that also takes 
into account uncertainty by performing sensitivity analysis. 
The AHP and FAHP techniques were used in this research in order to analyse the importance 
and criticality of the risks associated with the storage of CO2 in underground storage 
reservoirs. The said techniques produced a series of rankings for the risks shown in figure 7 
of section 4.3, the results of which can be seen in table 37. 
The AHP method was used since it is a useful and effective way to prioritise between a set of 
alternatives taking into account certain criteria in addition to its sophisticated but yet 
relatively easy nature. 
Moreover, the FAHP method was used in order to overcome the fact that human judgements 
are commonly imprecise, subjective and ambiguous, by calculating the importance and 
criticality of the risks associated with CO2 storage through fuzzifying the pair-wise 
comparison matrices that were used as part of the AHP method. The results of which can be 
seen in table 37.  
 
Alternatives AHP FAHP 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock 0.125 0.036 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone 0.108 0 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 0.378 0.502 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells 0.389 0.461 
Table 37, Calculated resutls using the AHP and FAHP methods 
 
As seen in table 37, the AHP and FAHP methods produced very similar results. Furthermore, 
using the AHP method resulted in the following ranking. The “leakage of CO2 through other 
wells” was ranked first, “leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well” was ranked 
second, “percolation of CO2 through the caprock” was ranked third and finally the “migration 
of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone” was ranked as the least important risk associated 
with CO2 storage. On the other hand, results of the FAHP method suggests “Leakage of CO2 
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through or along the injection well” is ranked above the “Leakage of CO2 through other 
wells” in terms of importance, criticality and likelihood of occurrence.  
As shown in figure 23, this suggests that these two risks are as important as each other and 
have to be taken into account equally when storage site operators and insurance companies 
are analysing the risks of CO2 leakage from storage sites.  
 
 
Figure 23, Comparison of results of the AHP and FAHP methods 
 
In order to test the robustness of the AHP and AHP Fuzzy methods used in this research and 
to see whether or not the obtained ranking of the risks would change when different methods 
are used, two other systems engineering optimisation techniques were used, TOPSIS and 
PROMETHEE. What follows is a short description of the nature of the said two methods and 
the way in which they operate in order to achieve the same outcome to the AHP technique 
whilst using other methodologies. The methodologies associated with TOPSIS and 
PROMETHEE methods and the ways in which their respective calculations took place are 
shown in sections 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 of Appendix I respectively. 
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7.4.1 Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
TOPSIS is a multi-criteria decision making method developed by Hwang and Yoon in 1981 
which is used on a large scale (Hwang and Yoon, 1981). The method was further developed 
by Yoon in 1987 (Yoon, 1987) and Hwang, Lai and Liu in 1993 (Hwang et al., 1993). 
Gumus describes TOPSIS as an approach for dealing with complex systems related to 
making a preferred choice amongst several alternatives and which provides a comparison of 
the considered options (Gumus, 2009). TOPSIS is based on a simple and intuitive concept; it 
enables consistent and systematic criteria, which is based on choosing the best alternative 
having the shortest distance from the positive ideal solution and the furthest distance from the 
negative ideal solution (Joshi et al., 2011). 
TOPSIS is a goal based decision-making technique. This method evaluates each of the given 
options and using quantitative information determines which one may be closest to which has 
been identified as the goal or the overall preferred option. So what one is looking at is − using 
the nominal design information − which individual alternative is closest to the ideal solution 
that a project at any given stage would require or prefer. Furthermore, one of the advantages 
of using TOPSIS is its ability to identify the best alternative out of a set of alternatives 
quickly (Parkan and Wu, 1997). 
The TOPSIS method has been deployed in order to calculate and obtain the ideal solution. 
Moreover, the ideal solution in TOPSIS is one which has the shortest distance from the 
positive ideal solution and the longest distance from the negative ideal solution. Furthermore, 
in the case of the CO2 storage technology, the negative ideal solution would be the leakage of 
CO2 from underground storage reservoirs and the positive ideal solution would be 
containment of CO2 underground. 
In order to be able to choose the preferred solution from a set of alternatives using the 
TOPSIS method, one has to go through five steps which have been described in detail in 
section 10.1.1 of Appendix I.  
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7.4.2 Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluation 
(PROMETHEE) 
The PROMETHEE method is based on mathematics and sociology. Furthermore, this method 
was developed and presented by J.P. Brans in 1982 at a conference and it has been developed 
and refined since then (Brans, 1982). This technique is considered to belong to the partial 
aggregation methods − some also call them outranking methods − and was partly designed as 
a reaction to the complete aggregation (MAUT) methods (Bekiaris and Nakanishi, 2004).  
The PROMETHEE method has been used extensively in a wide range of topics ranging from 
Environmental Management, Hydrology and Water Management, Business and Financial 
Management, Chemistry, Logistics and Transportation, Energy Management to Medicine, 
Agriculture and Education. 
This technique, which is a type multi-criteria decision making technique, helps decision 
makers find an alternative solution that best suits their respective projects as oppose to 
providing them with one solution. One of the main advantages of this technique is that it can 
be used when the important elements of the decision are difficult to quantify or compare. 
In a recent research project undertaken by Behzadian and colleagues, it was discovered that 
Environmental Management was the most popular topic which uses the PROMETHEE 
methods and it’s applications (Behzadian et al., 2010). Furthermore, within the environmental 
management area, the topics that were covered were, Waste Management, LCA, EIA and 
Land-Use Planning. 
The requirements for the PROMETHEE method to be carried out and subsequently determine 
the preference structure of the decision makers are: 
 Relative importance of the criteria that is being considered. This has also been 
referred to as the “relative weight of the criteria” in section 10.1.2 of the thesis;  
 Participants’ preference function, which he/she uses when comparing the contribution 
of the alternatives in terms of each separate criterion (Macharis et al., 2004). 
Nijkamp et al. and Eckenrode developed different methods that can be used in order to 
determine the relative weights of the criteria for the use of the PROMETHEE method (see 
(Nijkamp et al., 1990) and (Eckenrode, 1965) for an overview of these methods). According 
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to a recent study by Macharis and colleagues, PROMETHEE does not provide any guidelines 
on the calculation of the relative weights (Macharis et al., 2004). Furthermore, in this regard, 
the assumption of this technique is that the decision-maker is able to weigh the criteria 
appropriately, at least when the number of criteria is not too large. Moreover, she proposes 
that for large amounts of data, the relative weights can be calculated using methods such as: 
direct rating, point allocation, trade-off, pair-wise comparisons, and so on (Macharis et al., 
2004). For the purpose of this research project, the pair-wise comparison method i.e. the AHP 
method has been chosen in order to provide the input parameters i.e. the relative weights of 
the criteria for the PROMETHEE method. This was owing to the fact that as described in 
chapter 5, as part of the AHP method, an expert survey was sent to experts within the field of 
geological storage of CO2 underground. Furthermore, the results from the survey provided 
the input parameters for the AHP method which in turn can also be used for the 
PROMETHEE method. With this information, an overall preference index π(k,l) can be 
calculated, taking all the criteria into account. This preference index is based on the positive 
preference flow (  ) and negative preference flow (  ) for each alternative, which measures 
how an alternative may outrank or be outranked by the other alternatives. The net preference 
flow ( net ) is calculated by subtracting the negative preference flow from the positive 
reference flow. As a result, the most desired solution can be chosen as the one with the 
highest net preference flow. 
The way in which the negative, positive and the net preference flows can be calculated using 
the data generated by the AHP method, has been described in full in section 10.1.2 of 
Appendix I. 
According to tables 38 and 39, the AHP, TOPSIS and PROMETHEE methods all produced 
the same ranking for the risks shown in figure 7. The “leakage of CO2 through other wells” 
was ranked first, “leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well” was ranked second, 
“percolation of CO2 through the caprock” was ranked third and finally the “migration of CO2 
along a fracture or permeable zone” was ranked as the least important risk associated with 
CO2 storage. Therefore, it was concluded that the AHP method is a useful and robust method 
in analysing the risks associated with the underground storage of CO2.  
Having looked at the quantitative outputs shown in table 38, it was realized that the 
performance values are such that establishing a solid rank between some alternatives is 
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challenging as simple changes in the input information can potentially change the rankings. 
For example, the performance values of “Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection 
well” and “Leakage of CO2 through other wells” were very close to each other which can be 
shown by undertaking sensitivity analysis. Therefore, the said matter was another reason for 
using the Fuzzy AHP method in this research in order to inspect whether or not the results of 
the AHP method would vary with little variation in the input parameters. 
Furthermore, using the Fuzzy version of the AHP method, it was inspected that the order of 
importance and significance of the said two risk elements changed. Figure 23 further 
illustrates this matter by showing that the said two alternatives are not that different in 
performance. This is why the FAHP results are slightly different to the AHP results. 
Therefore, it is concluded that “Leakage of CO2 through the injection well” and “Leakage of 
CO2 through other wells” are more important than other risks. However, it is difficult to say 
with certainty as to which one of the said two risks are more important in comparison to one 
another. Therefore, it was further concluded that the said two risks is potentially as important 
as each other and have to be taken into account equally when analysing the risk of leakage 
associated with CO2 storage.  
 
Alternatives AHP TOPSIS PROMEHTEE FAHP 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock 0.125 0.203 -0.249 0.036 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone 0.108 0.116 -0.302 0 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 0.378 0.67 0.261 0.502 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells 0.389 0.676 0.289 0.461 
Table 38, Numerical value that each MCDM method calculated for the risks associated with CO2 
storage. 
Alternatives Rank 
 
AHP TOPSIS PROMEHTEE FAHP 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock 3 3 3 3 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone 4 4 4 4 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 2 2 2 1 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells 1 1 1 2 
Table 39, Ranking of risks of CO2 storage using different MCDM methods 
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Figure 24, Comparison of results of AHP, TOPSIS, PROMETHEE and FAHP methods 
 
MCDM methods are generally used in order to find the optimum solution from a range of 
suitable solutions in a multi-criteria decision-making problem. Emphasis is placed on the 
word “optimum”. Many solutions can be suitable but not all can be optimum. The AHP, 
TOPSIS and PROMETHEE methods point out the optimum solution for the decision makers 
rather than prescribing the correct one depending on their needs in any given project.  
Since the four MCDM methods used in this project each have a different notion of optimality, 
therefore, the optimum solution obtained as a result of carrying out each method is also 
different. However, what is important is that a preference table has now been constructed as a 
result of carrying out said techniques. Therefore, in case for any reason, the decision makers 
are not able to choose the best alternative, they can choose the second best alternative 
according to their specific needs. The same principle can be applied to the case of the risks 
associated with storage of CO2 underground.  
Amongst many different MCDM methods, four were employed in order to investigate the 
significance and criticality of certain risks in this study and their contribution towards the 
ultimate risk at the top of the fault tree which was “leakage of CO2 to the through the 
caprock”. 
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As mentioned above, as the notion of optimality is different in different MCDM methods, it 
was expected that the analysis from different methods would yield dissimilar results. 
Therefore, it was decided that more than one MCDM method would be used in order to 
obtain a more robust result. However, since the AHP, TOPSIS and PROMETHEE methods 
calculated the same ranking for the risks, their reciprocal findings suggest that the said 
methods are suitable techniques in analysing risks associated with CO2 storage in terms of 
their importance and criticality in comparison to each other. Furthermore, having performed 
sensitivity analysis using the Fuzzy AHP method and obtaining very similar results for the 
ranking of risks, it can be also concluded that the methods used in this thesis are robust 
methods. 
In conclusion, such risk analysis methods enable the storage site operators to focus on the 
weak points within the storage site, rank them in accordance to their importance and 
criticality towards the leakage of CO2, evaluate how these weak points can be properly tested 
and addressed if need be. Furthermore, this will enable the insurance industry and regulators 
to understand the risks associated with this industry as a whole more effectively and insure 
and regulate the storage sites more to the benefit of the CCS industry in order to encourage 
the growth and implementation of this technology. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The IPCC Working Group III (IPCC WC III) published their contribution to the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) in April 2014 and within the report there was a strong emphasis on 
the CCS technology in order to achieve the ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets. The 
two most important points within the report were the following:  
 Most climate change mitigation models show that without CCS (or even a 
considerable delay), the world will fail to limit atmospheric emissions of CO2 to 
450ppm (IPCC, 2014); 
 Without CCS, the total cost of limiting CO2 emissions to 450ppm could increase by 
138% (Darby, 2014). 
The IPCC WG III further states that CCS could be seen in the market providing that it is 
incentivised by regulation and be compensated by sufficiently high carbon prices or direct 
financial support should additional investment be needed caused by factors such as a 
reduction in plant efficiency (IPCC, 2014).  
Barriers to commercial scale deployment of the CCS technology include concerns about plant 
safety during operation phase, risks associated with the transportation of CO2 and perhaps 
more importantly, the long-term liability of storage sites in case leakages occur subsequent to 
end of injection and storage reservoirs have been sealed off. Storage site operators therefore 
have to ensure that the integrity of CO2 wells are assessed effectively in order to minimise the 
probability of occurrence of risks and their potential consequences that may be caused as a 
result of pressure build-up in the reservoirs.  
As mentioned in the IPCC 2014 report, in order for the large scale deployment of CCS 
technology to be successful, the support of regulators and insurers is necessary. This is owing 
to the fact that the companies adopting this technology will in this case be able to share the 
liability and therefore be compensated should leakage occur. Furthermore, insurance 
companies have to be able to estimate the risks associated with CO2 storage appropriately in 
order to feel content and as a result insure CO2 storage sites.  
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A review of the most recent regulatory and legislative literature was conducted in order to 
inspect the ways in which the risks of leakage and long-term liability are currently addressed 
in CCS related literature. Therefore, in chapter 3, this research has analysed and hence 
developed an understanding of the latest regulatory and legislative developments within the 
CCS industry. This was done by studying specific risk-related financial and regulatory issues 
with regards to CCS as well as the ways in which regulatory and legislative aspects of CCS 
are addressed in competing jurisdictions and the lessons that should be learnt from them. 
Furthermore, chapter 3 also compares the oil and gas, nuclear and waste management 
industries with the CCS industry with regards to their risk profiles and the ways in which 
those risks are addressed along with the different methods that they make use of in order to 
obtain insurance against the respective risks.  
As it stands, CCS legislation is comprised of an overlapping network of international 
agreements and regional policies in which they all form a strong basis for environmental 
protection in case potential leakages of CO2 from storage sites occur. This is done through the 
use of the precautionary and polluter pays principles. However, these legislative instruments 
form an uncoordinated legal basis for CCS with overly stringent liability provisions posing a 
significant barrier to stakeholder investment, technological development and future roll-out 
of commercial scale CCS projects.   
CCS will be unfolded in a competitive energy sector and holds within it ramifications for 
energy security. However, the current overly guarded regulation frameworks, particularly at 
the EU level, are restrictive to CCS competition. Therefore, the UK Government is advised to 
work with industry in providing clear regulatory solutions for a predictable investment 
framework for CCS when transposing the EU CCS Directive. This would allow for the 
tailoring of UK transposition legislation, having in mind the international legal basis for CCS, 
to the specific investment and regulatory climate of the UK. Furthermore, it would take 
advantage of pre-existing good relationships between policymakers and industry which can 
lead to invaluable feedback on the appropriateness and consequences of regulatory decisions. 
Ultimately, it is suggested that this would enhance the precision of monitoring activities and 
allow for a more inclusive approach to risk management measures.  
Real-world examples of flexible approaches to CCS regulation can be seen in the case of 
Norway, Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands and the USA. Moreover, Norway has 
incentivised CCS by legislating a carbon emissions tax of €40 t/CO2. Furthermore, CCS is 
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regulated both under the Norwegian Pollution Act and the Petroleum Act, however, at the 
present, responsibility for leakages is not satisfactorily regulated under Norwegian law. In the 
case of Australia, long term liability associated with the storage of CO2 is covered under the 
Research Development and Demonstration approval provision under the Victorian 
Environment Protection Act, which recognises that more comprehensive legislative cover 
would be necessary in the future for any commercial geo-sequestration projects. Moreover, in 
Canada, the CCS Act enables the Government to issue closure certificates which in effect 
transfers the responsibility for the stored CO2 from the storage site operator to the 
Government.  
In the US, the EPA has proposed a default 50-year time-frame for CCS liability with the 
provision that the acting EPA Director may shorten or lengthen that period based on risk data 
gathered during the permitting process. Additionally, this new permitting system will allow 
for financial guarantees for CCS to be chosen from a variety of different options which would 
allow for greater market competition and rapid deployment of lower-cost solutions in the 
CCS industry. Netherlands plans to implement the CCS Directive by amending the 
Netherlands Mining Act, which means that liability will lie with the storage license holder, 
up to the point of the license expiration.  
In addition, Germany has indicated that it will adopt a draft act on CCS which could 
potentially include the possibility that after a period of 30 years from the decommissioning of 
a plant, and thus about 80 years after its start-up, operators may transfer their responsibility to 
the Federal Government (once the operator has established proof of the long-term safety of 
the storage site). Notably, the CCS Demonstration Project Network which is sponsored by the 
European Commission has also expressed the belief that long-term CCS liability will be dealt 
with in the manner of oil spills – with “the state assuming liability after a regulated 
abandonment process”. 
As a result of said analyses (and reflecting initial work on the subject pertaining to the draft 
GD4), it was concluded that the EU GD4 demonstrates the knowledge that a risk-sharing 
approach, such as commercial insurance or risk pooling, would be preferable. However, since 
they perceive that CCS technology is not well developed and lacks a long empirical history, 
they posit that a risk-sharing approach would create a high degree of uncertainty in estimating 
probability and magnitudes of potential leakages. In addition, provision of security for worst 
case scenario as well as 25% contingency would make operator risk entirely disproportionate 
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especially as the CA would have already assessed the operator as being fit and proper as well 
as commented on the suitability of the proposed storage sit as part of the permitting process. 
Additionally, the proposed risk analysis method used in the EU GD1 will not be able to act as 
an optimum method when stakeholders are required to assess the risks of CO2 storage since it 
provides only two possible outcomes, significant or insignificant. On the other hand, this 
research project has developed a risk analysis mechanism which enables the stakeholders to 
assess the extent to which a potential risk is significant or insignificant.  
Moreover, this research project’s aim was to develop a novel mechanism by which the 
insurance industry would be able to assess the risks associated with the storage of CO2 under 
geological formations more effectively and therefore adjust their premium rates when 
insuring for CCS projects. In addition, this project’s results will also be beneficial for the 
regulators in enabling them to regulate and plan more effectively in order to incentivise 
stakeholder participation and investment in the CCS technology.  
As part of carrying out the said mechanism, an expert survey was designed and presented to 
national and international CO2 storage experts within academic institutions and companies 
that were active in this field. The output of the expert surveys were then used as input 
parameters for three different systems engineering optimisation modelling techniques that 
mathematically calculated the significance of each risk in comparison to other risks from 
different points of views. Furthermore, in order to account for possible subjectivity and 
ambiguity associated with the experts’ opinion, Fuzzy Logic was used in order to perform 
sensitivity analysis and assess whether or not the result of the said analyses would differ with 
slight variation in the input parameters.  
The significance of this thesis rests on the foundation that it provides a unique method of 
analysing the risks associated with CO2 storage under geological formations from a 
qualitative point of view as well as a quantitative one. Furthermore, as well as the uniqueness 
of the subject analysis itself, it is also the first time that such methods have been used in order 
to carry out the said analyses. Moreover, the methods used within this research, namely the 
AHP, FTA and FAHP techniques have not been widely used in combination with each other 
to quantify the risks involved in industrial scale projects such as CCS. In addition, neither 
have they been previously used in combination with each other within the CCS industry nor 
have they been used on an individual basis. However, they have been used widely on their 
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own within other similar industries (similar in terms of the associated risk profiles) such as 
the nuclear, oil and gas and chemical industries.  
Undertaking this research has resulted in the production of original mechanisms that can be 
used in order to calculate and estimate the criticality and importance of risks and therefore 
inspect the extent to which they have to be considered when storing CO2 under geological 
formations. Additionally, original regulatory and legislative mechanisms have been 
developed that enable the Member States’ Governments to place a cap on the long-term 
liability of CO2 storage and otherwise to assist in the management of financial, liability and 
regulatory risks. 
The analysis of the regulatory and legislative matters with regards to CO2 storage together 
with the quantitative risk assessment methods used within this research have further 
developed and enriched the risk assessment methodology used within the Commission 
Guidance Documents. Therefore, the said analyses can serve as useful tools and mechanisms 
for insuring the risks associated with the storage of CO2 in underground geological 
formations.  
 
8.1 Challenges 
In order to undertake this research, numerous methods were employed. As described in detail 
in chapter 5, in order to obtain stakeholder participation with regards to the risks associated 
with the storage of CO2 under geological formations, a comprehensive expert survey was 
designed.  
To the extent that was possible, it was made sure that the survey was distributed evenly 
amongst national and international experts within academia and the industry. Arguably, the 
response rates from the international stakeholder groups could have been higher. However, 
extensive efforts were made in order to increase the number of international experts to 
respond to the survey by telephone, email and approaching them at two major CCS-related 
conferences. Despite best efforts, no further responses were received. Furthermore, a total of 
55 national and international experts responded to the surveys. Many more experts expressed 
the initial interest to partake in this study when approached in said conferences. However, 
 204 
despite showing initial interest, many did not respond to the surveys when contacted 
afterwards. 
However, some of the experts who responded to the surveys also provided extensive 
qualitative feedback in the comment box that was provided for each question within the 
survey which was beneficial to this research. As such, it influenced the research and was 
incorporated in the findings. 
Expert were asked to complete the surveys taking into account only the first and second level 
in the overall risk hierarchy in order to simplify the risk analysis calculation process. In 
retrospect however, it would have been easier in survey terms to only focus upon risks on the 
first level of the fault tree, carry out the risk analysis procedure, interpret the results of the 
risk analysis calculations to trace the source of the risk and then apply the same procedure to 
the second, third and fourth levels in future research. 
Furthermore, perhaps it would have been more efficient if some parts of the introductory 
email, project background and project methodology were deleted in order to reduce the 
amount of time exerts had to spend on completing the questionnaires. This could have 
potentially increased the response rate. Moreover, different versions of the same 
questionnaire should have been designed for different categories of experts in order to better 
identify the experts that cooperated and took part in the study. This could have been 
potentially useful for future research as well as for this project. 
 
8.2 Further Research 
Several areas in this research have been identified that deserve further attention in future 
research. For example, there may be those that point to state aids and competition law 
restrictions on regulatory solutions for financial instruments for long term liability regulation 
further to the CCS Directive. It is noted that, to date, the UK and German Governments have 
taken a favourable position in this regard by adopting a flexible approach to state aids and it 
would appear that the European Commission is similarly disposed. There is also a strong 
argument to suggest that, in its essence, CO2 storage represents a public good or service that 
fulfils a government function of mitigating climate change.  
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By storing CO2 that would otherwise have been inevitably produced, in order to satisfy 
energy demand, storage serves to mitigate climate change and to meet binding emissions 
reduction targets that are placed upon Governments within an EU and international legal 
context. Given the additional point that CO2 storage may well turn out to be a cost vs. 
revenue neutral activity, some easing of state aids rules/competition law should apply. This 
argumentation is supported by the EC Treaty obligation of competition law to not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to services of general 
economic interest (i.e., arguably, the provision of CO2 storage for climate change prevention 
and mitigation).  
Thus far, leading Member State Governments have taken a sensible approach to state aid 
regulation and CCS. For this reason, it is not suggested that a formal procedure be 
commenced to review the EU General Block Exemption Regulation or Guidelines for State 
Aid for Environmental Protection with the aim of codifying new principles and rules in 
respect of CCS. This would constitute a drawn out and cumbersome process. Given the 
history of CCS Directive negotiation, there would be further uncertainty about the result and 
Member States and non-State interests, which are without direct and active interests and 
projects in the field of CCS, would still be in a position to influence the outcome in a manner 
that may not best serve Member States and private sector actors that wish to advance the CCS 
technology. There is also the observation that the revision of EU state aids regulation and 
guidance for CCS should have taken place at a time that was commensurate with the creation 
of the CCS Directive. Re-opening the debate would only lead to further market uncertainty at 
a time when the CCS Directive is due shortly to enter into force
10
. In any event, the signs are 
that a flexible approach is being taken by CCS implementing states to the interpretation of 
state aids disciplines. As such, it is anticipated that regulators will continue along these lines 
and that this approach will be reinforced in the final draft of the GD4 document. The issues 
raised require more detailed treatment but are beyond the scope of this research. 
As mentioned before, sensitivity analysis was carried out using Fuzzy logic in order to 
account for possible subjectivity and ambiguity associated with experts’ opinion in order to 
assess whether or not the results obtained as a result of the risk modelling would differ should 
                                                 
10
 At the time of writing this section of the thesis, June 2011. 
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there be little variation in the input parameters. The Fuzzy logic was applied to the AHP 
method and as a result, the FAHP method was conducted.  
In order to inspect the possibility of a change in the final result of the modelling techniques 
used in this research, it would be beneficial to apply the Fuzzy logic to the other methods 
used in this research, i.e. Fuzzy TOPSIS and Fuzzy PROMETHEE. 
Additionally, it would also be useful to inspect whether using other systems engineering 
optimisation techniques such as ELECTRE (Elimination Et Choice Translating Reality), 
ENTROPY and SAW (Simple Additive Weighted) would result in the same order for the 
ranking of the risks associated with CO2 storage. 
Finally, the regulatory and related EU Guidance Document analysis herein should be 
considered in the context of stakeholder and scholarly submissions to the recently announced 
CCS Directive review process. In this regard, it is felt that the analysis in this thesis for 
addressing risk could lead to the improvement of the Directive and the EU Guidance 
Documents. 
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10 APPENDICES 
 
10.1 Appendix I 
10.1.1 TOPSIS Methodology and its Application 
In order to be able to use the TOPSIS method, decision makers have to have knowledge of 
the relative weights of the criteria. Macharis et al. proposed that for large amounts of data, 
the relative weights can be calculated using methods such as: direct rating, point 
allocation, trade-off, pair-wise comparisons, and so on (Macharis et al., 2004). For this 
purpose, the pair-wise comparison method i.e. the AHP method has been chosen in order 
to provide the input parameters i.e. the relative weights of the criteria for the TOPSIS 
method. This was owing to the fact that as described in chapter 4, as part of the AHP 
method, an expert survey was sent to experts within the field of geological storage of 
carbon dioxide underground. Furthermore, the results from the survey provided the input 
parameters for the AHP method which in turn can also be used for the TOPSIS method. 
The way in which the TOPSIS technique is performed is as follows: 
1. In this algorithm, the inputs are in the form a Weighted Normalised Matrix, vij, 
which can be seen in equation 21. This matrix is obtained as a result of the 
multiplication of equations 8 and 9. 
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Equation 21, TOPSIS: Weighted Normalised Matrix 
 
2. Using the weighted normalised matrix, the Positive-Ideal, A*, and Negative-Ideal, 
A
-
, solutions are determined using equations 22 and 23 respectively. 
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      IjvIjvvvvA ijiijn  min,max,,,* **2*1   
Equation 22, TOPSIS: Positive-Ideal Solution 
 
      IjvIjvvvvA ijiijn   max,min,,, 21   
Equation 23, TOPSIS: Negative-Ideal Solution 
Where, I   is associated with the benefit criteria and I   is associated with the cost criteria. 
 
3. The alternative’s distance from the positive-ideal d+j and negative-ideal d
-
j 
solutions, known as the Euclidean distance, are calculated using equations 24 and 
25 respectively. 
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Equation 24, TOPSIS: Alternative's distance from positive-ideal solution 
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Equation 25, TOPSIS: Alternative's distance from negative-ideal solution 
 
4. Now the Relative Closeness (CL*j) of each alternative to the ideal solution has to be 
determined. CL
*
j is calculated using equation 26. 
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Equation 26, TOPSIS: Relative Closeness of each alternative to the ideal solution 
Since 0

jd  and 0

jd , then clearly  1,0

jCL . 
 
5. Finally, as result of these analyses, it will be concluded that the alternative that has 
the maximum 

jCL , is the appropriate alternative. All the other alternatives’ 
distances to the negative and positive ideal solutions are calculated in the same 
way. 
 
What follows is the way in which the TOPSIS method described above was used in order 
to calculate ranking for the main risks involved in CO2 storage. 
In order to be able to use the TOPSIS method, one has to know the relative weights of the 
criteria and alternatives. Furthermore, using the AHP method, the said weights were 
calculated and are shown in tables 40 and 41. 
 
 
Table 40, TOPSIS: Weight of different alternatives calculated using the AHP method 
 
 
 
a1 a2 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 d1 d2
A 0.726 0.570 0.467 0.138 0.711 0.046 0.068 0.058 0.062 0.114 0.059 0.078
B 0.094 0.064 0.407 0.566 0.195 0.116 0.074 0.110 0.065 0.076 0.061 0.081
C 0.088 0.184 0.048 0.159 0.048 0.385 0.555 0.458 0.345 0.475 0.313 0.137
D 0.091 0.182 0.079 0.137 0.047 0.454 0.303 0.375 0.529 0.335 0.567 0.704
Alternatives' Weights
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Criteria Weights 
a1 0.032 
a2 0.029 
b1 0.018 
b2 0.025 
b3 0.042 
c1 0.153 
c2 0.162 
c3 0.156 
c4 0.133 
c5 0.113 
d1 0.068 
d2 0.069 
Table 41, TOPSIS: Criteria Weights calculated using the AHP method 
 
Using equation 21, the Weighted Normalised Matrix, vij, is devised as below. As 
mentioned in the same section, this matrix has been developed as a result of multiplying 
equations 8 and 9. These matrices have been shown in tables 42 and 43. 
 
Weighted Normalised Matrix (Multiplication Matrix) 
  A B C D 
a1 0.0232 0.0030 0.0028 0.0029 
a2 0.0165 0.0019 0.0053 0.0053 
b1 0.0084 0.0073 0.0009 0.0014 
b2 0.0035 0.0142 0.0040 0.0034 
b3 0.0299 0.0082 0.0020 0.0020 
c1 0.0070 0.0177 0.0589 0.0695 
c2 0.0110 0.0120 0.0899 0.0491 
c3 0.0090 0.0172 0.0714 0.0585 
c4 0.0082 0.0086 0.0459 0.0704 
c5 0.0129 0.0086 0.0537 0.0379 
d1 0.0040 0.0041 0.0213 0.0386 
d2 0.0054 0.0056 0.0095 0.0486 
Table 42, TOPSIS: The normalised weighted matrix 
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As shown in table 43, positive ideal solution (A*) and negative ideal solution (A
-
) is 
calculated for each alternative using equations 24 and 25 respectively.  
 
  
  
Positive and Negative 
Ideal Solutions 
 
A* A
-
 
a1 0.0232 0.0028 
a2 0.0165 0.0019 
b1 0.0084 0.0009 
b2 0.0142 0.0034 
b3 0.0299 0.0020 
c1 0.0695 0.0070 
c2 0.0899 0.0110 
c3 0.0714 0.0090 
c4 0.0704 0.0082 
c5 0.0537 0.0086 
d1 0.0386 0.0040 
d2 0.0486 0.0054 
Table 43, TOPSIS: Positive and Negative Ideal Solutions 
 
Equations 24, 25 and 26 were used in order to calculate the alternatives’ distance from the 
positive ideal solution (d
+
j), alternatives’ distance from the negative ideal solution (d
-
j) and 
the relative closeness of each alternative to the ideal solution (CL
*
j) respectively.   
 
Positive and Negative Distances and Relative Closeness  
  A B C D 
d
+
j 0.1507 0.1472 0.0634 0.0597 
d
-
j 0.0385 0.0194 0.1288 0.1248 
CL
*
i 0.2037 0.1166 0.6702 0.6764 
Table 44, TOPSIS: Positive and negative distance and relative closeness of alternatives to ideal 
solution 
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Table 45 shows the ranking order for the criteria of this study using the TOPSIS method. 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives 
A 0.2037 
B 0.1166 
C 0.6702 
D 0.6764 
Table 45, Weight of the risks using TOPSIS  
 
Table 46 shows the different risks analysed in this project and their rank in comparison to 
each other using the TOPSIS method. Moreover, this ranking is in terms of their criticality 
and their potential to cause the stored carbon dioxide in underground storage reservoirs to 
leak to the atmosphere and cause harm to humans and the environment. 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives Rank 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock (A) 3 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone (B) 4 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well (C) 2 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells (D) 1 
Table 46, Ranking of the risks using TOPSIS 
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10.1.2 PROMETHEE Methodology and its Application 
The way in which the PROMETHEE method is carried out is as follows: 
1. The amplitude of deviation di between the evaluation of each alternative k and l, 
within each element i, is calculated using equation 27. 
 
  Jlkrrlkd likii ,2,1,,,   and ni ,,2,1   
Equation 27, PROMETHEE: Amplitude of deviation di between the evaluation of each alternative 
k and l within each attribute i 
 
Therefore, deviation amplitude matrix for an alternative j within n attributes can be 
calculated using equation 28. 
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Equation 28, PROMETHEE: Deviation amplitude matrix for an alternative j within n attributes 
 
2. Equation 29 shows the Gaussian function used as a preference function, Pi (d) for 
each criterion i. 
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Equation 29, PROMETHEE: Gaussian function used as a preference function 
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The preference function Pi (k,l) for each criterion i and alternatives k and l, is shown in 
equation 30.  
 
 lkPi ,





if
if
 
   
    





 


2
2
2
exp1,0,
0,0,

i
iiliki
iiliki
d
lkPlkdrr
lkPlkdrr
 
Equation 30, PROMETHEE: preference function Pi (k,l) for each criterion i and alternatives k and 
l 
 
If alternative k, based on criterion i, is similar or worse than alternative l, then the 
preference function will be zero. However, if alternative k, based on criterion i, is better 
than alternative l, the preference function will be between 0 and 1. Furthermore, wherever 
the preference function is close to 1, the distance between the normalized values of rki and 
rli increase. 
Based on the Gaussian preference function for determination of the inflexion point of the 
curve, equation 31 is used in order to calculate the threshold value of parameter σ. 
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Equation 31, PROMETHEE: threshold value of parameter σ 
 
3. Now the preference index has to be calculated. The preference index  lk,  is 
calculated using equation 32 which indicates the preference value of alternative Ak 
over alternative Al. 
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Equation 32, PROMETHEE: Calculation of the preference index 
 
4. After calculating the preference index,  lk, , the preference index matrix is 
calculated using equation 33. 
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Equation 33, PROMETHEE: Calculation of the preference index matrix 
 
5. The outgoing flow (
 j ) is calculated using equation 34. The outgoing flow is the 
sum of the value of arcs which leave node j and therefore yields a measure of the 
outranking character of alternative j. The outgoing flow indicates the strength of 
alternative j. 
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Equation 34, PROMETHEE: The outgoing flow 
 
6. The entering flow (
 j ) is calculated using equation 35. The entering flow is a 
measure of the weakness of an alternative j. 
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Equation 35, PROMETHEE: The entering flow 
 
7. The alternatives are ranked using the net flow (
net
j ) which is calculated using 
equation 36. 
  jj
net
j  
Equation 36, PROMETHEE: The net flow 
 
As mentioned in section 7.4.2, in order for decision makers to be able to use the 
PROMETHEE method, two requirements have to be met. Firstly, relative importance of 
the criteria that is being considered has to be taken into account. This has also been 
referred to as the “relative weight of the criteria within the theses.  
Secondly, decision makers’ preference function, which he/she uses when comparing the 
contribution of the alternatives in terms of each separate criterion (Macharis et al., 2004). 
As highlighted in the thesis, since the PROMEHTEE technique does not provide 
guidelines as regards to the relative weights of the criteria being considered, different 
people have developed different methods that enables decision makers to determine 
relative weights of the criteria in order to use within the algorithm (see (Nijkamp et al., 
1990), (Eckenrode, 1965) and (Macharis et al., 2004) for an overview of these methods). 
For the purpose of this research project, the AHP method has been chosen in order to 
provide the input parameters i.e. the relative weights of the criteria for the PROMETHEE 
method.  
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Therefore, the relative weights that were calculated using the AHP method (shown in table 
47) have been used in order to construct the matrix of deviation amplitude for normalised 
values which is shown in table 48. 
 
Table 47, PROMETHEE: Weight of different alternatives calculated using AHP 
 Matrix of deviation amplitude for normalised values 
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Table 48, PROMETHEE: Matrix of deviation amplitude for normalised values 
a1 a2 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 d1 d2
A 0.726 0.570 0.467 0.138 0.711 0.046 0.068 0.058 0.062 0.114 0.059 0.078
B 0.094 0.064 0.407 0.566 0.195 0.116 0.074 0.110 0.065 0.076 0.061 0.081
C 0.088 0.184 0.048 0.159 0.048 0.385 0.555 0.458 0.345 0.475 0.313 0.137
D 0.091 0.182 0.079 0.137 0.047 0.454 0.303 0.375 0.529 0.335 0.567 0.704
Alternatives' Weights
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The value of threshold for each alternative, σ, is calculated based on the Gaussian 
preference function for determination of the inflexion point of the curve using equation 31 
and shown in table 49 below. 
 
 
Values of threshold (σ) 
Criteria a1 a2 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 d1 d2 
Threshold 0.319 0.253 0.264 0.218 0.356 0.248 0.281 0.244 0.28 0.236 0.296 0.322 
Table 49, PROMETHEE: The values of threshold for each alternative (σ) 
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Having calculated the vales of threshold and the matrix deviation amplitude, the preference 
function is calculated using equation 32 and shown in table 50.  
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Table 50, PROMETHEE: Preference function matrix 
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Table 51 shows the matrix of preference index which has been derived using equation 32 
and equation 33. 
 
 
Matrix of preference index 
 
A B C D 
A 0.0000 0.0817 0.0950 0.0941 
B 0.0308 0.0000 0.0349 0.0345 
C 0.4866 0.4544 0.0000 0.0805 
D 0.5004 0.4710 0.1070 0.0000 
Table 51: PROMETHEE: Matrix of preference index 
 
Moreover, table 52 shows the outgoing flow, 
 j , and the entering flow, 
 j , which are 
calculated using equation 34 and equation 35 respectively. Furthermore, table 52 also 
shows the net flow, 
net
j , which is calculated using equation 36.  
 
All flows and ranking of alternatives 
 
A B C D 
Outgoing flow (+) 0.0902 0.0334 0.3405 0.3595 
Entering flow (-) 0.3393 0.3357 0.0789 0.0697 
Net flow -0.2490 -0.3023 0.2615 0.2898 
Ranking 3 4 2 1 
Table 52, PROMETHEE, Outgoing Flow, Entering Flow and Net Flow 
Table 53 shows the ranking of the criteria of this study using the PROMETHEE method. 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives 
A -0.2490 
B -0.3023 
C 0.2615 
D 0.2898 
Table 53, Weight of the risks using PROMETHEE 
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Table 54 shows the ranking of the different risks that were analysed in this research using 
the PROMETHEE method. 
 
Risk ranking of the alternatives Rank 
Percolation of CO2 through the caprock (A) 3 
Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone (B) 4 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well (C) 2 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells (D) 1 
Table 54, Ranking of the risks using PROMETHEE 
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10.1.3 Calculation steps of the AHP method 
 
 
Figure 25, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “a2” using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 26, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “a2” using a linguistic scale 
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Figure 27, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “a2” 
 
 
Figure 28, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “b1” using a numerical scale 
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Figure 29, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “b1” using a linguistic scale 
 
 
Figure 30, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “b1” 
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Figure 31, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “b2” using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 32, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “b2” using a linguistic scale 
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Figure 33, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “b2” 
 
 
Figure 34, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “b3” using a numerical scale 
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Figure 35, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “b3” using a linguistic scale 
 
 
Figure 36, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “b3” 
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Figure 37, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c1” using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 38, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c1” using a linguistic scale 
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Figure 39, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “c1” 
 
 
Figure 40, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c2” using a numerical scale 
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Figure 41, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c2” using a linguistic scale 
 
 
Figure 42, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “c2” 
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Figure 43, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c3” using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 44, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c3” using a linguistic scale 
 248 
 
Figure 45, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “c3” 
 
 
Figure 46, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c4” using a numerical scale 
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Figure 47, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c4” using a linguistic scale 
 
 
Figure 48, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “c4” 
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Figure 49, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c5” using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 50, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “c5” using a linguistic scale 
 251 
 
Figure 51, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “c5” 
 
 
Figure 52, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “d1” using a numerical scale 
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Figure 53, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “d1” using a linguistic scale 
 
 
Figure 54, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “d1” 
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Figure 55, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “d2” using a numerical scale 
 
 
Figure 56, Comparison of alternatives with respect to “d2” using a linguistic scale 
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Figure 57, Final weight of alternatives with respect to “d2” 
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10.1.4 Calculation steps for the Fuzzy AHP method 
 
Diffusion (possible initiation of other mechanisms) (a2) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (4,5,6) (6,7,8) (1,2,3) 
B (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1,1,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/5,1/4,1/3) 
C (1/8,1/7,1/6) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
D (1/3,1/2,1) (3,4,5) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 55, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria a2 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 4.00 6.00 1.00 12.00 22.41 0.027586207 0.33103 
2 1.00 5.00 7.00 2.00 15.00 28.93 0.034570747 0.51856 
3 1.00 6.00 8.00 3.00 18.00 36.25 0.044626255 0.80327 
B 
1 0.17 1.00 0.25 0.20 1.62 
 
0.027586207 0.04460 
2 0.20 1.00 0.33 0.25 1.78 
 
0.034570747 0.06165 
3 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.33 2.08 
 
0.044626255 0.09297 
C 
1 0.13 2.00 1.00 1.00 4.13 
 
0.027586207 0.11379 
2 0.14 3.00 1.00 2.00 6.14 
 
0.034570747 0.21236 
3 0.17 4.00 1.00 3.00 8.17 
 
0.044626255 0.36445 
D 
1 0.33 3.00 0.33 1.00 4.67 
 
0.027586207 0.12874 
2 0.50 4.00 0.50 1.00 6.00 
 
0.034570747 0.20742 
3 1.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 8.00 
 
0.044626255 0.35701 
Table 56, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria a2 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.3310 0.5186 0.8033 
S2 0.0446 0.0617 0.0930 
S3 0.1138 0.2124 0.3644 
S4 0.1287 0.2074 0.3570 
Table 57, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria a2 
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s1 >= s2 1 s3 >= s1 0.098386 
s1 >= s3 1 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 1 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 0 s4 >= s1 0.077053 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 0.980098 
Table 58, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to a2 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S2 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 0.0984 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 0.0771 1.0000 0.9801 1.0000 
Table 59, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria a2 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 1.0000 0.8507453 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0984 0.0837021 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.0771 0.0655526 
Table 60, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria a2 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0984 0.0771 
wi 0.8507 0.0000 0.0837 0.0656 
Table 61, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria a2 
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Fracturation of the caprock (b1) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (7,8,9) (7,8,9) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (5,6,7) (6,7,8) 
C (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/7,1/6/1/5) (1,1,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) 
D (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) 
Table 62, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria b1 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 7.00 8.00 17.00 34.74 0.022657999 0.38519 
2 1.00 1.00 8.00 9.00 19.00 39.88 0.025075874 0.47644 
3 1.00 1.00 9.00 9.00 20.00 44.13 0.028785196 0.57570 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 5.00 6.00 13.00 
 
0.022657999 0.29455 
2 1.00 1.00 6.00 7.00 15.00 
 
0.025075874 0.37614 
3 1.00 1.00 7.00 8.00 17.00 
 
0.028785196 0.48935 
C 
1 0.11 0.14 1.00 0.25 1.50 
 
0.022657999 0.03408 
2 0.13 0.17 1.00 0.33 1.63 
 
0.025075874 0.04075 
3 0.14 0.20 1.00 0.50 1.84 
 
0.028785196 0.05305 
D 
1 0.11 0.13 2.00 1.00 3.24 
 
0.022657999 0.07332 
2 0.11 0.14 3.00 1.00 4.25 
 
0.025075874 0.10667 
3 0.13 0.17 4.00 1.00 5.29 
 
0.028785196 0.15232 
Table 63, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria b1 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.3852 0.4764 0.5757 
S2 0.2946 0.3761 0.4893 
S3 0.0341 0.0407 0.0530 
S4 0.0733 0.1067 0.1523 
Table 64, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria b1 
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s1 >= s2 1 s3 >= s1 0 
s1 >= s3 1 s3 >= s2 0 
s1 >= s4 1 s3 >= s4 0 
s2 >= s1 0.509436 s4 >= s1 0 
s2 >= s3 1 s4 >= s2 0 
s2 >= s4 1 s4 >= s3 1 
Table 65, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to b1 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S2 0.5094 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S3 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
S4 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 66, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria b1 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 1.0000 0.66249892 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.5094 0.33750108 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0000 0 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.0000 0 
Table 67, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria b1 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0984 0.0771 
wi 0.8507 0.0000 0.0837 0.0656 
Table 68, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria b1 
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Non-permeable rock that becomes permeable (b2) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/5,1/4,1/3) (1/4,1/3,1/2) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (7,8,9) (7,8,9) 
C (3,4,5) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
D (2,3,4) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 69, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria b2 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.25 2.45 28.67 0.02769992 0.06786 
2 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.33 2.58 32.82 0.03046974 0.07871 
3 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.50 2.83 36.10 0.03487696 0.09882 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 8.00 7.00 17.00   0.02769992 0.47090 
2 1.00 1.00 9.00 8.00 19.00   0.03046974 0.57893 
3 1.00 1.00 9.00 9.00 20.00   0.03487696 0.69754 
C 
1 3.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 5.11   0.02769992 0.14158 
2 4.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 6.11   0.03046974 0.18620 
3 5.00 0.13 1.00 1.00 7.13   0.03487696 0.24850 
D 
1 2.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 4.11   0.02769992 0.11388 
2 3.00 0.13 1.00 1.00 5.13   0.03046974 0.15616 
3 4.00 0.14 1.00 1.00 6.14   0.03487696 0.21424 
Table 70, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria b2 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0679 0.0787 0.0988 
S2 0.4709 0.5789 0.6975 
S3 0.1416 0.1862 0.2485 
S4 0.1139 0.1562 0.2142 
Table 71, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria b2 
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s1 >= s2 0 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 0 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 1 s4 >= s2 0 
s2 >= s4 1 s4 >= s3 0.70747191 
Table 72, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to b2 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S3 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 1.0000 0.0000 0.7075 1.0000 
Table 73, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria b2 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 1.0000 1 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0000 0 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.0000 0 
Table 74, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria b2 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
wi 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 75, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria b2 
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Pre-existing fracture of the caprock (b3) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (7,8,9) (7,8,9) (7,8,9) 
B (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1,1,1) (5,6,7) (6,7,8) 
C (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/7,1/6/1/5) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
D (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 76, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria b3 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 23.00 39.60 0.02050131 0.47153 
2 1.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 26.00 44.67 0.02238607 0.58204 
3 1.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 28.00 48.78 0.02525177 0.70705 
B 
1 0.11 1.00 5.00 6.00 12.11   0.02050131 0.24829 
2 0.11 1.00 6.00 7.00 14.11   0.02238607 0.31589 
3 0.13 1.00 7.00 8.00 16.13   0.02525177 0.40718 
C 
1 0.11 0.14 1.00 1.00 2.25   0.02050131 0.04621 
2 0.13 0.17 1.00 1.00 2.29   0.02238607 0.05130 
3 0.14 0.20 1.00 1.00 2.34   0.02525177 0.05916 
D 
1 0.11 0.13 1.00 1.00 2.24   0.02050131 0.04584 
2 0.13 0.14 1.00 1.00 2.27   0.02238607 0.05077 
3 0.14 0.17 1.00 1.00 2.31   0.02525177 0.05832 
Table 77, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria b3 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.4715 0.5820 0.7070 
S2 0.2483 0.3159 0.4072 
S3 0.0462 0.0513 0.0592 
S4 0.0458 0.0508 0.0583 
Table 78, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria b3 
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s1 >= s2 1 s3 >= s1 0 
s1 >= s3 1 s3 >= s2 0 
s1 >= s4 1 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 0 s4 >= s1 0 
s2 >= s3 1 s4 >= s2 0 
s2 >= s4 1 s4 >= s3 0.957843 
Table 79, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to b3 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S2 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S3 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 0.0000 0.0000 0.9578 1.0000 
Table 80, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria b3 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 1.0000 1 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0000 0 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.0000 0 
Table 81, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria b3 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
wi 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 82, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria b3 
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Vertical migration through fractures in cement (c1) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/8,1/7,1/6) 
B (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/4,1/3,1/2) 
C (7,8,9) (4,5,6) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) 
D (6,7,8) (2,3,4) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) 
Table 83, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria c1 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 0.25 0.11 0.13 1.49 28.24 0.02466598 0.03666 
2 1.00 0.33 0.11 0.14 1.59 34.62 0.02888451 0.04585 
3 1.00 0.50 0.13 0.17 1.79 40.54 0.03541564 0.06345 
B 
1 2.00 1.00 0.17 0.25 3.42   0.02466598 0.08428 
2 3.00 1.00 0.20 0.33 4.53   0.02888451 0.13094 
3 4.00 1.00 0.25 0.50 5.75   0.03541564 0.20364 
C 
1 8.00 4.00 1.00 0.33 13.33   0.02466598 0.32888 
2 9.00 5.00 1.00 0.50 15.50   0.02888451 0.44771 
3 9.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 17.00   0.03541564 0.60207 
D 
1 6.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 10.00   0.02466598 0.24666 
2 7.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 13.00   0.02888451 0.37550 
3 8.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 16.00   0.03541564 0.56665 
Table 84, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria c1 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0367 0.0458 0.0635 
S2 0.0843 0.1309 0.2036 
S3 0.3289 0.4477 0.6021 
S4 0.2467 0.3755 0.5667 
Table 85, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria c1 
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s1 >= s2 0 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 0.767046734 
Table 86, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to c1 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 0.7670 1.0000 
Table 87, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria c1 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 1.0000 0.56591599 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.7670 0.43408401 
Table 88, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c1 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.7670 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.5659 0.4341 
Table 89, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c1 
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Vertical migration at cement/casing interface (c2) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/6,1/5,1/4) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1/5,1/4,1/3) 
C (7,8,9) (6,7,8) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
D (4,5,6) (3,4,5) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 90, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria c2 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 0.11 0.17 2.28 27.94 0.0257 0.05854 
2 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.20 2.33 33.22 0.0301 0.07013 
3 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.25 2.39 38.89 0.0358 0.08556 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.20 2.33   0.0257 0.05978 
2 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.25 2.39   0.0301 0.07202 
3 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.33 2.50   0.0358 0.08949 
C 
1 7.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 15.00   0.0257 0.38570 
2 8.00 7.00 1.00 2.00 18.00   0.0301 0.54180 
3 9.00 8.00 1.00 3.00 21.00   0.0358 0.75175 
D 
1 4.00 3.00 0.33 1.00 8.33   0.0257 0.21428 
2 5.00 4.00 0.50 1.00 10.50   0.0301 0.31605 
3 6.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 13.00   0.0358 0.46537 
Table 91, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria c2 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0585 0.0701 0.0856 
S2 0.0598 0.0720 0.0895 
S3 0.3857 0.5418 0.7517 
S4 0.2143 0.3160 0.4654 
Table 92, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria c2 
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s1 >= s2 0.93160775 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 0.26083793 
Table 93, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to c2 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.9316 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 0.2608 1.0000 
Table 94, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria c2 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 1.0000 0.7931233 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.2608 0.2068767 
Table 95, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c2 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2608 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.7931 0.2069 
Table 96, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c2 
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Vertical migration at cement/rock interface (c3) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/7,1/6/1/5) 
B (1,2,3) (1,1,1) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/4,1/3,1/2) 
C (7,8,9) (4,5,6) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
D (5,6,7) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 97, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria c3 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 0.33 0.11 0.14 1.59 26.00 0.0269614 0.04277 
2 1.00 0.50 0.13 0.17 1.80 31.33 0.0319183 0.05735 
3 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.20 2.34 37.09 0.0384573 0.08999 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.25 2.42 
 
0.0269614 0.06516 
2 2.00 1.00 0.20 0.33 3.53 
 
0.0319183 0.11278 
3 3.00 1.00 0.25 0.50 4.75 
 
0.0384573 0.18267 
C 
1 7.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 13.00 
 
0.0269614 0.35050 
2 8.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 15.00 
 
0.0319183 0.47877 
3 9.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 17.00 
 
0.0384573 0.65377 
D 
1 5.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 9.00 
 
0.0269614 0.24265 
2 6.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 11.00 
 
0.0319183 0.35110 
3 7.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 13.00 
 
0.0384573 0.49995 
Table 98, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria c3 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0428 0.0573 0.0900 
S2 0.0652 0.1128 0.1827 
S3 0.3505 0.4788 0.6538 
S4 0.2427 0.3511 0.4999 
Table 99, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria c3 
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s1 >= s2 0.30939231 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 0.539285 
Table 100, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to c3 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.3094 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 0.5393 1.0000 
Table 101, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria c3 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 1.0000 0.64965239 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.5393 0.35034761 
Table 102, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c3 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5393 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.6497 0.3503 
Table 103, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c3 
 
 
 
 269 
Vertical migration through EDZ (c4) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/8,1/7,1/6) (1/7,1/6/1/5) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/6,1/5,1/4) 
C (6,7,8) (7,8,9) (1,1,1) (1/4,1/3,1/2) 
D (5,6,7) (4,5,6) (2,3,4) (1,1,1) 
Table 104, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria c4 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.14 2.27 30.79 0.02423851 0.05497 
2 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.17 2.31 35.97 0.02779874 0.06420 
3 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.20 2.37 41.26 0.03247331 0.07685 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 0.11 0.17 2.28   0.02423851 0.05518 
2 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.20 2.33   0.02779874 0.06477 
3 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.25 2.39   0.03247331 0.07761 
C 
1 6.00 7.00 1.00 0.25 14.25   0.02423851 0.34540 
2 7.00 8.00 1.00 0.33 16.33   0.02779874 0.45405 
3 8.00 9.00 1.00 0.50 18.50   0.03247331 0.60076 
D 
1 5.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 12.00   0.02423851 0.29086 
2 6.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 15.00   0.02779874 0.41698 
3 7.00 6.00 4.00 1.00 18.00   0.03247331 0.58452 
Table 105, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria c4 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0550 0.0642 0.0769 
S2 0.0552 0.0648 0.0776 
S3 0.3454 0.4540 0.6008 
S4 0.2909 0.4170 0.5845 
Table 106, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria c4 
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s1 >= s2 0.974405583 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 0.86579691 
Table 107, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to c4 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.9744 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 0.8658 1.0000 
Table 108, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria c4 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 1.0000 0.53596401 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.8658 0.46403599 
Table 109, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c4 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.8658 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.5360 0.4640 
Table 110, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c4 
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Migration through cement matrix (cement wall) (c5) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/6,1/5,1/4) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/7,1/8,1/9) (1/5,1/4,1/3) 
C (1,2,3) (7,8,9) (1,1,1) (1,2,3) 
D (4,5,6) (3,4,5) (1/3,1/2,1) (1,1,1) 
Table 111, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria c5 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.17 2.50 24.14 0.02881152 0.07203 
2 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.20 2.70 29.56 0.03382823 0.09134 
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 3.25 34.71 0.0414174 0.13461 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 0.11 0.20 2.31   0.02881152 0.06659 
2 1.00 1.00 0.11 0.25 2.36   0.03382823 0.07987 
3 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 2.46   0.0414174 0.10182 
C 
1 1.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 11.00   0.02881152 0.31693 
2 2.00 9.00 1.00 2.00 14.00   0.03382823 0.47360 
3 3.00 9.00 1.00 3.00 16.00   0.0414174 0.66268 
D 
1 4.00 3.00 0.33 1.00 8.33   0.02881152 0.24010 
2 5.00 4.00 0.50 1.00 10.50   0.03382823 0.35520 
3 6.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 13.00   0.0414174 0.53843 
Table 112, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria c5 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0720 0.0913 0.1346 
S2 0.0666 0.0799 0.1018 
S3 0.3169 0.4736 0.6627 
S4 0.2401 0.3552 0.5384 
Table 113, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria c5 
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s1 >= s2 1 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 1 
s2 >= s1 0.72210455 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 0.651663912 
Table 114, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to c5 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 0.7221 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 0.6517 1.0000 
Table 115, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria c5 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 1.0000 0.60545005 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 0.6517 0.39454995 
Table 116, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c5 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.6517 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.6055 0.3945 
Table 117, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria c5 
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Leakage through a monitoring well (d1) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/7,1/6/1/5) (1/7,1/8,1/9) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/6,1/5,1/4) (1/7,1/8,1/9) 
C (5,6,7) (4,5,6) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) 
D (7,8,9) (7,8,9) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) 
Table 118, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria d1 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.11 2.25 32.87 0.024 0.05405 
2 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.11 2.28 38.09 0.0263 0.05980 
3 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.13 2.33 41.70 0.0304 0.07074 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.11 2.28   0.024 0.05462 
2 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.11 2.31   0.0263 0.06068 
3 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.13 2.38   0.0304 0.07227 
C 
1 5.00 4.00 1.00 0.33 10.33   0.024 0.24780 
2 6.00 5.00 1.00 0.50 12.50   0.0263 0.32818 
3 7.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 15.00   0.0304 0.45641 
D 
1 8.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 18.00   0.024 0.43165 
2 9.00 9.00 2.00 1.00 21.00   0.0263 0.55134 
3 9.00 9.00 3.00 1.00 22.00   0.0304 0.66940 
Table 119, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria d1 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0541 0.0598 0.0707 
S2 0.0546 0.0607 0.0723 
S3 0.2478 0.3282 0.4564 
S4 0.4317 0.5513 0.6694 
Table 120, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria d1 
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s1 >= s2 0.94850859 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 0.09985849 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 1 
Table 121, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to d1 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.9485 0.0000 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0999 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 122, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria d1 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0999 0.0907921 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 1.0000 0.9092079 
Table 123, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria d1 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0999 1.0000 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0908 0.9092 
Table 124, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria d1 
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Leakage through an exterior well (d2) 
 
A B C D 
A (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/7,1/8,1/9) 
B (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1/3,1/2,1) (1/8,1/7,1/6) 
C (1,2,3) (1,2,3) (1,1,1) (1/8,1/7,1/6) 
D (7,8,9) (6,7,8) (6,7,8) (1,1,1) 
Table 125, Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix for criteria d2 
 
 
TFNs Sum of Rows 
 
Sum Inverse Sk 
A 
1 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.11 2.44 28.03 0.025333559 0.06190 
2 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.13 2.63 33.42 0.02992604 0.07871 
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 3.14 39.47 0.035680304 0.11204 
B 
1 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.13 2.46   0.025333559 0.06228 
2 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.14 2.64   0.02992604 0.07909 
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 3.17   0.035680304 0.11299 
C 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 3.13   0.025333559 0.07917 
2 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.14 5.14   0.02992604 0.15391 
3 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.17 7.17   0.035680304 0.25571 
D 
1 7.00 6.00 6.00 1.00 20.00   0.025333559 0.50667 
2 8.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 23.00   0.02992604 0.68830 
3 9.00 8.00 8.00 1.00 26.00   0.035680304 0.92769 
Table 126, Showing the achieved TFNs for Sks of criteria d2 
 
 
Sk 
 
l m u 
S1 0.0619 0.0787 0.1120 
S2 0.0623 0.0791 0.1130 
S3 0.0792 0.1539 0.2557 
S4 0.5067 0.6883 0.9277 
Table 127, TFN values of Sk for each alternative with respect to criteria d2 
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s1 >= s2 0.99232662 s3 >= s1 1 
s1 >= s3 0.30414728 s3 >= s2 1 
s1 >= s4 0 s3 >= s4 0 
s2 >= s1 1 s4 >= s1 1 
s2 >= s3 0.31131908 s4 >= s2 1 
s2 >= s4 0 s4 >= s3 1 
Table 128, Degree of possibility of different amounts of Sk for TFNs with respect to d2 
 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 1.0000 0.9923 0.3041 0.0000 
S2 1.0000 1.0000 0.3113 0.0000 
S3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
S4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 129, The achieved amounts of Sk for criteria d2 
 
 
 
W' (xi) wi 
Vector of weight, w' (xi), and 
Vector of normalised 
attributes, wi 
min S1 >= S2, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S2 >= S1, S3, S4 0.0000 0 
min S3 >= S1, S2, S4 0.0000 0 
min S4 >= S1, S2, S3 1.0000 1 
Table 130, Calculation of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria d2 
 
 Vector of weight, w' (xi), and Vector of normalised attributes, wi 
w' (xi) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
wi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Table 131, Vector of the weights of the alternatives with respect to criteria d2 
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10.2 Appendix II 
10.2.1 Expert Consultations 
The following is the email invitation that was sent to national and international experts 
within the field of carbon dioxide storage who were active in either academia or the CCS 
industry. 
 
Dear X, 
I hope this email finds you well. 
As part of a research project on the environmental risk analysis of carbon dioxide 
storage underground at the Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College 
London, under the supervision of Dr. Tim Cockerill and Dr. Zen Makuch, I would 
be grateful if you could take 20 minutes to take part in this study. This project aims 
to systematically understand, quantify and present the environmental risks 
associated with the storage of carbon dioxide underground by studying the chain of 
events that could lead to major failures in storage sites using quantitative risk 
analysis methods as well as qualitative ones. 
As part of this research project, I have asked a number of carefully selected experts 
within the field of carbon dioxide storage to complete a survey that I have 
developed, which takes 20 minutes to complete. As such, I would be grateful if you 
could also complete this survey. There are two parts to this survey. The full value 
of this research will be completed if you complete both parts of this survey. 
However, if you do not have the time to do so, I would be grateful if you could 
complete Part 1 of the survey. Each part should take approximately 10 minutes of 
your time. A PDF version of the completed thesis will be sent to all the experts 
who contribute to this study. This survey will play a central role in the completion 
of my PhD thesis. Please do not hesitate to ask any questions you may have by 
contacting me.  
Email: b.oraee@imperial.ac.uk 
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Telephone: +44(0)79 2112 2242 
The survey can be taken by clicking on the link below. Furthermore, I would also 
be grateful if you could kindly send this email to other members within your 
institution who are working in areas related to carbon dioxide storage underground. 
The link to the survey is:  
http://www.surveymethods.com/EndUser.aspx?B793FFE6B2FDE3EDB4 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Behdeen Oraee-Mirzamani 
Doctoral Researcher 
Centre for Environmental Policy 
Imperial College London 
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The following is the project background and a short methodological framework that was 
provided to the experts as part of the email invitation in order to for them to gain an 
overview and an understanding of the project as whole before completing the expert 
surveys. 
 
Welcome to a survey assessing the risks associated with Carbon Capture and 
Storage 
Project Background 
This PhD research project aims to systematically understand, quantify and present 
the risks associated with the storage of carbon dioxide underground by studying the 
chain of events that could lead to major failures in storage sites. On the one hand, 
this study will enable insurance companies to understand the risks better and 
therefore adjust their current terms and premiums for insuring CCS projects against 
the risks. By doing this, insurance companies can be instructed as to which risks 
they have to take into account more in comparison with others so that they can 
minimise their financial risks by tying them down and therefore lower their 
premiums for insuring CCS projects. On the other hand, this project aims to assist 
regulators and policy makers to better understand the risks and hence legislate 
more effectively to address the risks associated with CCS. 
Methodology 
These analyses will be carried out using two different quantitative risk analysis 
methods. These methods are Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Fuzzy 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP). The AHP and FAHP methods have rarely 
been used in CCS projects individually and have not been used in combination 
with each other at all. However, they have been used widely in other similar 
industries (similar in terms of the risks involved and their potential consequences) 
such as Nuclear and Oil and Gas industries. 
The way that this analysis is carried out is as follows. Firstly, the risk events 
identified in the study are going to be presented to you and other experts in the 
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field of carbon dioxide storage in the form of surveys. This will be done in order to 
find out which risks are significant and to what extent.  
This survey has been designed as part of the AHP method in order to gather 
information from experts within the field of CCS such as yourself pertaining to the 
importance and criticality of the risk elements identified within a fault tree 
developed in this study. 
After you and other experts have kindly completed the survey by comparing the 
risk elements within the survey pairwise and in comparison with each other, the 
results will then be used in order to develop the models created in this study. This 
will be done using the methods described above in order to obtain overall weights 
for the said risks and determine their relative significance to the eventual risk 
which is the leakage of carbon dioxide from underground storage reservoirs. As 
such, the overall aim of this survey is to compare the risks pairwise and then rank 
them in order of importance and criticality. The scale used within the ranking 
ranges from 1 (used when two element contribute equally to the leakage of carbon 
dioxide) to 9 (used when the evidence favouring one element over another is of the 
highest possible order of affirmation).  
It is expected that the output of this survey will then partially provide the input for 
the AHP and FAHP methods. This will be in the form of different weights for 
different risk elements within the fault tree developed in the study.  
This is done in order to assist the insurance industry and regulators better 
understand the risks associated with carbon dioxide storage underground and 
therefore lower insurance premiums for CCS projects and regulate more effectively 
and in favour of CCS projects respectively. 
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PART 1 
1. Pair-wise comparison of the main criteria: 
Please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability 
and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important and probable than the other 
one.  
Please use the scale below to rank the risks from 1 to 9. 
Intensity of Importance Definition Explanation 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favouring 
one element over another 
is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation 
7 Very strong importance One element is favoured 
very strongly over 
another and its 
dominance demonstrated 
in practice 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment 
strongly favour one 
element over another 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment 
slightly favour one 
element over another 
 
1 Equal importance Two elements contribute 
equally to the objective. 
2, 4, 6 and 8 When compromise is needed Can be used to express 
intermediate values 
Table 132, Saaty's 9 point scale showing fundamental importance scales in AHP 
For example: If criterion A is favoured very strongly over criterion B, 
select A7.Moreover, if criterion B is slightly favoured over criterion A, select B3. 
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 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Percolation of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Percolation of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Percolation of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
or B: Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Migration of CO2 along fracture or permeable zone 
or B: Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well 
or B: Leakage of CO2 through other wells 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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2. Percolation of CO2 through the caprock:  
 
With regards to the “percolation of CO2 through the caprock”, please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important 
and probable than the other one. 
 
It should be noted that, the experts were asked to use the same scale for the pairwise comparisons as before 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Migration of CO2 through the caprock or B: 
Diffusion 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
3. Please give reasons for the risks you regard as most significant. 
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4. Migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone: 
With regards to the “migration of CO2 along a fracture or permeable zone” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a 
scale of 1 to 9. Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely 
more important and probable than the other one. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Fracturation of the caprock or B: Non-permeable fault 
that becomes permeable 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Fracturation of the caprock or B: Pre-existing fracture 
of the rock 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Non-permeable fault that becomes permeable or B: Pre-
existing fracture of the rock 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. Please give reasons for the risks you regard as most significant. 
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6. Leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well: 
With regards to the “leakage of CO2 through or along the injection well” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale 
of 1 to 9. Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more 
important and probable than the other one. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Vertical migration through fractures in cement or B: Vertical migration at 
cement/casing interface 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration through fractures in cement or B: Vertical migration at 
cement/rock interface 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration through fractures in cement or B: Vertical migration through 
EDZ 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration through fractures in cement or B: Migration through cement 
matrix (cement wall) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration at cement/casing interface or B: Vertical migration at 
cement/rock interface 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Vertical migration at cement/casing interface or B: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration at cement/casing interface or B: Migration through cement 
matrix (cement wall) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration at cement/rock interface or B: Vertical migration through EDZ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration at cement/rock interface or B: Migration through cement matrix 
(cement wall) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Vertical migration through EDZ or B: Migration through cement matrix (cement 
wall) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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7. Please comment on your selections. 
 
 
8. Leakage of CO2 through other wells: 
With regards to the “leakage of CO2 through other wells” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important 
and probable than the other one. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Leakage of CO2 through a monitoring well or B: 
Leakage of CO2 through an exterior well 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
9. Please comment on your selections. 
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PART 2 
10. Migration through the caprock (Darcy flow): 
With regards to the “Migration through the caprock (Darcy flow)” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 
to 9. Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more 
important and probable than the other one. 
 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Overpressure superior to capillary pressure within 
the caprock or B: Sufficient permeability 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
11. Please comment on your selections. 
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12. Fracturation of the caprock: 
With regards to the “Fracturation of the caprock” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. Select 1 
when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important and 
probable than the other one. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Overpressure of the reservoir or B: Chemical 
alteration by CO2 within the caprock or along a fault 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Overpressure of the reservoir or B: Seismic event ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Overpressure of the reservoir or B: Pre-existing 
non-permeable fault or fracture 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Chemical alteration by CO2 within the caprock or 
along a fault B: Seismic event 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Chemical alteration by CO2 within the caprock or 
along a fault B: Pre-existing non-permeable fault or 
fracture 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Seismic event B: Pre-existing non-permeable fault 
or fracture 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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13. Please comment on your selections. 
 
 
14. Pre-existing fracture of the caprock: 
With regards to the “pre-existing fracture of the caprock” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important 
and probable than the other one. 
 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Pre-existing fault due to human exploitation 
(depleted oil field only) or B: Permeable fault not 
detected at the conception stage 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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15. Please comment on your selections. 
 
 
16. Degradation of cement due to injection: 
The fault tree developed as part of this study indicates that “Vertical migration of CO2 through the fractures in the cement” occurs as a 
result of the presence of fractures (or channels) in the cement caused by the degradation of cement due to CO2 injection. 
Therefore, with regards to the “degradation of cement due to CO2 injection”, please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a 
scale of 1 to 9. Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely 
more important and probable than the other one. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Mechanical stresses or B: Thermal stresses ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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17. Please comment on your selections. 
 
 
18. Migration of CO2 through cement matrix (cement wall): 
The fault tree developed as part of this study indicates that “migration of CO2 through cement matrix (cement wall)” occurs as a result of 
the presence of fractures (or channels) in the cement caused by the degradation of cement due to CO2 injection. 
Therefore, with regards to the “degradation of cement due to CO2 injection”, please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a 
scale of 1 to 9. Select 1 when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely 
more important and probable than the other one. 
 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Initial bad quality of cement (design or setting) or 
B: Degradation of cement with time 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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19. Please comment on your selections. 
 
 
20. Degradation of cement with time: 
With regards to the “degradation of cement with time” please compare criteria A with criteria B in each row on a scale of 1 to 9. Select 1 
when two criteria are equally important and have the equal probability and 9 when one criterion is extremely more important and 
probable than the other one. 
 B9 B8 B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
A: Normal aging or B: Degradation with brine (lixiviation) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Normal aging or B: Degradation by brine containing dissolved CO2 (and possibly 
other substances) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Normal aging or B: Degradation by CO2 supercritical (including impurities) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Degradation with brine (lixiviation) or B: Degradation by brine containing dissolved 
CO2 (and possibly other substances) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Degradation with brine (lixiviation) or B: Degradation by CO2 supercritical 
(including impurities) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A: Degradation by brine containing dissolved CO2 (and possibly other substances) or B: 
Degradation by CO2 supercritical (including impurities) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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21. Please comment on your selections. 
 
 
22. Please provide some information about yourself. 
 
Full Name  
Institution/Company  
Position within Institution/Company  
Email Address  
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10.3 Appendix III 
10.3.1 Experts that were contacted 
Table 133 shows a list of experts that were invited to take part in the survey of this research. 
The table further shows the sector that each expert belonged to, their speciality and reasons 
behind why they were selected along with the country that their institution was located in. 
Name of 
Organisation
11
 
Sector 
(Academic / 
Industry) 
Speciality / Justification Country 
Imperial College 
London – Qatar 
Carbonate Capture and 
Storage Research 
Centre (QCCSRC) 
Academic 
QCCSRC 
investigates key 
challenges in the 
exploitation of carbonate 
reservoirs by combining 
the expertise, local 
knowledge, resources 
and the research 
strengths of Shell, Qatar 
Petroleum, Qatar Science 
and Technology Park 
(QSTP) and Imperial 
College London’s 
Energy Futures Lab 
respectively. 
UK 
Imperial College 
London – Department 
of Earth Sciences and 
Engineering (ESE) 
Academic 
Combining 
experimentation, 
imaging and modelling 
to study multiphase flow 
and reactive transport in 
porous media with 
applications to 
CO2 storage. 
UK 
University of 
Edinburgh 
Academic 
Analysing the natural 
CO2 reservoirs with 
respect to the long-term 
behaviour of CO2 in the 
subsurface. 
UK 
                                                 
11
 The views of the experts that were contacted within the companies and academic institutions listed in table 
133 do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective companies as whole. 
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University of Leeds 
Energy and Resource 
Research Institute 
Academic 
CCS for large scale 
power generation 
systems, reducing 
emissions from road and 
aviation transport, 
emissions from the use 
of renewable and future 
fuels (University of 
Leeds, n.d.). 
UK 
Department of Mines & 
Petroleum with industry 
partners 
Industry 
Working on the South 
West CO2 
Geosequestration Hub in 
South West Australia 
capturing, transporting 
and storing CO2 in 
onshore deep saline 
formations. 
Australia 
Heriot Watt University Academic 
Analysing the risks of 
leakage of carbon 
dioxide in the north Sea 
and surrounding waters. 
UK 
Carbon Capture and 
Storage Association 
(CCSA) 
Industry 
CCSA brings together 
specialist companies in 
manufacturing & 
processing, power 
generation, engineering 
& contracting, oil & gas 
and minerals as well as a 
wide range of support 
services to the energy 
sector such as law, 
finance, consultancy and 
project management 
(Carbon Capture and 
Storage Association 
(CCSA), n.d.). 
UK 
Scottish Carbon 
Capture and Storage 
(SCCS) 
Academic 
SCCS is the largest 
carbon capture and 
storage research group in 
the UK. With 
internationally renowned 
researchers and state-of-
the-art facilities (Scottish 
Carbon Capture & 
Storage (SCCS), n.d.). 
UK 
Error! Hyperlink Academic Risk assessment, focused Australia 
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reference not valid. on assessment of CO2 
storage risks, particularly 
in identifying and 
characterising storage 
sites of suitable quality 
with adequate prospects 
for long-term reservoir 
performance and 
containment(Cooperative 
Research Centre for 
Greenhouse Gas 
Technologies 
(CO2CRC)). 
British Geological 
Survey (BGS) 
Industry 
One of the leading 
institutions researching 
on the ways in which 
carbon dioxide can be 
stored underground. 
UK 
Ostfold Research Co. Industry 
Life cycle assessment of 
CO2 capture and storage 
Norway 
Nottingham Centre for 
Carbon Capture and 
Storage (NCCCS) 
Academic 
Fully integrated research 
centre bringing together 
the expertise of the 
British Geological 
Survey and the 
University of 
Nottingham. NCCCS 
addresses and 
acknowledges the need 
for cross disciplinary 
research by bringing 
together experts which is 
roughly double the size 
of any comparable 
institution in UK 
(Nottingham Centre for 
CCS (NCCCS), n.d.). 
UK 
CCS TLM Industry 
Practical experience of 
developing industrial 
scale integrated CCS 
projects having 
previously played 
leading roles in the 
development of projects 
advanced by both BP and 
Hydrogen Energy 
(CCSTLM, n.d.). 
UK 
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CO2 Deep Store Ltd. Industry 
The company co-invests 
alongside partners and 
provides the 
development capability 
to enable the capture, 
transport or storage of 
CO2 for major industrial 
emitters (power stations, 
cement works, iron / 
steel / aluminium plants 
and similar large 
emitters) 
(CO2DeepStore, n.d.). 
UK 
Rhead Group Industry 
Knowledge of the oil and 
gas sectors, and of the 
development of on and 
offshore pipeline 
networks including 
compression facilities 
such as those used to 
capture, transport and 
store CO2 underground  
(Rhead Group, n.d.). 
UK 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology’s 
Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration 
Technologies Program 
(MIT CCS&ST) 
Academic 
MIT CCS&ST has been 
conducting research into 
technologies to capture, 
utilise and store CO2 
from large stationary 
sources since initiated in 
1989 (MIT CCS&ST, 
n.d.). 
USA 
Schlumberger Carbon 
Services 
Industry 
Experts in providing 
technologies and services 
for the long-term 
geological storage of 
carbon dioxide as a result 
of participating in many 
CCS projects worldwide 
backed up by a corporate 
history of over 80 years 
in the oil and gas 
industry (Schlumberger, 
n.d.). 
UK 
Senergy Industry 
CO2 storage consultancy 
with expertise ranging 
from basin screening, 
site selection and 
UK 
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development through to 
storage site operation 
and storage monitoring, 
measurement and 
verification (Senergy, 
n.d.). 
UK Carbon Capture and 
Storage Research 
Centre (UKCCSRS) 
Academic / 
Industry 
UKCCSRC is a research 
centre that aims to 
provide a national focal 
point for CCS research 
and development in 
order to bring together 
the user community and 
academics to analyse 
problems, devise and 
carry out research and 
share delivery, thus 
maximising impact (UK 
Carbon Capture and 
Storage Research Centre 
(UKCCSRC), n.d.). 
UK 
GDF Suez Industry 
The Group has been 
participating with other 
organisations in the 
“France Nord” pilot CCS 
project on transport and 
storage of carbon dioxide 
in saline aquifers since 
2010 (Carbon Capture & 
Storage Association 
(CCSA), n.d.-a). 
France 
University of 
Strathclyde 
Academic 
Structural and 
permeability architecture 
of faults. 
UK 
University of Sheffield Academic 
Develops fundamental 
understanding and 
quantitative description 
of CO2 migration in 
porous media at extreme 
conditions relevant to 
saline aquifers 
encountered in carbon 
sequestration (University 
of Sheffield, n.d.). 
UK 
Maersk Oil Industry 
Maersk Oil is active in 
innovative oil and gas 
extraction methods by 
Denmark 
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combining EOR 
techniques with CCS 
projects (Maersk Oil, 
n.d.). 
Japan CCS Co., Ltd. 
(JCCS) 
Industry 
JCCS conducts 
investigations and 
studies into CCS projects 
in Japan as well as acting 
as body that brings 
together major 
companies with expertise 
in CCS-related fields 
such as electric power, 
petroleum and oil 
development (Japan CCS 
Co., n.d.). 
Japan 
British Petroleum (BP) Industry 
BP captures and stores 
up to one million tonnes 
of CO2 a year at its In 
Salah demonstration 
plant in Algeria. 
UK 
Gulf Coast Carbon 
Centre (GCCC) 
Academic 
GCCC conducts 
extensive studies on 
geological sequestration 
of CO2 in the deep 
subsurface, focussing on 
the Gulf Coast (Bureau 
of Economic Geology, 
n.d.). 
USA 
Table 133, List of expert participants 
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10.4 Appendix IV 
10.4.1 Calculation steps of the Fuzzy AHP method 
The way in which the FAHP technique was used in this research has been shown in this section. Furthermore, this method was modelled using 
Excel. 
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